This appendix probes key sources that Andrew Moravcsik uses in the *Choice for Europe* to advance a liberal intergovernmentalist theory of European integration.¹ The core claims of CfE are that the institutional structure of the European Union is determined by intergovernmental bargaining, that governments are motivated chiefly by economics not geopolitics, and that governments do so in response to the demands of producer groups. By arguing that international negotiation is the key to explaining European treaties and by placing international negotiation in the context of domestic interest aggregation, the book gave legitimacy to a field—diplomacy—that appeared out of touch with contemporary political science. The book argues against the dominant view that diplomacy was oriented to power politics. Moravcsik (AM) argues that negotiations are undertaken by ‘national leaders who consistently pursued economic interests—primarily the commercial interests of powerful economic producers and secondarily the macroeconomic preferences of ruling governmental coalitions’ (CfE: 3).

1. Quality of evidence

The evidence presented in CfE takes the form of an extended narrative that encompasses the bulk of the book. Its purpose is to probe the motivations of French, German, and British leaders

1 We wish to thank James Depolo for his research assistance and Bryson Alexander for (co-)authoring profiles 2-10.
in successive EU negotiations to show that their chief concerns were economic rather than geopolitical. Economic and geopolitical reasons are often tightly interconnected, and so one must probe motivations with a fine comb to claim that one has primacy over the other.

The challenge for narrative is to convince the reader that it is free of bias. Science in its broadest sense as disconfirmable knowledge rests on its method not its findings. Systematic case study and quantitative analysis are predominant in the social sciences precisely because they are designed to allow observation to check theory. Both methods make the procedure of observation transparent so that observations can be assessed independently of one’s priors. In the words of Richard Feynman (1985: 343) you ‘must not fool yourself, and you are the easiest person to fool’.

The potential pitfalls of narrative have led historians to place great weight on the accurate use of sources. Some would argue that if the method of observation is not transparent, the result cannot be regarded as science. The fallback position, and one that we accept, is that in the absence of explicit methods for collecting data, academic standards of honesty and detachment are absolutely vital. To what extent has an author accurately cited material? Does the author interpret the sources plausibly or does he manipulate them in line with his theory? Does the author admit evidence that is inconsistent with his priors or does he cherry-pick evidence in line with his theory?

Six years after CfE was published, it was subject to a thorough and detached investigation by a team led by Robert Lieshout, former president of the Dutch Political Science Association. In 2003, Lieshout had published a piece in which he refers to Moravcsik’s book as ‘convincing,’ but his subsequent investigation of the sections of the book dealing with de Gaulle and French policy finds a pattern of systematic bias. Of the 221 references on which AM builds his case, Lieshout et al. (2004) reveal that 127 are inaccurate. Many references deal with a ‘totally different subject – for example, a different set of negotiations … or a different topic’ (95). Where references are on topic, they refer to statements that ‘have been taken out of context, or are inaccurate with respect to content’ (96). Lieshout et al. conclude that CfE is irremediably biased in its treatment of each of the four episodes where it claims that agricultural interests, not geopolitics, were decisive for de Gaulle’s European policies.

A comprehensive study of key sources that AM uses in this online appendix reveals a sustained pattern of bias in interpretation and bias of omission. The sources are chiefly secondary works that describe de Gaulle’s motivations as centered on the effort to reconstitute France after its humiliating defeat and occupation. De Gaulle (1971: 163) begins the chapter ‘Europe’ in his memoirs with two powerful sentences that are the irreducible core of his life’s experience: ‘War gives birth and brings death to nations. In the meantime, it never ceases to loom over their existence’. This is the essence of a geopolitical conception of international relations, and as de Gaulle explains at length, it is the foundation of his conception of France’s role in Europe. One might ask how it could be otherwise. De Gaulle’s life was inextricably tied to two world wars in which France had been crushed. Grandeur—the desire for power, national pride, and recognition—is central to his geopolitical strategy not just because it enhanced France’s standing in the world but because, in de Gaulle’s words (166) ‘this was essential for France’s ‘political stability and the social progress without which [France] would … be doomed
to disorder and decline’. In his memoirs de Gaulle emphasizes that he is implacably opposed to supranationalism which would allow ‘foreigners ... the authority to decide the fate of the French people’. The French ‘were determined to preserve their own identity, all the more so because they had nearly lost it and because others everywhere were ardently affirming theirs...’ (170). In de Gaulle’s account these principles have underpinned France’s European policy. ‘In practice this led [my government] to put the European Economic Community into effect; to encourage the Six to concert together regularly in political matters; to prevent ... Great Britain, from dragging the West into an Atlantic system which would be totally incompatible with a European Europe’. De Gaulle’s geopolitical convictions shaped his approach to ‘the all-important question of Germany’s future’. It was ‘essential that [Germany] should form an integral part of the organized system of co-operation between States ... envisaged for the whole continent’ (171-3).

How is one to understand AM’s insistence that on issues of policy related to Europe, de Gaulle ‘never mentions geopolitical or ideational issues’. AM argues that, in any case, de Gaulle’s geopolitical ideology was a ‘deliberate deception’ designed to mislead foreign and domestic critics (CfE: 177). De Gaulle and his advisors ‘deliberately manipulated public perceptions in order, in the words of de Gaulle’s closest associate, to “seduce” observers into believing that geopolitical factors were decisive’ (CfE: 84). The smokescreen worked so well that even 35 years later most analysts ‘remain in the thrall of the General’s seduction’ (CfE: 84).

Lieshout and his colleagues (2004) catalogue a series of errors, false claims, and overt biases in the evidence AM marshalls for this interpretation. The evidence rests on a single document, a memorandum by Alain Peyrefitte, which AM cites from a secondary source. AM describes Peyrefitte’s role in exaggerated terms as de Gaulle’s ‘closest associate’ (CfE: 84), his ‘chief strategist on Europe’ (CfE: 186), and ignores contrary evidence, including Peyrefitte’s own account, to sustain his view that de Gaulle’s geopolitics was a screen for commercial interest. In his memoirs, Peyrefitte recounts that de Gaulle summoned him to strategize how France could protect its national sovereignty under the EEC and Euratom treaties. De Gaulle was concerned that the framers were intent on federalism, and ‘That, we don’t want. ... Supranationality is absurd. Nothing exists above the nations, except for what their States decide together!’ (Peyrefitte 1994, Vol. I: 67).²

References


² Lieshout and his colleagues published their article in 2004. To this date there has been no response from AM. The article can be downloaded here: http://www.robertthomson.info/wp-content/uploads/2010/11/Lieshout_onMoravcik_JCWS04.pdf


Given that de Gaulle’s motivations are so crucial as evidence for LI, de Gaulle’s autobiography is a sensible place to begin. AM refers to the book several times, but rarely accurately and always to select passages that support his interpretation.

It is worth reading de Gaulle at some length on how he approached France’s relations to Britain, Germany, and Europe. De Gaulle sets out his views in a chapter entitled “Europe.” He begins, “War gives birth and brings death to nations. In the meantime, it never ceases to loom over their existence” (163). This is the essence of a geopolitical conception of international relations, and, as de Gaulle expounds at length, it is the foundation of his conception of France’s role in Europe. One might ask: How could it be otherwise? De Gaulle’s existence was inextricably tied to two world wars in which France had been crushed. Commerce in agriculture was a secondary concern that existed in the shadow of geopolitics.

De Gaulle concludes the paragraph by asking the question that underpins his strategic vision: “Now, in the aftermath of the last conflict in which she had all but perished, on what premises was France to base her progress and her actions” (163)? De Gaulle proceeds to outline the geopolitical position of France in relation to its neighbors, its former colonies, the two great powers, all of which sustains his conviction that “the political stability and the social progress without which she [France] would unquestionably be doomed to disorder and decline demanded that she should once again feel herself invested with world responsibility. Such was my philosophy” (166).

Now, de Gaulle turns to the implications of his philosophy. He recalls his defense of France and its sovereignty in World War II, and expresses surprise that “After so many lessons, it might have been thought that once the war was over, those who claimed to lead public opinion would be less inclined towards subordination” (169). This leads de Gaulle to attack “the doctrine of ‘supra-nationalism’, in other words France’s submission to a law that was not her own. Hence the support for ‘Europe’ seen as an edifice in which technocrats forming an ‘executive’ and parliamentarians assuming legislative powers—the great majority of both being foreigners—would have the authority to decide the fate of the French people” (169). De Gaulle leaves no doubt that this is of prime importance, both in the construction of his European policy and for the French people at large: “Emotionally, I would have the backing of the French people, who, without being in the least inclined to arrogance, were determined to preserve their own identity, all the more so because they had nearly lost it and because others everywhere were ardently affirming theirs, whether in terms of sovereignty, language, culture, production or even sport. Whenever I expressed myself in public on these matters I felt a quiver of response” (170).

The inference is that de Gaulle would defend the national veto as a matter of principle beyond any economic policy effects it might have. Before leaving the topic, de Gaulle reinforces
the argument with a subtle claim: “arbitrary centralization always provoked an upsurge of violent nationalism by way of reaction” (171). So far, no mention of agriculture or commercial interest, but now de Gaulle turns to the European Economic Community. It is worth reading this at length. He begins,

“My policy therefore aimed at the setting up of a concert of European States which in developing all sorts of ties between them would increase their interdependence and solidarity. From this starting-point, there was every reason to believe that the process of evolution might lead to their confederation, especially if they were one day threatened by the same source.

In practice this led us to put the European Economic Community into effect; to encourage the Six to concert together regularly in political matters; to prevent certain others, in particular Great Britain, from dragging the West into an Atlantic system which would be totally incompatible with a European Europe, and indeed to persuade these centrifugal elements to integration themselves with the Continent by changing their outlook, their habits and their customers; and finally to set an example of détente followed by understanding and co-operation with the countries of the Eastern bloc, in the belief that beyond all the prejudices and preconceptions of ideology and propaganda, it was peace and progress that answered the needs and desires of the inhabitants of both halves of an accidentally divided Europe.

At the heart of the problem and at the center of the continent lay Germany. It was her destiny to be the keystone of any European edifice, and yet her misdeeds had contributed more than anything else to tearing the Old World apart. ... How could the age-old threat of ruin and death be finally dispelled on either side of the Rhine as long as the old enmity remained?

On the all-important question of Germany’s future, my mind was made up. First of all, I believed that it would be unjust and dangerous to revise the de facto frontiers which the war had imposed on her. ... I considered it essential that she should form an integral part of the organized system of co-operation between States which I envisaged for the whole continent. In this way the security of all nations between the Atlantic and the Urals would be guaranteed, and a change brought about in circumstances, attitudes and relationships which would doubtless ultimately permit the reunion of the three segments of the German people. In the meantime, the Federal Republic would have an essential role to play within the Economic Community and, should it ever materialize, in the political concert of the Six. Finally, I intended that France should weave a network of preferential ties with Germany, which would gradually lead the two peoples toward the mutual understanding and appreciation... (171-3).

De Gaulle then relates in some detail his meeting with Chancellor Konrad Adenauer in 1958. De Gaulle admits, “I had, indeed, before the end of hostilities, intended that such precautions [HM: against German resurgence] should be physical and territorial. But in view of
the momentous events which had occurred since then … I felt that we should try to reverse the
course of history by reconciling our two peoples…” (175).

De Gaulle and Adenauer then get down to business. “This said, Adenauer and I
proceeded to consider how to put our aims into practice. … According to the Chancellor, there
were three things which humiliated and handicapped Germany ventured to ask of France: first,
to help her to recover the respect and trust of other nations which would restore her
international position; secondly, to contribute towards her security vis-à-vis the Soviet camp,
especially with regard to the threat that overshadowed Berlin; and thirdly, to recognize her
right to reunification. I pointed out to Chancellor that, in response to so many requests … to
justify her (French) support, she would insist that certain conditions be fulfilled on the German
side. These were: acceptance of existing frontiers, an attitude of goodwill in relations with the
East, complete renunciation of atomic armaments, and unremitting patience as regards
unification” (175-6). Here, de Gaulle again takes a subtle stab at supra-nationalism and
reiterates his goals for Europe. He recalls, “I told Adenauer that from a strictly national point of
view, France, unlike Germany, had no real need of an organization of Western Europe, since the
war had damaged neither her reputation nor her territorial integrity. Nevertheless, she was in
favor of a practical and, if possible, political rapprochement of all European States because her
aim was general peace and progress” (177: emphasis added).

The two leaders then discuss their positions on the EEC. De Gaulle states, “Difficulties
would arise for the European Economic Community from the problem of agriculture, a solution
to which would be essential for France, and Britain’s application for membership, which France
felt must be turned down as long as Britain remained economically and politically what she
was” (178). In fairness to AM, this quotation does suggest that commercial agricultural
interests were of great importance for de Gaulle, however, for de Gaulle the problem of
agriculture was inextricably linked to the most pressing geopolitical questions, namely what
form a united Europe should take and the question of British membership. Therefore, it is
unreasonable to say that agriculture was the General’s primary concern. It is more accurate to
say that commerce in agriculture was an important issue for de Gaulle, but not one for which
he would France’s national sovereignty nor one for which he would let Britain Atlantacize his
vision of a European Europe.

The General then discusses his plans to withdraw from NATO and characterizes it as an
“international mission” to restore the vision of France as the “mastodon of Europe,” and he
warns that any threat to that mission would represent a “grave danger to us [France] and a
serious threat to others” (179). This quotation is quite telling. De Gaulle’s chief concern was to
re-establish French prominence in the global arena, an entirely geopolitical motivation.

As regards the nature of the Franco-German relationship, de Gaulle states: “it was my
intention that the relationship between the two nations, so long at enmity, should be solemnly
consecrated” (180). For de Gaulle, a Franco-German axis in Europe was a necessary
precondition for any lasting peace. However, de Gaulle is firm, and at times vitriolic, in his
denunciation a supra-national Europe. He emphasizes that,
It had to be acknowledged that the so-called executives installed at the head of common institutions by virtue of the delusions of integration which had prevailed before my return, were helpless when it came to making and enforcing decisions, that only governments were in a position to do this, and then only as a result of negotiations carried out in due form between ministers or ambassadors (181: emphasis added).

De Gaulle continues,

Once initiated, the Common Market was to give rise to a vast outgrowth of not only technical but also diplomatic activity. For, irrespective of its very wide economic scope, the operation proved to be hedged about with specifically political intentions calculated to prevent our country from being its own master. Hence, while the community was taking shape, I was obliged on several occasions to intervene in order to repel the threats which overshadowed our cause (183: emphasis added).

De Gaulle’s memoirs leave little room for interpretation. He makes it plain that, under his leadership, France’s national sovereignty would never be subverted or subsumed by a supranational body, and he was wary of perceived attempts to curtail French agency.

Next, de Gaulle discusses agriculture within the Common Market more directly noting,

[Members of the Community] were in no hurry to see the Six take upon themselves the consumption and, therefore, the cost, of continental farm products, nearly half of which happened to be French. For instance, Germany nearly two-thirds of whose food was imported cheaply from outside the Community in exchange for manufactured goods, would have liked to see a Common Market for industrial goods only, in which case the Federal Republic would have had an overwhelming advantage. This was unacceptable to France. We therefore had to put up a fight in Brussels (185).

While this passage may seem to corroborate AM’s position of the primacy of agriculture in de Gaulle’s policy, the General was more concerned with what he perceived as Germany’s attempt to “acquire the preponderant influence which its economic strength would no doubt earn it,” a goal which he attributed to Commissioner Hallstein in particular (184). Thus, de Gaulle’s dogged pursuit of the CAP was as much an attempt to ensure France’s political position in Europe as much as it was to strengthen French commerce. De Gaulle even states outright that he and his ministers made “quite clear that [France] was prepared to withdraw from the Community if [their] requirements were not met” (186-187). This strategy posed the very real risk of denying France the CAP and access to the Common market, further emphasizing the importance of geopolitical aims over commercial interests.

De Gaulle goes on to describe a meeting between himself and Harold Macmillan in which the latter decried the CAP and Common Market as the start of a “war which will doubtless be economic at first but which runs the risk of gradually spreading to other fields”
Macmillan’s concerns reinforce the idea that the CAP and geopolitics were inextricable and suggest that, in fact, de Gaulle wielded the CAP as a geopolitical tool to dissuade Britain from joining the Common Market.

Later, in discussing Britain’s failed bid to join the Common Market, the General declares,

It was now clear to all involved that in order to achieve the unification of Europe, *individual states are the only valid elements*, that when their *national interest* is at stake nothing and nobody must be allowed to force their hands...In this respect what is true of economics is even truer of politics. *What depths of illusion or prejudice would have to be plumbed in order to believe that European nations... could cease to be themselves and form a single entity?* ... On the other hand...there was no reason why they should not organize concerted action in every sphere...set up permanent organs to discuss politics, economics, culture and defense, ... and as far as possible adopt a united front towards them...*And perhaps in this way, by opposing war, which is the history of men, that united Europe which is the dream of the wise might ultimately be achieved* (189-91).

Here again, de Gaulle’s insistence on the importance maintaining individual states as a means to oppose war and his unreserved attack on supra-national institutions bely AM’s argument that it was principally agriculture which drove the General’s policy. Above all else, de Gaulle concerned himself with war, or its avoidance, and the preservation of national sovereignty, embodied in the national veto.

Next, De Gaulle recalls his speech of September 5, 1960 in which he declared his aim to “unite Europe” using the national states as the pillars on which the union would be built. For in de Gaulle’s eyes “states are the only entities with the right to give orders and the power to be obeyed” (194-195). This vision gave rise to the Fouchet Plan, which de Gaulle viewed as the path towards a European Europe, free from the influence of the Atlantic powers. De Gaulle is quite adamant that “If the Western half of the Old World remained subordinate to the New, Europe would never be European, nor would she ever be able to bring her two halves together (196).

In de Gaulle’s memoirs, commerce in agriculture is hardly mentioned when compared to the General’s insistence upon his geopolitical aims i.e. his concern with war in Europe, the form of a European Union, and the return of France as a global power. Under what circumstances could de Gaulle have written “Commerce in agriculture gives birth and brings death to France”? It is absurd to believe that de Gaulle’s strategy to Europe and the EEC was shaped chiefly by commercial considerations. Commercial considerations could only be important in a larger strategic vision that was shaped by war and peace, political relations among countries in their widest sense, and national identity. De Gaulle perceived agriculture’s importance chiefly as it pertained to France’s position in Europe. Otherwise, he was completely absorbed with the return of French grandeur and the protection, whatever the costs, of France’s national sovereignty and national identity, which were so nearly lost and so dearly won.
Lieshout et al. review the following citations

41 de Gaulle [SP]: reference 182ff. is not correct; de Gaulle indeed criticizes the ambivalence of the Community, yet none of the quotations used by Moravcsik appears on these pages.

44 de Gaulle [SP]: reference Mémoires, (read Memoirs of Hope), reference 158–159, is not correct; de Gaulle does not refer to a deal between French agriculture and German industry or to British entry into the Common Market.

45 de Gaulle [SP]: reference 217–220 is not correct; de Gaulle does not discuss the loss of the “rural vote”; he discusses the British membership application.

50 de Gaulle [SP]: reference 131ff. is not correct; de Gaulle does not confirm the “primacy of economic interests” but defends himself against the charge that he has been indifferent to economic and social matters.

50 de Gaulle [SP]: reference 159 is not correct; de Gaulle discusses the potential importance of the Common Market for French agriculture, but he does not refer to agriculture as the major problem facing France.

50 de Gaulle [SP]: reference 178 is not correct; de Gaulle invites Konrad Adenauer to support the French position with respect to agriculture and British membership in the EEC.

50 de Gaulle [SP]: reference 182–83 is not correct; no mention of cabinet meetings on EC issues; instead de Gaulle says that in the Rome Treaty industrial provisions were as precise “as those concerning agriculture were vague.”

52 de Gaulle [SP]: reference 171 is not correct; de Gaulle does not discuss agriculture; he says that France can “survive only in the 1st rank of nations” and that this is what he aims for in the arena of Europe; he also says that a united Europe should lead not to a fusion of its peoples but to a concert of European States, which might evolve into a confederation.

52 de Gaulle [SP]: reference 173 is not correct; de Gaulle does not discuss agriculture; instead, he refers to Germany’s future role in Europe and the complimentary nature of the Gauls and the Teutons.

52 de Gaulle [SP]: reference 174–180 is not correct; de Gaulle reports on his 1st meeting with Adenauer at Colombey-les-deux-Églises, during which they discussed Franco-German cooperation, NATO, and Berlin.

58 de Gaulle [SP]: reference 182 is not correct; de Gaulle threatens to “liquidate the Common Market” if his agricultural demands are not met but does not mention any reconsideration of French political-military policy.

58 de Gaulle [SP]: reference 188 is not correct; de Gaulle merely discusses his attitude toward the British FTA proposals of 1958.

76 de Gaulle [SP]: reference 218–220 is not correct; de Gaulle not only discusses economic obstacles to British entry but also mentions geopolitical considerations.
3. Jean Lacouture, *De Gaulle the Ruler*

Jean Lacouture’s *De Gaulle the Ruler* is an important source AM uses to substantiate his claim about the importance of commercial/agricultural interests to European integration. AM cites Lacouture’s *The Ruler* four times, and Lieshout et al. identify one citation as incorrect. However, even the citations which are “correct” are taken out of context of the rest of the book and misrepresent Lacouture’s argument.

AM quotes from chapters seventeen “Greatness in Perspective” and twenty-seven, “The Shores of Europe.” He ignores such chapters as “As God Made Me,” “The State,” and “The National Territory,” the first three chapters of Lacouture’s book which describe de Gaulle’s actions in 1944, after he assumes control of a struggling divided France. These chapters emphasize the importance of the state and geopolitical events to the General’s policy. A mere four pages into *The Ruler* Lacouture

“sums up what was then [de Gaulle’s] entire political strategy, a strategy to which, over the next quarter of a century, he hardly added anything: disordered acts can only be the work of people who can never realize their aims, or the work of evil-minded intriguers. Any disagreement with him can only be an affront to national unity. De Gaulle’s insistence on legitimacy based on the principle of unanimity is both contradicted and consoled, in any case complemented by a constant dramatization: the man of the nation is perpetually at odds with the demons of division…So the first government of the new era would be one of ‘national unanimity’ (4-5).”

In “The State” Lacouture recounts how in 1944 de Gaulle and his government had to assume roles as the “rebuilders of the state,” reorganize the French government, contend with “patriotic militias,” and more while “over two million French people were still being held in Germany… and...war was still being fought in seven departments (22-25).”

The first three chapters of *The Ruler* describe the formative events of the Fourth Republic and of de Gaulle’s political philosophy. France’s internal and international security and its position on the world stage were central to de Gaulle while he was helping rebuild France and, as later chapters argue, these concerns retained their primacy for de Gaulle until the end of his time as leader.

The first sentence of “Greatness in Perspective,” a chapter from which AM cites, contradicts AM’s argument that de Gaulle’s chief concerns were commercial, particularly agricultural interests. Lacouture writes,

“The philosophy inspiring Charles de Gaulle’s diplomatic words and actions is simple and strong: all human activity is ordered round the nation, which is in turn shaped by history and geography, armed by the state, held together by common interests, animated by culture and led by a hero. (211)."
Lacouture continues,

“[De Gaulle’s] foreign policy was merely a long march in which France would be dragged back to the position it once could claim in the pantheon of nations (211).”

AM quotes from “Greatness in Perspective” to evidence the claim that the French supported the EC for principally economic reasons. However, as Lieshout et al. note, Lacouture does not discuss the EC in the cited section.

In the section AM quotes, Lacouture does discuss a June 1958 memorandum which referred to the Common Market in terms of its “economic efficiency” for Paris, but only as secondary to geopolitical concerns (212). According to Lacouture, the meeting between de Gaulle and Paul-Henri Spaak which produced the memorandum was prompted by the General’s desire to rescind France’s March 1958 agreement with Germany and Italy to “exchange information with regard to nuclear research” to preserve relations with Moscow (212).

When discussing the common market, Lacouture writes that de Gaulle “would accept only an organization with a common external trade agreement and agricultural policy (213).” However, Lacouture mentions that these demands resulted from “a campaign launched by London against the Community” and a June 29, 1958 meeting de Gaulle had with Harold Macmillan in which the latter begged de Gaulle not to proceed with the common market for the sake of avoiding “a war which will doubtless be economic at first but which runs the risk of gradually spreading into other fields (213).”

Further, Lacouture’s reference to the Common Market in “Greatness in Perspective” is tangential. The rest of the chapter focuses on the General’s preoccupation with seeing “the return of France’s ‘day’” and on the major geopolitical events which defined de Gaulle’s presidency (214). If anything, Lacouture’s inclusion of the common external tariff/CAP quote in this section implies that he considers it a defining geopolitical event in de Gaulle’s presidency and not, as AM posits, the result of economic pressures.

Lacouture also mentions that “[De Gaulle] would not give in and would refuse unreservedly to negotiate under the threat of an ultimatum (218).” While this is in reference to pressure from the Kremlin in 1945 to settle the issue of East and West Berlin, it may reasonably be assumed that if de Gaulle was unwilling to change his policies in the face of the Kremlin, it is unlikely that he would bend to French commercial/agricultural interests in the way AM suggests.

Additionally, Lacouture’s work argues against AM’s point that de Gaulle attempted to undermine and destroy European institutions. Lacouture says,

“The British prime minister Harold Macmillan had outlined Britain’s reluctance to accept continental unification which, according to the eternal precepts of British democracy, could only be directed against the United Kingdom. All the efforts of the London government would tend, therefore, if not to destroy that body, at least to try to water it
down in a wider entity that could be supervised by the foreign office, namely the European free trade association. London had hoped that de Gaulle’s long-standing antipathy to the European Community would play in its favor. But the General had only to glimpse such a manoeuvre on the part of the British Foreign Office to rediscover what a good, strong, European he was: and he would be all the more a European because that particular Europe would be animated by ideas coming from Paris (219).”

AM then quotes from “The Shores of Europe” simply to argue against Lacouture. In “The Shores of Europe,” Lacouture includes an anecdote in which the French statesman Paul Reynaud criticized de Gaulle’s decision to veto Britain’s bid to join the EEC. The General responded by sending Reynaud an empty envelope on which the General had written, “If absent, Forward to Agincourt or Waterloo (359).” AM cites this anecdote as the type of poor evidence used to substantiate the claim that de Gaulle was driven by nationalistic and geopolitical motivations during European integration in the 1960s. By using this citation, AM mischaracterizes and omits the remainder of Lacouture’s argument, especially de Gaulle and Adenauer’s goal to build Europe around a Franco-German axis, which was indeed a geopolitical motivation. Of de Gaulle and Adenauer’s relationship Lacouture writes,

“On 29 July 1960, Konrad Adenauer was received by Charles de Gaulle at Rambouillet. Two months earlier, the Chancellor had been received by de Gaulle with a view to clarify their points of view prior to the summit conference that was to bring together the representatives of the USA, the USSR, Great Britain and France two weeks later. The General intended to represent Germany at this conference – he did not say so, but that was the fact of the matter – just as Churchill had spoken for French interests at Yalta (338)”

This quote reveals that, according to Lacouture at least, at the beginning of the 1960s, it was geopolitics that drove Franco-German cooperation, not commercial interests.

On the matter of a Europe built on a Franco-German axis Lacouture quotes de Gaulle who, in 1962, said,

“There is an interdependence between Germany and France. On that interdependence depends the immediate security of the two peoples. One has only to look at the map to see this. On that interdependence depends any hope of uniting Europe in the political field as also on the defence or economic fields. On that interdependence depends, consequently, the destiny of Europe as a whole (340 emphasis added).”

De Gaulle mentions economic concerns as tertiary in the formation of a European Europe. Of utmost interest to the General were the security and political unity of the continent. The General saw the EEC and his vision for a confederation of states as a way to achieve “increased independence for Europe” and to move out of the shadows of the US and USSR (341). Indeed, de Gaulle saw Europe’s future role “as that of an arbiter on the world scale between the two blocs and, in the long term, the means for their dissolution (345).” Lacouture describes de
Gaulle’s vision for Europe as an autonomous “grouping of free peoples” between the East and the West (345). De Gaulle’s “master plan [was] to build a ‘European Europe’ in which the nation states of the old continent would be confederated round a lodestone situated in Paris and manipulated by him, de Gaulle (345).”

In “The Shores of Europe” Lacouture represents the Fouchet Plan in a way that is incompatible with AM’s account of it. Lacouture describes the Fouchet Plan, “which bore the mark of the General himself,” as it is often described, as a “Union of States (347-348).” AM argues that the Fouchet Plan was a diversion meant to dissuade other EEC members from “obstructing CAP negotiations” and that it had the added benefit of making Great Britain “shy away from joining the EEC (Lieshout, 98).” Lacouture notes, however, that the Fouchet Plan was concerned with “diplomacy, defence and culture (excluding economics)” and that the confederate structure for Europe that the Fouchet Plan proposed actually drew the British closer to Europe. Macmillan “declared that he did not regard the Fouchet plan unfavorably (348).”

Further, Lacouture’s work contradicts AM’s position that de Gaulle was driven by economic interests to block the UK’s entrance to the EEC. Lacouture writes that de Gaulle opposed Britain’s attempt to include itself in Europe because he believed that the “history of Europe was a matter of British manoeuvres to divide the continent and that its future could therefore only reproduce this schema, aggravated by London’s collusion with the ‘hegemonic’ United States (350-351).” De Gaulle’s opposition to British membership in the EEC did not stem from a commercial interest to keep Britain’s powerful industries outside the common market but rather from a fear that Britain would Atlanticize the EEC while at the same time putting its relationships with the Commonwealth before Europe (351). Lacouture continues,

“The British government was to make more and more moves in [Europe’s] direction, but de Gaulle was constantly there to face them, alert to any attempt by a Britain ultimately serving the interests of the United States to take over Europe, then sabotage it. He sums up this idea in his Memoires d’espoir. ‘Having failed from without to prevent the birth of the Community, they [the British] now planned to paralyse it from within (353).’”

In his final citation from The Ruler, AM quotes Lacouture to support the claim that the 1962 Nassau negotiations between the US and Great Britain were not causally linked to de Gaulle’s veto of British EEC membership (TCfE, 192). While this is citation is accurate, it leaves out the rest of Lacouture’s discussion of de Gaulle’s veto which describes de Gaulle’s aversion to a “colossal Atlantic community under American dependence and direction” which he feared would arise from Britain’s inclusion in the Common Market (358). While the same quotation from de Gaulle does refer to his concerns about Britain’s “trade, its markets, its food supplies” and its “essentially industrial and commercial” activity, Lacouture’s work does not support the conclusion that de Gaulle’s veto of British membership “further confirms the primacy of economics” in de Gaulle’s decisions about Europe (The Ruler, 358; TCfE, 192, emphasis added).
In short, Lacouture’s *De Gaulle the Ruler* contradicts AM’s argument that de Gaulle was driven by commercial and agricultural interests and argues against many other positions AM takes in TCFE. Indeed, Lacouture’s account of de Gaulle’s time as the leader of France shows him as a reluctant European who was driven to cooperate on a European level by an intense desire to secure France’s place in the pantheon of nations. The citations from *The Ruler* in TCFE are either simply wrong, as defined by Lieshout et al., or they are technically correct, but misrepresent Lacouture’s argument.

**Lieshout et al. review the following citations in *The Ruler***

44 Lacouture [SS]: reference De Gaulle (read De Gaulle: The Ruler), 212, is not correct; Jean Lacouture does not discuss EC affairs; instead, he refers to an agreement with Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia and the decision to suspend the provision of information on nuclear energy to Italy and Germany.

60 Lacouture [SS]: reference is correct

78 Lacouture [SS]: reference must be to De Gaulle: The Ruler, 359, and is correct.

85 Lacouture [SS]: reference (read De Gaulle: The Ruler, 356–358) is correct.

Miriam Camps wrote *European Unification* following her work for the US Department of State during and after the war on European problems and while she was a research fellow at the Royal Institute of International Affairs. The book is an incisive and richly informed account of de Gaulle’s European policies. AM cites Camps seven times in his discussion of French motivations under de Gaulle. Six of these citations are incorrect and one is only partly correct (Liesbhout et al 2004: 126-7; 137-9).

In *European Unification*, Camps analyzes European integration after the French veto of Britain’s EEC membership application. This is relevant for our analysis because the 1963 British veto and the Empty Chair Crisis of 1965-66 are two of AM’s chief points to confirm the “primacy of economic interests” in de Gaulle’s decision-making paradigm (TCfE, 182). Camps’ conclusions, however, do not support AM’s argument that these events were driven by de Gaulle’s desire to secure French commercial interests, and, in fact, Camps’ work refutes many elements of AM’s theory.

Each of AM’s citations is designed to confirm his commercial thesis. AM does not refer to Camps’ central observation that “in a very real sense the crisis that began in 1963 when General de Gaulle brought the negotiations with the British an abrupt halt was simply the first half of the more serious crisis that began with the French boycott of the Community in July 1965. Both times the essential points at issue concerned the type of Europe that was being built, and both times the French leadership of the Continent seemed to be threatened. In 1963 the difference in the conception of Europe related to the external orientation of the Community: in General de Gaulle’s eyes Britain was a Trojan horse which once inside would seek to ensure that the Community maintained an unhealthily close relationship with the United States. And the challenge to French leadership on the Continent came from the United Kingdom (Camps 1966: 3).”

Camps describes that, under de Gaulle, “The process of integration was under attack and independence for France seemed to rank higher in General de Gaulle’s scheme of things than a ‘European Europe (5).’” This quotation emphasizes the high importance of geopolitics in de Gaulle’s strategy. Without European integration, the CAP and other French commercial interests would have been at stake, but this meant little to de Gaulle weighed against losing French national sovereignty and identity.

While the “warning issued by General de Gaulle in July [1963] that the Community would ‘disappear’ if the deadlines for the settlement of the outstanding agricultural issues were not met” would seem to be incontrovertible evidence of the primacy of agricultural/commercial issues, it is less significant because the General gave *the same* warning some time later about geopolitical issues. Camp notes that in July 1964 de Gaulle exclaimed that Bonn and Paris could not agree on “a long list of subjects: defense, relations with Eastern Europe, and the related
questions of frontiers, relations with China, peace in Asia, aid to developing countries, the common agricultural policy, and ‘consequently the future of the community of the Six (14-15).’"

Camps goes on to quote de Gaulle’s warning:

> If this state of things were to last, there would be the risk, in the long run, of doubts among the French people, of misgivings among the German people, and, among their four partners of the Treaty of Rome, an increased tendency to leave things as they are, while waiting, perhaps, to be split up (15).

These quotes show that de Gaulle’s blatantly threatening negotiating tactic was hardly reserved for commercial/agricultural issues, and therefore argues against the theory that agricultural interests were the prime drivers of de Gaulle’s policy.

Further, Camps attributes the 1964 slowdown of negotiations in the community to “continuing basic differences between the French and the others about what kind of Europe they were creating...The fundamental differences between [the French and Germans] over the organization of defense—and, in particular, the nature of the tie with the United States—were becoming increasingly difficult to play down (12).”

Next Camps describes how in June 1964, “General de Gaulle ridiculed again...those who wanted to build a federal Europe and accused them of rejecting, consciously or on unconsciously, an independent ‘European Europe’ in favor of continued subordination to the United States (14).”

Camps goes on, “The French decision in 1965 to seek to loosen the structure of the Community and thus to regain ‘independence’ was, from a Gaullist standpoint, the logical consequence of the French failure to shake the German’s on the defense issue during the summer and autumn of 1964 (16).” Here again, geopolitical issues, like Germany’s commitment to the MLF, not commercial issues were driving French European policy.

Camps begins her second chapter by recalling de Gaulle’s 1964 New Year’s Eve address “which stressed the theme of French independence.” The General emphasized that the French were “becoming [themselves] again in political, economic, monetary and defense affairs...while rejecting all systems which, under the cover of ‘supranationalism’ or of ‘integration,’ or even of ‘atlanticism’” would seek to “keep [France] under the hegemony which comes to mind (29).”

In a subsequent chapter, ‘The Meaning of the Crisis’—referring to the Empty Chair Crisis—Camps states outright that “the crisis was only peripherally about the regulation of financing of agriculture and much more profoundly about the way the Community functioned (81).” This directly contradicts AM’s argument that de Gaulle precipitated the Empty Chair Crises to secure concessions on agriculture. Instead, Camps argues that de Gaulle’s boycott of the EEC was a protest against federalism and an attempt to return to negotiation between national governments.
AM’s citations give the impression that Camps supports his thesis. This is not the case. Camps writes that “Those I have called ‘Gaullist’ follow General de Gaulle in rejecting the concept of ‘integration’ at the European level and of ‘interdependence’ with the United States at the Atlantic level. They accept General de Gaulle’s thesis that the national-state is the only valid entity in international affairs, and that the European countries, linked in some loose coalition, should become a ‘third force’ deliberately rejecting any close tie with the United States (Camps 1966: vii).” AM mischaracterizes Camps’ work by arguing that it substantiates his claims about the primacy of agriculture/commerce when Camps’ book clearly and frequently contradicts those claims. Agriculture and commerce were probably important to de Gaulle, but Camps describes them as decidedly secondary to geopolitical interests.

Lieshout et al (2004) detect the following incorrect references:

55 Camps [SS]: reference 86–87 is not correct; Miriam Camps discusses Maurice Couve de Murville’s 20 October 1965 speech to the French National Assembly, not de Gaulle’s vision of a trade conflict between France and the Anglo-Americans.

55 Camps [SS]: reference 91 is not correct; Camps discusses Couve de Murville’s statement that “events might well have taken a different turn if the French proposals on political union had been accepted.”

57 Camps [SS]: reference 117 is not correct; Camps does not mention “‘brutal’ negotiating tactics” or “Kennedy’s proposals for the MLF” here; note, moreover, that this page reference is inconsistent with the one in n. 89

89 Camps [SS]: reference 104–115 is not correct; Camps here discusses the two Luxembourg meetings of January 1966; she does not mention her alleged conjecture that de Gaulle adapted “a more ‘brutal’ style of negotiation” after being “disillusioned by the collapse of the Fouchet Plan, suspicious of U.S. proposals for an MLF, and rebuffed by the Erhard government.”

94 Camps [SS]: reference is not correct; Moravcsik has not produced a correct reference to Camps’s alleged conjecture that “the boycott stemmed from de Gaulle’s anger over Kennedy’s proposals for an MLF” (TCFE, p. 195).

98 Camps [SS]: reference 122 is not correct; Camps does not refer to the incredibility of “any French threat to withdraw from the EC”; she notes that the Common Market was very popular in France and adds that de Gaulle “himself may have felt the Common Market was expendable.”

AM cites Lord Gladwyn four times, of which three citations are incorrect. Each of these citations is designed to confirm AM’s commercial thesis. However, this is a real stretch because Lord Gladwyn provides extensive, first-hand evidence of de Gaulle’s strategic thinking very much at odds with AM’s commercial theory.

Lord Gladwyn’s account is valuable because he is an acute first-hand witness. After serving as Acting United Nations Secretary-General from October 1945 to February 1946 and the UK’s Ambassador to the United Nations from 1950 to 1954, he became UK ambassador France from 1954 to 1960 and remained active in politics. His association and occasional meetings with de Gaulle continued through the early 1960s.

Am cites the book in connection with the UK’s EEC membership proposal from mid-1961 to 1963. However, the pages AM cites are related to the 1950s. Moreover, they focus on Gladwyn’s conception of Britain’s political interests rather than its commercial interests. Lord Gladwyn’s account of de Gaulle emphasizes the General’s geopolitical strategy and provides no support for AM’s claim that commercial/agricultural issues were predominant in de Gaulle’s thinking.

Lord Gladwyn’s first-hand account of his meetings with de Gaulle and his deeply informed interpretation of French strategy in relation to Europe are worth close attention.

As ambassador to France, Lord Gladwyn relates that de Gaulle, prior to returning to power, had a clear conception of France’s position in Europe and in the world. De Gaulle explains to Lord Gladwyn that “Both America and Russia, according to him, were likely as time went on to move towards isolationism and to withdraw within their own borders, becoming more and more nationalistic in the process. Thus ‘Europe’ had a chance of recovering some of her ancient prestige. But Western Europe could never form a political entity. There could be some economic rationalization and standardization; there might be greater political and diplomatic liaison between European nations; even ‘common policies’ might one day be worked out; but further than that ‘integration’ could not go. Europe as a ‘thing in itself’ was an illusion and Jean Monnet was the champion ‘illusionist’. Nationalism was the thing. It followed that the existing division of Germany was artificial and could not last. As he saw it, Germany ought to be neutralized up to the Oder-Neisse line on the model of Austria” (309-10).

“In April 1960,” Lord Gladwyn relates, “there was the State Visit of the General to London. He had agreed to this, but I think it caused him some apprehension. After all, the British could hardly imagine that he was in favor of the system, operating since the war, whereby they had in effect run Western Europe as the ‘principal ally’ of America! And if they did not imagine this then clearly there was going to be, at the least, a tussle of wills, since the only way to change the system was for France to take the lead and establish the new Europe on the basis of a close alliance with Germany, or rather (as the General always really considered it)
with a ‘Confederation of the Rhine’, l’Angleterre being left to occupy herself with her Commonwealth and Empire and perhaps, if that faded out, being eventually admitted to ‘Europe’ as a sort of poor relation, but only after a long interval, and preferably as a kind of ‘associate’ with no influence on policy” (318-9).

When Lord Gladwyn again met with de Gaulle to make the case for British membership, he writes that after he had made a series of strategic arguments “There was a pause. I had evidently made a point. Then the General said that if there really was a genuine indication on the part of any British Government that this was its intention, the situation would indeed be changed. On the other hand, what he would never, never agree to was any sacrifice of national sovereignty. (This was said rather defensively, but with passion.)” (328).

Lord Gladwyn’s subsequent chapter, “Pursuit of Europe (1960-5),” is an impressive diagnosis of the geopolitics of the UK’s bid for membership and de Gaulle’s veto. Agriculture is mentioned, though only as a secondary factor. In a masterly summary, Lord Gladwyn overviews the early course of European integration in the light of French geopolitics:

“Ever since 1870 some French voices had been raised in favour of a Franco-German association or understanding, and after 1932 and the rise of Hitler these redoubled in intensity, gaining the upper hand in France under the Pétain regime of 1940-4. Unexpectedly England stood firm. A world coalition took shape. Once again the Reich was utterly defeated. One again France, this time to her considerable surprise, found itself restored to her pre-war position, complete with a gigantic overseas empire. Was European hegemony really again possible? Or was the time now ripe for France to merge herself in Europe as Briand had advocated nearly twenty years before?

After the end of the first brief Gaullist experiment in 1946, it became clear that the Fourth Republic had chosen the second course. In 1948, France took the lead in negotiations for the Council of Europe. In 1950, the first real step towards union with Germany – the European Coal and Steel Community – came about. In 1950, too, the European Defense Community – a French initiative – was first mooted. It failed, for the French themselves got cold feet and killed it; but the general tendency was apparently irreversible. 1957 saw the completion of what might well prove to be the greatest of all French achievements, the Treaty of Rome. The second Gaullist regime, which shortly followed, provoked by the failure of the Fourth Republic to cope with the problem of decolonization, notably in Algeria, might have been expected to try to reverse this trend, never accepted by the extreme nationalists, who continued to live entirely in the past. Nothing of the kind occurred. The trend towards the merging of France in Europe was actually accentuated. The entry into the Common Market was even speeded up: the remains of the overseas empire were given complete liberty; the réservoir d’hommes disappeared; instead of a French it became clearer and clearer that the objective of General de Gaulle was an autonomous and, if necessary in the long run, an independent Algeria. Only the decision to accelerate the manufacture of an atomic bomb and the evident desire of General de Gaulle that France should be recognized as representing
‘Europe’ in some three-Power directorate of the Western world, seemed to conflict in practice with the general tendency. It was, in fact, specifically stated that France, a ‘puissance à intérêts mondiaux’, was in a special category which neither Germany nor Italy had the right to enter. In other words, at the same time as the empire, as such, was liquidated, the claim was made that her overseas obligations conferred on France a special European status. How as this apparent paradox to be explained? The answer, in a word, was Britain. General de Gaulle was determined that for so long as we desired to be a ‘World Power’, he would also put in such a claim for France. Were we ever to abandon this position he would no doubt have to consider the possibility of admitting us to his ‘confederation’. But even if he decided in his own mind to exclude us he might find it difficult to do so before the Six had really sealed their union, and, more especially, before he had ended the Algerian war” (336-7).

Lord Gladwyn’s account, much of it first hand, casts serious doubt on the claim that de Gaulle’s predominant motivation was commercial. Even more importantly it reveals that AM systematically ignores the contrary evidence that is expressed eloquently and at length in Lord Gladwyn’s book.

Lieshout et al (2004) detect the following incorrect references:

50 Jebb (read Gladwyn) [SP]: [HM note: AM refers to the author as Jebb, not Gladwyn]: reference 310 is not correct; Lord Gladwyn does not discuss agriculture or the Plan Rueff here.

71 Jebb (read Gladwyn [SP]) reference 292–298 is not correct; Gladwyn gives an overview of his thoughts on EEC, the European Free Trade Area (EFTA), and other topics in the first months of 1957; he does not discuss the negotiations in 1962.

79 Jebb, read Gladwyn [SP]: reference 292ff. is not correct; Gladwyn does not discuss the motivations for the French veto on these pages.

Lieshout et al. detect two citations of *Political Union* in TCfE, of which they identify one as incorrect. However, in citing from *Political Union*, AM ignores Bodenheimer’s account of de Gaulle’s primary motivations as President as well as the geopolitical events which influenced the French during the Fouchet Negotiations and the British veto.

Throughout *Political Union*, Bodenheimer characterizes de Gaulle and many of his actions as being driven by nationalism and de Gaulle’s conceptions of *grandeur*. Bodenheimer writes,

> “Since the core of Gaullism is nationalism, one of the most important elements is the Gaullist ideal of the nation. [De Gaulle] felt contempt for [the Fourth Republic’s] political instability and its vacillation between undertakings which French resources were not capable of bringing to a successful conclusion (such as the Suez venture and the Indochinese and Algerian wars), and hesitation in areas where France was strong enough to take positive action. The basic corrective for such vacillation and the primary condition of ‘nationhood’ in de Gaulle’s view, was internal unity, as a basis for making decisions to act. Once having achieved this cohesion, the nation could fulfill its main objective and ambition: the pursuit of *grandeur* (41 emphasis original).”

Bodeneimer argues that the General’s mandate from the people was to seek French geopolitical advancement. Bodenheimer quotes the contemporary political scientist, Raymond Aron, who describes the mood which precipitated de Gaulle’s rise saying,

> “The general dissatisfaction was not linked with economics. It was a national dissatisfaction with the evolution of French power in the world. In my view, the dissatisfaction with the status of France is much more profound than economic dissatisfaction (48).”

Bodenheimer argues that French discontent in 1958 was “one symptom of the identity crisis which the French were experiencing about their role in the world.” France had always been a great power and, after the economic recovery of 1958, felt it should no longer accept “a reduced position in international affairs (48).” This was the mood when de Gaulle came to power, and it was his fervent desire to see France restored to the pantheon of nations.

From the beginning of his tenure as President, Bodenheimer argues, de Gaulle’s national aims “[were] primarily political and diplomatic, rather than economic, and it is in political terms that a policy of *grandeur* acquires a specific meaning to de Gaulle (44).”

AM first cites Bodenheimer from chapter IV of *Political Union* to discuss de Gaulle’s strategy with regard to the Fouchet Negotiations, particularly what AM saw as the General’s plan to eliminate supranational elements from the Treaty. However, as Lieshout et al. note,
Bodenheimer does not discuss de Gaulle’s strategy during the Fouchet Negotiations in the cited section, rather, she discusses “the possibilities for compromise on substantive issues (Lieshout et al., 130; Bodenheimer, 77).” Moreover, AM suggests that de Gaulle meant for the Fouchet Negotiations to fail and merely used them as a way to deter British interest in the Common Market and secure the CAP. Bodenheimer’s work argues against this conclusion.

In TCFE, AM attempts to dismiss the distinct geopolitical aims of the Fouchet Plan by characterizing it as merely an “illusion of a positive French policy towards Europe (TCFE, 187).” In so doing, AM ignores the body of Bodenheimer’s discussion of de Gaulle’s policies and the Fouchet Negotiations as being driven by pressing geopolitical concerns, particularly the issues of European defense, British EC membership, the status of the Atlantic Alliance in Europe, among others (77-84).

Towards the beginning of Political Union, Bodenheimer describes the Fouchet Plan as the “first concrete proposal for achieving cooperation in foreign and defense policy. Even now [1966], no specific alternative proposals are under consideration; all proposals are variations of the Fouchet Plan (24).”

Additionally, Bodenheimer argues that a Union of States or a European confederation had long been (since 1951) de Gaulle’s vision for a political Europe (42). She states, “A confederation… to serve the national interests on the basis of which it was formed…. This is the framework for the Gaullist outlook on European community institutions, and for de Gaulle’s European policy (42).”

Bodenheimer claims that de Gaulle’s motivations were “to gain, through unity, added authority for whatever is undertaken by the nations of Europe—and by France in particular (43).”

Bodenheimer also includes various speeches by de Gaulle in which he enumerates his goals for Europe. In 1950, de Gaulle stated, “I am convinced that if France, … on her feet again, and with proper leadership, took the initiative in calling upon [Western] Europe to unite, …the whole European atmosphere, from the Atlantic to the Urals would be changed, and even the men in power on the other side of the Iron Curtain would feel the consequences (44).”

In 1960, the General reiterated, “to build Europe, that is to say, to unite it, is evidently something essential (43).”

Bodenheimer’s account of de Gaulle’s long-held vision for Europe and France’s role within it clearly resemble the General’s objectives in the Fouchet Negotiations. Therefore, AM’s theory that the Fouchet Plan was merely a façade to facilitate the implementation of the CAP contradicts the main argument of Bodenheimer’s work and the evidence she presents.

AM’s second quote from Political Union is from the chapter “The Context of European Politics,” particularly from the section on Britain in Europe. AM correctly quotes Bodenheimer
in saying that de Gaulle’s Foreign Minister, Couve de Murville, had “made clear to the point of tendentiousness that the critical issue [for France during Britain’s EC negotiations] .... was agriculture (TCF, 191).” However, AM ignores the rest of the section which describes major geopolitical events which influenced de Gaulle’s decision-making prior to the veto.

Bodenheimer writes,

“While he was perfectly willing to consider the British application, ... de Gaulle was, by this time, more concerned about his project for European political union: his objective was ‘not...to keep Britain out of the Common Market, but to weld a political union of the Six before they came in (123).’”

Bodenheimer also argues that de Gaulle

“recognized that the effect of Britain’s direct presence in Europe would be a closer tie between Europe and the US, and a shift in the balance of power within Europe, reducing the position of France. He was eager to secure rapid agreement on a treaty for European Union so that, when Britain became a part of Europe, she would be committed to endorse an already existing European structure, characterized by independence from the U.S. and a strong position for France (123).”

De Gaulle’s fears that Britain would impact the political development of Europe would have only been exacerbated by British actors. Harold Macmillan said of the British EC membership application, “this is a political as well [as] an economic matter.” And, “Heath stated at the opening session of the negotiations that Britain would be eager to participate in the political union discussions after she was a member of the economic communities (124).” Additionally, in April 1962, Heath stated,

“What is essential is that any European point of view or policy on defense should be directly related to the Atlantic Alliance. We must make it clear beyond all doubt that the object of our common policy is to defend and strengthen the liberties for which the Atlantic Alliance is the indispensable shield (125).”

Such a position was antithetical to de Gaulle’s vision for an independent Europe that was beyond the reach of the Iron Curtain or the American hegemonic agenda.

Moreover, it was Britain’s stated desire to join a European political union that caused the Dutch and Belgians in April 1962 to harden their position and “suspend negotiations on a political union until the relations between the Six and Britain had become clarified (124).” This would have been especially frustrating for de Gaulle because, “by April 17, 1962, the Six were, on almost all of the basic issues, closer to agreement than they had been at any previous time, in spite of the grave setback following de Gaulle’s revisions of the French draft treaty [of the Fouchet Plan] in January, 1962 (84).” Moreover, Political Union does not support the theory that the French were intentionally obstinate during the Fouchet Negotiations in order to ensure
their failure. Bodenheimer notes, “In fact, on many occasions throughout the negotiations, the Dutch, rather than the French, stood alone and defended an isolated position (84).”

Similarly, during Britain’s EC membership negotiations, it may have been the French who delivered the veto, however,

“Within the EEC Commission and the national ministries, many had felt for some time that that the negotiations with Britain had been lagging, [sic] and would not necessarily end in success. Several members of the commission indicated their ‘thinly-disguised relief’ that the task of ‘digesting’ the British had, at least, been deferred (129).”

Bodenheimer argues that few people were surprised at the outcomes of the negotiations, but that the Five were shocked and indignant at the General’s unilateral decision to end the negotiations without even informing them of his decision (128). However, the French were not alone in opposing Britain’s EC bid. Bodenheimer comments,

“Adenauer himself had become less enthusiastic about Britain’s Common Market bid ever since the failure of the political union talks, which had been a major blow to him, and for which he held the British partly responsible (130).”

In TCfE, AM omits most of Bodenheimer’s arguments in Political Union which suggest the primacy of geopolitical motivations for de Gaulle’s policy. Further, of the two citations from Political Union AM includes, one is inarguably wrong, and the other misrepresents the argument Bodenheimer makes in the section.

Lieshout detects the following citations from Political Union

70 Bodenheimer [SS]: reference 76–84 is not correct; Susanne Bodenheimer does not discuss de Gaulle’s strategy with respect to the Fouchet Plan on these pages; she discusses “the possibilities for compromise on the substantive issues” in the final months of the Fouchet negotiations.

79 Bodenheimer [SS]: reference 127 is correct.

Paul Henri Spaak’s account is particularly valuable in discussions of European integration. Spaak was a prominent Belgian politician and diplomat who was active during the formative years of modern Europe. Spaak promoted the customs union uniting the Benelux countries, helped establish the Council of Europe, from 1952-1953 oversaw the Common Assembly of the ECSC, presided over the negotiations for the Treaty of Rome, served as the Secretary-General of NATO, participated in the Fouchet Negotiations, and more. AM includes one citation from *The Continuing Battle* in TCFE, and Lieshout et al. identify it as incorrect.

Throughout *The Continuing Battle*, Spaak characterizes de Gaulle as both arrogant and nationalistic, often with *ad hominem* attacks. While Spaak acknowledges on several occasions that the French were particularly interested in securing the CAP, he stresses, contrary to AM’s argument, political motivations as equally important in determining de Gaulle and France’s policy.

As regards the General himself, Spaak admits,

“I find it difficult to give an impartial judgement on General de Gaulle...I have seen in him the most dangerous adversary of the two ideals for which I have fought for nearly a quarter of a century: the Atlantic Alliance and European unity. It may well be that General de Gaulle has wrecked both these ideals (305).”

Spaak continues,

“When de Gaulle steps down into the political arena, he says: ‘After me there will be chaos.’ I consider this to be a confession of his own failure. In the history of France, he figures neither as one who has carried on an existing tradition nor as the first of a new line of statesman (307).”

Spaak goes on to comment on lines from de Gaulle’s 1932 book, *The Edge of the Sword*, saying,

“We find in them, above all, the reflection of his lust for power, defined as ‘a passionate will and an eager, even jealous desire to make decisions (307).’”

Spaak continues,

“He [de Gaulle] is apt to conceal his intentions only to reveal them unexpectedly, mostly amidst a burst of publicity...He is a master of the art of equivocation and takes pleasure in provoking misunderstandings (311).”

Spaak’s account of de Gaulle’s personality certainly goes hand in hand with AM’s theory that the General secreted his true aims for Europe, namely to secure commercial and agricultural advantages for France, behind a façade of geopolitical motivations. The type of man
Spaak describes could certainly pursue such a deception. However, Spaak often mentions de Gaulle’s desire for French geopolitical advancement and even goes as far as to suggest that de Gaulle endangered CAP negotiations in 1965 to secure a political victory.

Before that, however, Spaak claims that in September 1958 de Gaulle sent a memorandum to Eisenhower and Macmillan in which, among other things he proposed a change to the Atlantic Alliance which would have created a triumvirate of the US, Britain, and France which would have been “responsible for taking joint decisions on policy matters arising in connection with international security, as well as for drawing up and, should the need arise, for putting into operation, plans for military action, notably in regard to the use of nuclear weapons...General de Gaulle went on to declare outright that the French Government considered such security arrangements essential and made it clear that France’s participation in NATO depended on the adoption of this system (314).” Though his plan was rejected, this was, inarguably, a geopolitical move intended to secure French grandeur and elevate France above the other European NATO members.

After de Gaulle’s plans for a triumvirate failed, Spaak, who served as the Secretary-General of NATO, believes,

“Since [de Gaulle’s] views on how the world should be run had been rejected, he was determined to destroy the organization which was the chief obstacle to his schemes. From that time on, NATO was under sentence of death so far as de Gaulle was concerned (318).”

This included refusing to integrate the French military into NATO, pursuing a French nuclear strike force, and adopting an isolated opinion in international affairs (457).

Protected by a fear among the European partners of open confrontation with France “de Gaulle continued his systematic destruction of NATO. Two years later this policy was to culminate in the French withdrawal from the organization... His aim was not to convince but to destroy (466).”

Spaak goes on to describe the General as being motivated to take political actions by his conceptions of French greatness. For instance, Spaak claims that it was de Gaulle’s conception of French greatness that drove him to acquire the status of a nuclear power (320).

Later, in his discussion of the Fouchet Negotiations, Spaak recounts how he

“realized that the General’s proposals had from the outset given rise to a good deal of suspicion among those to whom they had been put. His ideas were vague and the whole project was marked by a certain confusion. Those who were aware of the French intentions feared that...the project might weaken the Atlantic Alliance and deprive the EEC Commission of some of its powers (436).”

Spaak goes on,
“It seems to me that the French want to reduce the Commission’s ability to act to the absolute minimum. They want its agenda to be purely technical and to strip it of all its political powers. The General’s speech on defense was even more worrying. He maintained that the Six must be seen as a bloc apart from the other Powers and that the defence problems of the Six were not identical with those of the United States, the Scandinavian Countries, or even those of Britain. His aim...is evidently to establish a European military entente (438).”

In fairness to AM, here Spaak’s account does provide evidence for the AM’s theory that the General used French policy to intentionally attack EC and Atlantic institutions. However, Spaak gives the impression that de Gaulle was driven by a desire to see France recognized as the leader of an intergovernmental political union and a neutral military bloc which could mediate between the US and USSR. Spaak goes on to describe that

“[the] amendments made to the original text [of the draft of the Fouchet Plan], on which agreement had been reached in principle, concerned, in essence, four issues: the relations between the future united Europe and the Atlantic Alliance; those between the new organization and the Common Market; the prospects for the future; and British participation (439).”

Among the issues Spaak notes, three stand out as predominantly geopolitical, while only one—the new organization’s relationship with the CAP—stands out as commercial. This suggests that while France certainly had agriculture in mind when negotiating the Fouchet Plan, it could not be said to have primacy over their substantial geopolitical concerns, namely Britain’s potential impact on any political union and the Atlantic influence Britain was likely to bring.

According to Spaak, Macmillan made his intentions to join the EC known in July 1961 (472). The CAP was agreed in January 1962 and France vetoed the British application in 1963. It is entirely plausible that de Gaulle was worried about,

“Britain’s...request...that certain special problems should be examined: agricultural policy and the position of the Commonwealth and EFTA countries, and in this context she asked for temporary relaxations (474-475).”

However, according to Spaak,

“There is every reason to believe that it was the attitude adopted by Macmillan at his meeting with Kennedy in Bermuda which so upset the President of the French Republic. Macmillan’s crime was to have reached agreement with the President of the United States on Britain’s nuclear weaponry...In General de Gaulle’s eyes this cooperation with the Americans was tantamount to treason of Europe’s interests and justified his refusal to allow Britain into the Common Market (476).”

Though implementation of the CAP was an important point for France, Spaak’s account does not support the conclusion that agricultural issues had primacy in the negotiations over
Britain’s entry to the Common Market. If anything, this first-hand witness, a man who came to know de Gaulle well, attributed his actions to major geopolitical events.

The Empty Chair Crisis, Spaak maintains, was largely created by disagreement over the CAP and a desire on the part of Italy, Germany, and the Netherlands to exact vengeance for France’s veto of British EC membership (481). Thus, the Crisis was caused by both political and commercial interests, but the French position was, at least initially, determined solely by the position of the CAP.

Spaak recalls that the Council of Ministers decided that a plan to finance the CAP must be agreed upon by June 1965. In the spring, “the Commission drafted a report which covered...(1) the provision of funds for the common agricultural policy; (2) establishment of the Community’s own financial resources; and (3) stronger powers for the European Assembly (481-482).”

The Hallstein Commission submitted the proposal to the Assembly, who endorsed it, before the Council of Ministers had been consulted. The Germans, Dutch, and Italians insisted on tackling all the problems raised in the Commission’s report as a whole, essentially stalling the CAP’s implementation (482). When the Commission’s June 30 deadline passed with no agreement on the CAP, Couve de Murville ended the negotiations (483-484). In response to the failure of CAP negotiations, “[France] refused to send her representatives to the Ministerial Council and the Council of Deputy Chief Delegates, thus paralysing the efforts of the Community (484).” While this would seem to lend itself to AM’s argument about the primacy of the CAP to France’s policy, Spaak later claims that even after

“[a]greement on agricultural finance was, in fact, possible...this was not enough to bring France’s delegates back to the council table...[The] French Government was pressing for a revision of the Treaty and notably for the abolition of the provision relating to the majority vote.”

De Gaulle also seems to have been offended by Commissioner Hallstein’s attempts to assert the Commission’s independence and authority pursuant to the Treaty of Rome but in a manner inconsistent with de Gaulle’s vision for Europe (485). Moreover, he was concerned with protecting the national veto which he viewed as the safeguard for national sovereignty.

In terms of how AM uses The Continuing Battle in TCFE, Lieshout et al. identify one citation of The Continuing Battle in TCFE which they label incorrect. According to Lieshout et al., “Paul-Henri Spaak does not mention French commercial concerns or financial regulation of agriculture in his discussion of de Gaulle’s veto on [the cited] pages (133).” While AM does discuss France’s agricultural interests as the deciding factor in the 1963 veto of Britain’s EC membership, it seems that AM is citing Spaak to suggest that there was little evidence that “French officials should dissemble” regarding the primacy of agricultural policy (TCFÉ, 191). AM suggest that Couve de Murville believed he was fairly representing de Gaulle’s position when he was arguing that agriculture was the main point of contention during Britain’s 1963
membership negotiations, when in fact, the General was being driven by outrage at the Bermuda meeting between Macmillan and Kennedy. If anything, this account argues directly against AM’s theory that de Gaulle was using geopolitics as a mask for his true commercial interests. The section of Spaak’s book AM cites suggests that the inverse is true. Couve de Murville insisted upon the primacy of agriculture for the French while de Gaulle was being driven to action by what he considered geopolitical slights to French sovereignty and grandeur.

Lieshout et al. detect the following citation in TCfE

79 Spaak [SP]: reference 476ff. is not correct; Paul-Henri Spaak does not mention French commercial concerns or financial regulation of agriculture in his discussion of de Gaulle’s veto on these pages; Spaak puts the “chief blame for what just happened on General de Gaulle—on his personality, his character and psychology” (p. 478).

AM cites *Using Europe, Abusing the Europeans* (UEAE) once in TCfE. Lieshout identifies this citation as correct, but insufficiently specific.

Taken out of context, Kaiser’s work supports AM’s argument that de Gaulle was motivated primarily by economic interests, however, from the very beginning of his argument, Kaiser makes plain that it is geopolitics and the principle of national sovereignty which drove de Gaulle’s actions. In his introduction Kaiser points out that, “the British government had in fact come to terms with the implications of majority voting by 1961, whereas Charles de Gaulle provoked a serious constitutional crisis in 1965-6 specifically in order to prevent the transition to majority voting (xvii).”

In his second chapter, Kaiser discusses the situation of British trade with Europe and the Commonwealth and mentions that “Should [the British] government have decided in favour of membership in a customs union, the Treasury wanted to see very strict rules limiting the use of quantitative restrictions by member states, particularly France, to reduce balance of payment problems (33).” While the British position on agriculture would have been important to de Gaulle, Kaiser provides no evidence that it influenced the General’s actions towards the UK.

In fairness to AM, Kaiser’s argument does seem to support the theory that agriculture was of extreme importance to de Gaulle stating,

> It soon became obvious during the FTA negotiations that the initial British concept could not be obtained and that the government in London needed to make substantial concessions to the Six as well as other OEEC countries – a move which would also affect Commonwealth interests in agriculture. Nonetheless the governments of some Commonwealth countries...hoped that, in return for further reductions of British preferences within their markets, they would be able to negotiate with the Six better access to the EEC market. The French demand in 1958 to include the existing Commonwealth preferences in the FTA temporarily appeared to offer a window of opportunity for such negotiations at the expense of the British. Some Commonwealth governments clearly underestimated the extent to which in principle the Six were already committed to common agricultural protection...Through their demand the French had primarily intended to obstruct the FTA negotiations (91).

This quote seems to support the conclusion that the French were concerned with agriculture, particularly with protecting the fate of the still nascent concept of a common agricultural policy. However, Kaiser later goes onto describe the relevant geopolitical motivations which prompted de Gaulle to oppose the FTA. Kaiser states,
For the French...the new European organizations, the EEC and Euratom, had to contribute to the control of Germany through integration...Contrary to the FTA the EEC presented many advantages to France. It offered, for example, the prospect of a socially tolerable route to economic modernization and of significantly increasing exports of agricultural products to the Federal Republic. In addition, Euratom would provide the French influence over the development of the German nuclear industry... While Macmillan nonetheless claimed political leadership of Western Europe for Britain, Adenauer was happy to leave it, at least symbolically, to France...In the bipolar world of the nuclear age the stability of the worldwide balance of power, to which the divisions of Germany and Europe were subordinate, did not depend on a few British nuclear weapons. At the very least the British government wanted to tip the scales in Franco-German relations...[B]ut after three wars in three generations the Germans and French decided to throw their weight onto the scale on the same side with the creation of the EEC and Euratom. The scale was suspended and, as a result, Britain lost much of its former influence in Western Europe (95-97; emphasis added).

While de Gaulle was concerned with agriculture and perhaps factored it into his political strategy, this quote gets at the heart of the General’s geopolitical motivations. The EEC and Euratom created a system in which France was recognized as the dominant power and in which neither Britain or its Atlantic partners held sway. This certainly played into the General’s decision to suspend FTA negotiations as much, but probably more than, his agricultural/commercial considerations.

Kaiser immediately goes on to describe de Gaulle’s 1958 attempt to establish a French, British and American “political directorship” over Europe. Further, Kaiser describes a meeting between de Gaulle and Adenauer in which the latter agreed to “put aside German economic interests and effectively support a French veto [of the FTA], and that in turn de Gaulle would demonstrate strength over the Berlin ultimatum vis-à-vis the Soviet Union (97).” These two quotes further emphasize that while FTA negotiations were continuing, de Gaulle was occupied with the largest geopolitical questions, namely hegemony in Europe and resistance against the Soviet presence in Europe.

Kaiser then muses that “If French consent to the FTA proposal was so essential and, if at all, only available on political grounds, it must be asked why the British government never made an additional political offer (98).” While Kaiser poses this as a hypothetical, he is asking why the British did not change their negotiating tactic, not questioning whether it was politics which motivated de Gaulle.

Next, Kaiser discusses Britain’s first EEC membership application. In this discussion, Kaiser notes that “The British did not regard the EEC as the main threat to their special bilateral relationship with the United States; rather, the perceived threat was de Gaulle’s plans for closer intergovernmental political cooperation among the Six which would eventually include foreign
policy and, ultimately, defence matters, measures that in de Gaulle’s view would help to establish the Six as a French-led group of states with substantial international influence (123).”

Kaiser goes on to quote from a 1960 memorandum in which a British Assistant-Undersecretary of State declared “It seems clear that General de Gaulle is thinking in terms of a wide intergovernmental structure for the Six covering defence, political, economic, social and cultural questions. This degree of integration among the Six would probably constitute a far greater threat than the E.E.C., not only to European unity but also to Atlantic solidarity (125).”

Then, Kaiser quotes a 1958 memorandum from Macmillan in which he “suggested internally that Britain would have to retaliate in the field of defence and security policy if the FTA negotiations were to break down (151).” Macmillan stated,

‘I feel we ought to make it quite clear to our European friends that if little Europe is formed without a parallel development of a Free Trade Area we shall have to reconsider the whole of our political and economic attitude towards Europe…We should not allow ourselves to be destroyed little by little. We would fight back with every weapon in our armury. We would take our troops out of Europe. We would withdraw from NATO. We would adopt a policy of isolationism. We should surround ourselves with rockets and would say to the Germans, the French and the rest of them: ‘Look after yourselves with your own forces. Look after yourselves when the Russians overrun your countries.’ I would be inclined to make this position quite clear to both de Gaulle and Adenauer, so that they may be under no illusion.’

Kaiser continues, “It soon became clear, however, that such threats did little to impress de Gaulle who was aiming at a more independent French policy within the Atlantic Alliance (152).” This series of quotations leaves nothing to the imagination. For de Gaulle and Macmillan, agricultural and commercial interests were inextricably linked to vitally important geopolitical issues.

Next, Kaiser reiterates that de Gaulle’s “strategic aim” was to “establish the Community… as an economically and politically cohesive organization led by France which would eventually be capable of acting as a third force on the same level as the United States and the Soviet Union (157).” Here Kaiser notes as well that de Gaulle may have had a “pragmatic” incentive to allow Britain into the EEC “in exchange for a British offer for Anglo-French cooperation in security matters, particularly nuclear weapons (157).”

Finally, it is worthwhile looking at AM’s use of Kaiser’s work in TCfE. AM cites Kaiser to substantiate the claim that Macmillan was pessimistic about de Gaulle’s willingness to admit Britain to the EEC, however, Kaiser discusses Macmillan’s attitude in relation to his failure to appease the General’s nuclear aims and his aims in NATO (TCfE, 188; Kaiser, 165-167).

By citing Kaiser’s work in support of his theory that commercial interests took primacy over geopolitical ones, AM both mischaracterizes and categorically omits the bulk of Kaiser’s
argument which frames de Gaulle’s actions with respect to the FTA and later Britain’s EEC membership application as inherently linked to his *certaine idée* of France his geopolitical motivations.

Lieshout et al (2004) detected the following reference:

71  *aiser [HS]:* reference is correct, though not sufficiently specific; see pp. 165–167.

AM cites Campbell twice and Lieshout et al find one of the citations correct, and the other incorrect. While AM clearly designed for his citations to support his thesis that de Gaulle’s motivations were primarily commercial and agricultural, Campbell’s work provides little support for this thesis.

One passage, which Campbell presents on page 123, appears to support AM’s assertion that de Gaulle was motivated primarily by economic and agricultural factors. Campbell states,

“A more substantive problem was that in the autumn of 1961 the Six were still in the process of settling between themselves the principles of the common agricultural policy (CAP). It would have been helpful to Britain if this could have been left over until Britain was inside the community and able to take part in shaping the CAP as a member. But the French were determined that the CAP negotiations must be concluded first – very much to French advantage – before there was any consideration of how it might be modified to accommodate Britain. Until 1962 the Six were still locked in agricultural/financial wrangling of their own which would settle the outlines of the CAP for thirty years to come. Britain initially hoped for a quick negotiation – for the very reason that they wanted to get in before the shape of the Community was set in concrete. As *The Economist* wrote in July, at the time of the final decision to apply: ‘1961 may well be the last year in which Britain can enter with a fair hope of helping to shape it.’ This was precisely why the French had no intention of letting Britain in until the last major element of the structure envisaged in 1957 was in place. There was a good deal of criticism, after the British application had failed, that the negotiation had been too slow, that Britain had dragged it out by insisting on haggling in painstaking detail over every item of agricultural produce (kangaroo meat was always cited), instead of plunging in with a whole-hearted acceptance of the principle of entry, leaving the details to be worked out later. There are several answers to this criticism, but not the least important is that it was the French who, for reasons of their own, were determined to impose delay.” (123)

While this passage seems to support AM’s conclusion that France was motivated by economic and agricultural concerns, Campbell is clear that the French were concerned with the major elements of the structure of the Community, which de Gaulle still hoped would take an intergovernmental shape. Thus, while Campbell mentions commerce/agriculture in relation to Britain’s EEC membership negotiations, it can hardly be argued that this passage supports the conclusion that de Gaulle’s interests were primarily commercial. Protecting the CAP was just one element of the EEC which de Gaulle wanted to insulate against British influence.

Moreover, the rest of the chapter “Mr. Europe,” which is the only chapter in Campbell’s book AM cites, is at odds with the assertion that commerce dominated the French political strategy. Campbell describes that “Heath was careful to place EEC membership in the context
of other international organizations to which Britain already belonged: NATO, the OECD, EFTA, the Council of Europe (124).” This illustrates that while both Britain and France had commercial interests that they wanted to protect during Britain’s EEC membership negotiations, there were geopolitical factors which were inextricably linked to the negotiations to which Heath and de Gaulle would have been acutely tuned. During this time, the General was at odds with NATO and reviled the thought of Atlantic influence in Europe, and his fear that Britain would indeed Atlanticize Europe would have only been “exacerbate[d] [by] his deep suspicions of the Americans and of the British for being too much in their pocket (127).”

De Gaulle would have been further wary of Heath’s claim that “Britain would have a veto on developments she did not like. In particular, he stressed that Britain would not be turning her back on the Commonwealth (124).” This had several implications for de Gaulle. The first is that Heath clearly hoped that Britain could change the structure of the EEC, and it meant that Britain wanted to maintain access to Commonwealth markets. Thus, Heath’s position was diametrically opposed to de Gaulle’s political and commercial strategies in Europe. This was clear in the press statement in which de Gaulle announced the veto. In the statement, De Gaulle decried Britain’s “obviously incompatible” trading system and “preferences for the Commonwealth,” but he stressed that “If Britain came in…. [a] colossal Atlantic Community would emerge under American dependence and control, which would soon swallow up the European Community (129).”

Campbell also presents strong evidence that what motivated de Gaulle to even consider admitting Britain into the EEC was not commercial benefit, but the possibility of security benefits provided by their sharing nuclear arms. Campbell observes that it is distinctly possible that the reason negotiations for British entry into the EEC failed were a result of de Gaulle’s belief that they would not share sufficient nuclear resources with France:

“[That] Kennedy agreed to let [Macmillan] have Polaris on favourable terms, further convinced de Gaulle that Britain’s primary international relationship was still with the United States. Kennedy’s subsequent offer of Polaris to France as well he regarded as an insult. What, it appears, de Gaulle had really wanted all along from Britain was a promise of nuclear co-operation, sharing Britain’s more advanced nuclear technology. This was the key which might have persuaded the General to allow Britain into Europe. But in the course of the several meetings they had during 1961-2 – at Birch Grove in November 1961, at Chateau des Champs in June 1962 (on both of which occasions de Gaulle had seemed to be prepared to look favourably on British membership) and finally at Rambouillet in December 1962, just before Macmillan flew off to Nassau – Macmillan had not offered it and de Gaulle had been too proud to ask. The Rambouillet meeting was a chilly one, from which Macmillan guessed the worst. When the veto came he at least was forewarned.” (128)

This is one of the key passages on de Gaulle specifically, rather than France more generally, within this book that AM ignored because it did not fully support his argument that de Gaulle
was motivated primarily by commercial gain. Indeed, this passage appears to undermine AM’s argument, showing that de Gaulle was primarily motivated not by commercial interests, but by those of national security.

Campbell’s work does not, as a whole, appear to support AM’s thesis that de Gaulle was motivated primarily by commercial or agricultural needs in regards to European unification. While Campbell’s work shows that agricultural and commercial concerns were a contributing factor in his decision making, it does not show them as the primary factor. On the contrary, Campbell’s work shows that de Gaulle’s primary motivations, when considering British entry into the EEC in particular, were based on national security and geopolitical interests. In Campbell’s words, “de Gaulle simply wished to maintain French hegemony in a cosy European club of six (132).”

Lieshout et al (2004) detected the following references:

78 Campbell [SS]: reference 123 is correct.

83 Campbell [SS]: reference 129-130 is not correct; John Campbell does not discuss the issue of agriculture here
10. Alfred Grosser, *French Foreign Policy Under de Gaulle*

Grosser is an eminent political scientist known for his contribution to Franco-German cooperation in the post war period. Grosser’s work in political science, particularly his involvement with Franco-German cooperation up to the Elysee treaty, make his account of de Gaulle’s political strategy worth close attention.

AM cites Grosser once in TCfE to substantiate the claim that economic considerations were the driving force of de Gaulle’s foreign policy. Lieshout et al. note that this citation is incorrect. More generally, however, Grosser’s work belies the claim that “The preponderance of direct evidence concerning de Gaulle’s own expression of his motivations confirms the primacy of economic interests (TCfE, 182).” Grosser describes de Gaulle as a nationalist, in a very specific sense, concerned with history and his own perception in it and with major contemporary geopolitical developments.

Early in his second chapter, “The Conceptions of General de Gaulle,” Grosser claims “If by ‘nationalist’ one means a man for whom the nation represents the supreme political value, then General de Gaulle is a nationalist. This is not to imply any notion of aggressiveness, it is simply to emphasize the privileged position of the nation among his political concepts. This idea explains the primacy of foreign policy and the notion of national unity as the essential ideal of all domestic policy (15).” Grosser continues, “[for de Gaulle] the goal of the state is external ambition, and this is what justifies very broadly the presence at the helm of a person in possession of the power of the state, and capable of acting toward the world outside (15).”

Grosser then relays some of de Gaulle’s own descriptions of his goals as leader as being ‘To pursue the development of our country [France] in such a manner as to enhance at the same time the condition of the individual, national prosperity, and the power of France (16).” Grosser empathizes, in contrast to AM’s claim that for de Gaulle, “The economy is a means. The prosperity of the French people is a means, especially in that they are not the objective of a policy. The objective of policy is ‘France’ (17).” This analysis of de Gaulle’s policy, both his own and Grosser’s suggests that for de Gaulle, the commercial and economic interests could only be important in the context of expanding French political power.

This concept of the nation also drove de Gaulle’s attitudes towards Europe. De Gaulle was wary of supranationalism for many reasons and often expressed his feeling that “What is important and enduring in international affairs are nation states... And a nation state is only truly worthy of being one if it has ambition (17).” Grosser continues, “The greatest difficulty for General de Gaulle, with his concept of the nation-state, is not to conceive of regimes and ideologies, but to conceive of a political entity distinct from and superior to the nation-state. In any case he has a deep horror of all so called supranational organisms (19).” De Gaulle’s conception of the nation as the primary instrument of international politics is what drove him to pursue is European confederation in the form of the Fouchet Plan and to fight for sovereignty in the form of the national veto.
Beyond influencing his European policy, de Gaulle’s geopolitical motivations drove his German policy. In his chapter on Franco-German relations, Grosser notes that, whatever their differences, de Gaulle and Adenauer were both drawn together by “the importance of foreign policy (65).” Moreover, Grosser suggests that the Franco-German relationship forged under de Gaulle and Adenauer was the product of a “similar analysis of the international situation” in which “[f]irmness towards the East [and] the necessity of never making unilateral concessions” featured prominently (66). Franco-German cooperation was not driven by commercial interests. In fact, as Grosser later points out, the economic interests of France and Germany were almost diametrically opposed. France wanted its farmers to have access to the European market, and Germany wanted to protect its domestic agricultural market from French agricultural imports. Yet, France and Germany, or more accurately, de Gaulle and Adenauer formed a close relationship built on geopolitical interests.

In discussing the General’s stance towards East Germany, Grosser notes that de Gaulle despite having “a number of reasons for drawing close to Russia, has been much more intransigent than the governments of the Fourth Republic” because of “his refusal to yield without compensation and his desire to “[support] the Federal Republic in order to receive its support (78).” Grosser then quotes a lengthy speech by de Gaulle in which he discusses a Franco-German union:

“Union—why union? To begin with, because we are together and directly threatened. Before the dominating ambition of the Soviets, France is aware of the immediate peril to her body and soil if, before her, Germany came to bow, and Germany is not unaware that her fate would be sealed were France to cease supporting her. Next, union because the alliance of the free world—in other words, the reciprocal commitment of Europe and America —can, in the long run, only conserve its assurance and solidarity if there exists on the old continent a bastion of power and prosperity of the same dimensions of the United States in the new world. Now, such a bastion could only be based on the solidarity of our two countries... (79-80).”

Here, de Gaulle spells out the motives which drive him to pursue both Franco-German union and later European union. A Franco-German union was essential to resist the Soviet threat, and, in de Gaulle’s eyes, Franco-German union would provide the building blocks for an independent Europe which could be an equal power with the US and USSR. As Grosser emphasizes, for de Gaulle, “one of the goals of Western Europe is to be strong enough to unite somehow or other with a liberalized Eastern Europe to form One Europe that would be one of the major world powers (80).” Grosser’s analysis of de Gaulle’s actions in relation to the Federal Republic and to Europe suggest that de Gaulle was almost exclusively preoccupied with contemporary geopolitical events and the potential for French grandeur as a byproduct of European cooperation.

In fairness to AM, Grosser does admit that “the sharpest problem for the Common Market since 1959 has been the issue of agriculture, where France stands in a very favorable position from the community’s point of view, and where the Germans find themselves in the role of bad sports refusing to play by the rules of the game (82-83).” To the end of securing
CAP, the General was quite brutal, demanding an agreement by December 31, 1963 and threatening to disband the community if an agreement was not reached (84).

However, this was hardly the General’s only (or primary) concern with the community’s institutions. In October 1963, de Gaulle refused to reappoint the “supranational” Etienne Hirsh to the Euratom presidency. There was also a “malaise” in Euratom stemming from France’s perception that “her five partners had profited from the considerable advance that the work of the Commissariat à l’Énergie Atomique had given France since 1945, [and] there was no perceptible counter-advantage to compensate for this opportunity (85).” Grosser’s work therefore suggests that the CAP was one among of number of other issues, that were chiefly geopolitical, which factored into the General’s political strategy.

On the issue of economic integration in the community, Grosser notes that France was not alone in creating economic barriers and that the Five, still enraged by the 1963 veto, obstinately refused to integrate on some issues, arguing “that these economic barriers would not exist if France had not first blocked the way to political integration [namely the UK’s accession] (85).” As Grosser describes it, the Five, not just de Gaulle, made economic decisions because of their geopolitical aspirations, punishing France for instance, and not, as AM suggests, the other way around.

In terms of the French position on British accession, Grosser notes, “There were at least two factors against the British Entry into the Common Market. The first was American Pressure. There was so much pressure in favor of Great Britain that it aroused distrust, whence the idea of the ‘Trojan Horse’...In the second place, the presence of England would upset the Franco-German leadership [in Europe] (88).” Grosser’s account of the French veto is antithetical to AM’s, describing it as geopolitical and not purely an attempt to protect the nascent CAP from the Commonwealth.

Grosser continues: “This must be emphasized: the major reason why de Gaulle rejected the British entry was probably not at all European, but Atlantic (88).” Grosser argues that the UK’s and US’s refusal to reply to de Gaulle’s proposal for a tripartite directory for the Atlantic Alliance, for de Gaulle, meant “there would be no dealings with Great Britain in Europe (88-89).” De Gaulle’s position was further solidified after Macmillan’s meeting with Kennedy in the Bahamas, which lead to significant changes in the MLF proposal. Afterwards, “General de Gaulle concluded that so important a proposal could not have been improvised, and consequently, that Macmillan must have known at Rambouillet that, not only would he not give the British atomic force as a dowry to Europe, but that American control over the British force would be increased. I remain convinced that the decision to break off negotiations so abruptly was largely made on the basis of the Bahamas meeting, more than European economic considerations (89; emphasis added).”

Grosser goes on, “This part explains why General de Gaulle broke off negotiations so abruptly. It was doubtless because time was passing, and there was a possibility that the negotiators would reach agreement on agricultural and economic questions, while the real
divergence lay elsewhere (89).” The importance of this quote cannot be overstated. Grosser hypothesizes that de Gaulle was so concerned with the French reputation and perceived geopolitical slights that, even though a mutually beneficial economic situation between the Community and Britain may have been possible, he scuttled the negotiations to punish Britain for her collusion with the Americans and out of fear of Atlantic influence in Europe.

Grosser later argues that de Gaulle’s motivations within Europe were distinctly geopolitical. He quotes de Gaulle: ‘In the French view, this economic construction [EEC] is not enough...Western Europe must form itself politically...Let us set up a political commission, a defense commission and, a cultural commission, just as we have already formed an economic commission...(93).” This quote is especially damaging to AM’s theory because Europe was already achieving economic cooperation. If economic and agricultural considerations were really the driving factor in de Gaulle’s political strategy, why would he pursue defense and foreign policy objectives after already achieving his desired outcome?

Finally, Grosser’s focus on de Gaulle’s dogged pursuit of nuclear weapons elucidates his true aims as leader. Grosser notes that, “[the] link between the military and the diplomatic has always been one of General de Gaulle’s major preoccupations, even before he became a general...[T]he conclusion to be drawn, according to General de Gaulle, is that there is no diplomacy without offensive weapons, i.e., without the possibility of using for diplomatic purposes a military threat other than defense against attack (99).”

In de Gaulle’s own words,

“It is with the same intention of ensuring that others should not become masters of our destiny that we, too, are in the process of endowing ourselves with nuclear weapons. For it is a fact of gigantic proportions and without precedent that, at the present time, the very life of every nation is literally at the mercy of whoever possesses such weapons, unless in some quarter the same means exist, and the wicked know that they will be struck peremptorily, should they venture to commit aggression (107).”

Grosser emphasizes that “The general theme is: ‘France will not accept that two privileged states should be the sole possessors of nuclear strength (108).’” De Gaulle’s preoccupation with France’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is a testament to the salience of French power and grandeur in his political philosophy. De Gaulle was shaped by war. He had twice borne witness to the near destruction of France, and his insistence upon raising Europe, France particularly, to the level of a global power belies the argument that his European policy and acquiescence to integration were solely due to domestic commercial concerns.

In his conclusion, Grosser defines France’s European policy succinctly as “To establish Europe as a power in itself and not to dilute it in advance by immersing it in a wider conglomeration where it would immediately lose its personality (129).” For de Gaulle “Europe is considered both as a means for France to resume a status worthy of her historic mission, and, on the other hand as a goal desirable in itself.” Thus, Grosser’s work seems to contradict LI’s
focus on economic bargaining as the driving force behind European integration. For de Gaulle, economics was important, but it was at best parallel to geopolitical considerations, and, more likely, a secondary concern.
10. France: De Gaulle’s deliberate deception?

Peyrefitte’s memorandum of 29 August 1960, Peyrefitte’s four articles in Le Monde of September 1960, and Peyrefitte’s memoirs on de Gaulle

AM makes two claims in the section “France: De Gaulle’s deliberate deception” (CfE: 176-97). First, de Gaulle was “primarily concerned not with geopolitical ideas, but with French commercial interests, particularly those of agriculture” (CfE: 185). He was willing to compromise his anti-supranational ambitions to achieve CAP. Second, de Gaulle engaged in an “elaborate and deliberate deception designed to maintain the illusion of a positive European vision” (CfE: 177). De Gaulle’s alternative intergovernmentalist vision, his delay of British accession, and the Fouchet plan were all part of this deception strategy.

AM singles out three “primary sources” (see Lieshout et al. 2004, for a discussion of hard and soft sources) as critical for substantiating this double claim: Alain Peyrefitte’s (AP) ten-page memorandum, Peyrefitte’s memoirs (1994), and Peyrefitte’s four articles published in Le Monde in September 1960. Peyrefitte is the sole author of all three, and he wrote the memo and the four articles in Le Monde at de Gaulle’s direction. As Peyrefitte recalls (Peyrefitte 1994: 69):

Au moment de me raccompagner à la porte, le Général me demande négligemment: ‘Vous pouvez me faire une note sur les moyens pratiques d’étouffer la supranationalité? Et, tant que vous tiendrez la plume, vous pourriez faire des articles pour vulgariser un peu ces idées de concertation des États, de construction confédérale, de référendum européen.

As he accompanies me back to the door, the General casually asks me, ‘Can you prepare me a memo on the practical means of stifling supranationality?’ And, while you are at it, could you also write some articles to popularize a bit these ideas of interstate concertation, confederal construction, European referendum.

The memorandum was confidential, and its chief goal was to explain how supranationalism might be to negated. The purpose of the Le Monde articles was to explain to the public de Gaulle’s vision of Europe. The memoirs provide background on de Gaulle’s motivation for both (Peyrefitte 1994: esp. pp 66-70). AM cites Peyrefitte’s memoirs in 28 of 65 notes in this section, of which Lieshout et al. judge nineteen to be incorrect. These three sources have been closely scrutinized by Lieshout et al., and our account is indebted to their analysis.

If de Gaulle did indeed try to deceive the world about his true motivations, one would expect discrepancy between the memorandum and the articles in Le Monde, and one would anticipate Peyrefitte’s memoirs to corroborate deception or discrepancy between the confidential and the public version. Neither finds much support in the historica record as we explain below.
AM’s summary of the confidential memorandum

Given the centrality of Alain Peyrefitte’s memo to AM’s argumentation, it is useful to begin with his summary of its meaning and relevance in CfE (186; our italics):

“Peyrefitte argued that the French government must disguise its true goals, agricultural modernization and undermining supranational institutions; France must strive ‘never to appear negative.’ To keep negotiations moving and to avoid triggering counterdemands and obstruction from its allies on economic issues, France must avoid conveying any inkling of its desire to destroy EC institutions in pursuit of its true goal: ‘a British Europe without the British.’ Any hint of de Gaulle’s plan to destroy EC institutions would disadvantage the French or lead the other five to side with the British. France should instead, in Peyrefitte’s words, ‘seduce’ the other five governments away from the EC by proposing positive plans that did not undermine sovereignty, such as the Fouchet plan. Such plans were needed to create the illusion of a positive French policy toward Europe and thereby to assure forward motion on economic issues and, if possible, to induce other governments to renounce the EC voluntarily. Perhaps, the Peyrefitte memo cynically speculated, this policy might persuade European federalists, who comprised a majority in many national parliaments, that ‘the President of the Republic had been ‘converted’ to their principles.’”

This interpretation is inaccurate and highly stilted. We build on Lieshout et al. (2004) by closely examining AM’s evidence. This involves,

- A closer look at AM’s word choice
- Scrutinizing the substance and wording of Alain Peyrefitte’s memo (hereafter: AP memo)
- Analyzing the public version in Le Monde, and comparing its contents with that of the memo
- Comparing de Gaulle’s “true goals” according to AM, with several memoir sources and how AP treats these in the memo, articles, memoirs.
- Examining the context of the memo, drawing mostly from AP’s memoirs.

Word choice in AM’s summary

Three of the four translated quotes in AM’s summary magnify the impression of deliberate deception. The italics below are ours:

- Instead of “never to appear negative,” AP’s memo recommends “never to be negative” (ne jamais être négatif);
- Instead of using the verb “seduce,” the memo uses the less forceful adjective form: “présenter les projects français sous la forme la plus séduisante,” which translates as “in
their most attractive form” (Cambridge dictionary & Collins dictionary; see also Lieshout et al. 2004: 107);

- Instead of speculating that “this policy might persuade European federalists that ... ‘the president of the Republic has been ‘converted’ to their principles,” the memo suggests a passive approach: “Let us even allow our partners to believe, or pretend to believe, that the president of the Republic and the French government have ‘converted’ to their positions” (Permettons même à nos partenaires de croire, ou de feindre de croire, ... )

AM’s synthesis uses words, such as “disguise,” “avoid conveying” or “create the illusion,” which suggest deception. However, these words are not in the memo, and they mischaracterize AP and de Gaulle’s motivations. Lieshout et al. (103-110) devote eight pages to a close reading of this excerpt alongside three paragraphs directly preceding or following and provide a sentence-by-sentence rebuttal to each of AM’s assertions.

Excerpts from the AP memo

The AP memo was reproduced in its entirety in Edmond Jouve’s two-volume dissertation on de Gaulle, which was published in 1967, and the page numbers refer to its reprint (Volume 2). The memo organizes its advice to President de Gaulle under four headings. The headings recommend a change in style of engagement with the other member states rather than a change in substance. Three of the four use the phrase “ne pas donner l’impression” to underline this. The fourth heading simply advises “to not make propositions that are too limited,” which could be construed as substantive advice. A close reading of the text reveals that AP is mostly interested in improving the presentation of de Gaulle’s political vision. It is one thing to recommend a less confrontational or more positive attitude and another to recommend concealment. We quote from the memo:

First, “do not give the impression to want to destroy the existing European institutions” [ne pas donner l’impression de vouloir détruire les institutions européennes existantes]. AP recommends that the government does not threaten to abolish the existing institutions or demand extensive treaty revision. It is simply not worth the bother because the existing institutions do not constitute a threat—they are too weak.

Pourquoi, du reste, s’attaquer aux institutions existantes? Ne leur donnons pas une importance qu’elles n’ont pas. ... La supranationalité n’existe pas. D’abord, parce que les hommes restent nationaux (sauf de rares exceptions, le plus souvent françaises); les membres des exécutifs voient peu ou prou les problèmes selon l’optique de leur

---

3 The memo was submitted to Prime Minister Debré and not to de Gaulle, and Peyrefitte claims in his memoirs that the General never spoke of the note (Peyrefitte 1994: 69). At the same time, he observes that the methods in the memo “for putting supranationality to sleep” [mise en sommeil de la supranationalité] seemed to guide policy over the next six years, and then he adds modestly, “perhaps because they suggested themselves” [probablement parce qu’elles s’imposaient d’elles-mêmes]. This seems to be the passage that induces AM to deduce that the memo set out the core of de Gaulle’s strategy from 1960 through 1966 (CfE: 186), though AM does not reference the page in AP’s memoirs.
milieu d’origine. Ensuite parce que la suprématie des organes dits ‘objectifs’ sur les organes gouvernementaux ne correspond pas à la nature des choses (490).

Why, for that matter, attack existing institutions? Do not give them an importance they do not have. ... Supranationality does not exist. First, because the people remain national (except for rare exceptions, most often French individuals); the members of the executives see the problems more or less from the viewpoint of their milieu of origin. Second, because the supremacy of the so-called ‘objective’ organs over governmental organs does not correspond to the nature of things.

Instead, he suggests, de Gaulle should exploit the vagueness of the treaty language: “ces traités-cadres sont aussi des traités-façades” (491) – “these framework treaties are also treaty-facades.” And France should be willing to be no less hypocritical as the other countries in preaching European ideals but practicing national interests:

(491) (et l’Europe-myth est aussi une Europe-alibi). A l’abri de dispositions, à ce point complexes qu’on peut fréquemment tourner l’une grâce à l’autre, nos partenaires sont communautaires quand cela leur rapporte, discrètement mais efficacement anticommunautaires quand cela les gênerait, tout en multipliant les protestations de foi dans l’Europe unie... Les préoccupations nationales jouent probablement un rôle plus déterminant pour nos partenaires que pour nous, mais ils ont l’habilité de mettre les apparences de leur côté (491-2).

(491) (and the myth of Europe is also an alibi). Protected from dispositions, at this point so complex that one can frequently do another a favor, our partners are communautaire when it suits them, discreetly but effectively anti-communautaire when that bothers them, while multiplying the protestations of faith in the united Europe ... National interests probably play a more determining role for our partners than for us, but they are in the habit of putting up appearances on their side.

Second, “do not give the impression to want to reject a priori extensions of the three treaties” [ne pas donner l’impression de repousser à priori les prolongements des trois traités]. AP then discusses three popular federalist ideas (merger of the executives; European elections; European University institute) and warns against opposing them outright since—again—they pose no threat to French sovereignty. AP is especially keen to defang the fear that the proposed merger of the communities’ three executives would strengthen supranationalism:

Ce projet serait dangereux s’il nous engageait sur la voie de la supranationalité; nous ne pouvons accepter que des responsabilités politiques soient exercées par les organes techniques. Mais les ‘exécutifs’ des communautés n’ont-ils pas cessé d’être redoutables? ... Sauf sur certains points très limités, ils doivent se contenter d’adresser des recommandations au Conseil ... Les membres des (soi-disant) ‘exécutifs’ eux-mêmes, ne croient plus qu’on puisse passer de l’Europe économique à l’Europe politique par l’extension de leurs pouvoirs. ... Dès lors que la fusion des
‘exécutifs’ ne présente plus de danger politique, elle se réduit en réalité à une rationalisation de services administratifs, pourquoi aurions-nous peur? (493)

This project would be dangerous if it committed us to the path of supranationality; we cannot accept that political responsibilities are exercised by technical organs. But have the 'executives' of the communities not ceased to be formidable? ... Except on very limited points, they must be content to make recommendations to the Council ... Members of (so-called) 'executives' themselves, no longer believe that we can move from an economic Europe to a political Europe by extending their powers. ... Since the merger of the 'executives' is no longer politically dangerous, and has been reduced to administrative rationalization, why should we be afraid?

Third, “do not give the impression to want to exclude the British while adopting their formula” [ne pas donner l’impression de vouloir exclure les Anglais en adoptant leur formule]. “Since we do not want them in the first stage” [“Puisque nous ne voulons pas d’eux [les Anglais] dans un premier stade,”] a “pragmatic” strategy is needed that keeps them at bay while at the same time shifting Europe towards confederalism. And AP recommends taking a leaf from the successful strategy with respect to economic integration:

... nous devrions pouvoir présenter une question pragmatique du même ordre que celle que nous avons fait jusqu’ici prévaloir sur le plan économique; voulant depuis deux ans éviter à la fois la division de l’Europe et la dissolution du Marché common, nous y avons en fait réussi. Dans l’immédiat, it semble souhaitable de proposer à la Grande-Bretagne une simple association aux organismes à créer; à plus long terme, laisserons-lui la porte ouverte, pour le jour ou elle se sentirait prête à accepter les servitudes d’une confédération (495).

... we should be able to present a pragmatic solution of the same kind that we have hitherto made with respect to economic integration; wanting for two years to avoid the division of Europe and the dissolution of the Common Market, we have in fact succeeded. In the short term, it seems desirable to propose to Great Britain a simple association with the organisms to be created; In the longer term, let us leave the door open for the day when she would feel ready to accept the bondages of a confederation.

This can be achieved by a) telling the Europeans that future integration steps among the Six will not turn Britain off, but instead prompt it to seek closer association with the continent, and b) telling all that a confederal Europe will, ultimately, increase Britain’s chances of entry.

Il est de bonne guerre de rappeler à nos partenaires que chaque progrès de la construction des Six pousse la Grande-Bretagne dans la voie de l’association avec le Continent. Chaque pas en avant auquel on renonce, l’engage au contraire à ne rien faire (495).

It is a good thing to remind our partners that every progress in the construction of the Six pushes Great-Britain on a path towards association with the Continent. Each step forward that one gives up, leads [Great-Britain] on the contrary to do nothing.
And on future enlargement (to Britain or others):

Faisons ressortir d’autre part qu’un traité confédéral offre beaucoup plus de possibilités d’élargissement ultérieur qu’un traité d’intégration. ... un traité confédéral, se contentant d’élaborer de grandes lignes et d’établir des institutions souples, pourrait s’ouvrir à tout instant à de nouveaux partenaires ... (495-6)

Let us also point out that a confederal treaty offers many more possibilities for ultimate enlargement than an integration treaty. ... [A] confederal treaty, content to develop large lines and establish flexible institutions, could be open for business at any time to new partners ...

Fourth, “do not make propositions that are too limited” [ne pas faire des propositions trop limitées]. The projected confederation should be more ambitious than traditional intergovernmental organizations such as NATO or the Council of Europe.

L’initiative européenne de la France a besoin d’être montrée sous un jour généreux. Il ne faut pas craindre d’y voir une approche, plus réaliste que celle de l’intégration, vers (de lointains) États-Unis d’Europe (496).

The European initiative of France needs to be shown in a generous light. We should not be afraid to see [in the confederation] an approach, more realistic than that of integration, to a (distant) United States of Europe.

AP has two concrete suggestions. The first is that France present the plan as multi-stage, whereby intergovernmentalism is the first stage of three that culminate in a confederation that could decide by simple majority. However, critically, it is governments who determine unanimously when the time is ripe to move to a next stage.

La confédération constitue une approche vers les futurs États-Unis d’Europe, suffisamment rassurante pour être réaliste, puisqu’elle laisse intacte l’autonomie de chaque état membre, confie aux gouvernements le soin de décider de chaque nouvelle étape vers l’Europe unie, concilie l’idéal européen et la sauvegarde des patries; mais suffisamment constructive -- puisqu’elle organise une coopération permanente (497).

The confederation constitutes a path towards future United States of Europe [note: plural], sufficiently reassuring to be realistic, since it leaves intact the autonomy of each member state, entrusts to governments to decide on each new step towards a united Europe, reconciles the European ideal and the safeguarding of homelands; but sufficiently constructive - since it organizes a permanent cooperation.

The second suggestion is to launch a bold idea—"a psychological shock" [un choc psychologique] or “a grand idea” [idée-force]—that can capture people’s imagination: the European-wide referendum. It would allow France to seize the high ground:

Le ‘référendum solennel’ des Européens libres donnerait un spectaculaire départ à la construction de cette confédération. ... Le référendum constituerait en outre, en face des nations captives, un autotut dans la guerre psychologique. La France et l’Europe reprendraient à leur compte les idées explosives de 1789. Parlant le langage même de
la Charte des Nations-Unies, mettant la conscience internationale de leur côté, elles donneraient au monde libre l’arme redoutable du droit des peuples à disposer d’eux-mêmes (497).

The 'solemn referendum' of free Europeans would give a spectacular start to the construction of this confederation. ... The referendum would also constitute, in the face of captive nations, an obstacle in our psychological warfare. France and Europe would adopt the explosive ideas of 1789. Speaking the very language of the United Nations Charter, bringing the international conscience on their side, they would give to the free world the formidable weapon of peoples’ right to self-determination.

AP concludes with the words cited in AM’s summary: “Those four conditions could be summed up in one: never be negative” [Ces quatre conditions pourraient se réunir en une seule: ne jamais être négatif]. Rather than prodding de Gaulle to conceal or distort, he finishes by recommending:

Mettons-nous ainsi en position de démasquer les hypocrisies, au lieu de nous laisser accabler par elles. Cessons de prêter le flanc aux procès d’intention, en faisant ressortir la pureté et le réalisme des nôtres (498).

Let us put ourselves in a position to expose the hypocrisies, instead of allowing ourselves to be overwhelmed by them. Let us stop being open to trials of intent, while highlighting the purity and realism of our [plans].

In all, AP’s memo is a tightly written document intent on reigning in de Gaulle’s inclination to be confrontational. The red thread is that the institutions, the treaty language, and the political context are on France’s side: supranationality is weak and ineffective; the treaties are harmless frames without positive intergovernmental steps; the other governments are no less concerned about national interests than is France, only less openly so, and Britain’s accession is at worst a distant possibility. If there is deception, it seems directed at de Gaulle in that the memo minimizes the potential threat of supranationality. It is hard to detect here a strategy of concealment of de Gaulle’s “true” vision of Europe or his “true” goal of commercial and agricultural interests.

The public version in Le Monde

Under the overarching title “L’Avenir de l’Europe,” four articles in Le Monde set out a Gaullist vision of an anti-supranationalist, intergovernmentalist Europe that is wary of British accession (Jouve II: 427-441). The articles were published on 14, 15, 16, and 17 September 1960, two weeks after Peyrefitte submitted his memo to Prime Minister Debré and reproduced in Jouve’s dissertation (1967). The page numbers refer to Jouve’s reprint.

The first article, “Où va la construction à Six?” states the need to go beyond the common market, exposes the ineffectiveness of supranationality, and laments the lack of a common political purpose. It echoes tone and language of the memo’s first recommendation, and AP certainly does not conceal his disdain for supranationality:
The war of myths continues. Integration or association? Supranationality or intergovernmental cooperation? ... The High Authority has been powerless to impose on governments a decision that offends the interests of certain member countries . . . Supranationality receded on the first occasion that some wished to invoke it.

In the Treaties of Rome, the principle of supranationality intervenes only in an elusive way, as if an echo of distant goals. In fact, in one community as in the other, the harmonization of policies and legislation can only be achieved gradually, by unanimous consent of the council. The six governments are the only actors endowed with authority.

“Comment passer d’une communauté économique à une communauté politique?” rejects the federalist plans of concentrating executive power in supranational institutions and of direct parliamentary elections, two prominent themes discussed in the memo’s second recommendation. It then plants the idea of a confederation as an extended stage towards European unity.

“Un project de conféderation” explicates the institutional features of a confederation, the most central of which are a) intergovernmentalism, with perhaps in the distant future majority voting and an elected parliament, b) a political union with at its core foreign and defense collaboration, and c) a plan in progressive stages policed by the governments. AP explains:

La première [caractéristique], c’est que les gouvernements en prendraient l’initiative. Ils ne risqueraient pas de se voir entraîner dans une voie dangereuse pour les intérêts nationaux essentiels: au lieu de craindre qu’une assemblée leur force la main, ils garderaient eux-mêmes la direction du mouvement. La deuxième, c’est que les chefs de gouvernement auraient le contrôle de la politique européenne. ... La troisième caractéristique devrait être la priorité donnée à la coordination des politiques étrangères et de défense. ... La quatrième caractéristique serait l’appel au suffrage universel ... La cinquième caractéristique du nouveau système devrait être la progressivité. Les esprits ne sont pas encore suffisamment préparés à aller de l’avant.

On pourrait imaginer une période transitoire comportant plusieurs étapes (434-5).

The first [characteristic] is that governments take the initiative. They would not run the risk of being dragged into a lane that endangers vital national interests: instead of
fearing that an assembly would force their hand, they would themselves keep control over the course of action. The second is that the heads of government would have control over European politics. ... The third characteristic should be the priority given to the coordination of foreign and defense policies. ... The fourth characteristic is the call for universal suffrage. ... The fifth characteristic of the new system should be progressivity. The spirits are not yet sufficiently prepared to go forward. One could imagine a transitional period consisting of several stages.

The final article, “Le référendum et l’étendue de la confederation,” extols the virtues of (government-controlled) referendums as a means to solicit public support and casts doubts on an imminent British accession while keeping the door ajar to enlargement. It echoes ideas and borrows expressions from the second and third section in the memo.

On the virtues of the referendum, AP repeats almost word for word the memo:

> Enfin ce référendum, processus simple, accessible à tous les peuples d’Europe, constituerait un atout dans la guerre psychologique. L’Europe reprendrait à son compte les idées explosives de 1789. Parlant le langage même de la charte de San-Francisco, mettant la conscience internationale de son côté, elle donnerait au monde libre l’arme redoutable du droit des peuples à disposer d’eux-mêmes (438).

Finally, this referendum, a simple process accessible to all the peoples of Europe, would be an asset in psychological warfare. Europe would take over the explosive ideas of 1789. Speaking the language of the charter of San Francisco, placing the international conscience on its side, it would give the free world the formidable weapon of the right of peoples to dispose of themselves.

The language on British accession is more circumspect, but like the memo, AP begins by staking out the dilemma: how to engage Britain enough to avoid its hostility, but not too much so it can deadlock the union? [“La question, vieille de dix ans, est de savoir si les Six trouveront une formule qui associe suffisamment l’Angleterre pour ne pas entraîner son hostilité, mais pas assez pour paralyser leur union. Nous semblons acculés à un dilemme.”]. He proposes a pragmatic two-step solution, and echoing the memo, he compares it to the solution worked out in the economic field:

> La solution la plus heureuse serait sans doute une formule pragmatique, du même ordre que celle qui a jusqu’ici prévalu sur le plan économique. Les Britanniques auraient voulu la dissolution du Marché commun dans la zone de libre-échange. La France a fait adopter une méthode visant à sauvegarder le Marché commun tout en veillant que sa mise en marche n’apporte pas de bouleversement parmi nos autres partenaires d’Europe occidentale. Les Six pourraient, dans le même esprit, mettre en train une union confédérale en tenant étroitement la Grand-Bretagne au courant de leurs travaux (439).

The happiest solution would undoubtedly be a pragmatic formula, of the same order as that which has hitherto prevailed economically. The British would have liked the dissolution of the Common Market into the free trade zone. France has adopted a method to safeguard the Common Market while ensuring that its implementation
does not bring disruption among our other partners in Western Europe. The Six could, in the same spirit, set up a confederal union by closely keeping Britain informed of their work.

AP’s contribution in *Le Monde* is very careful not to rule out British membership, which is again consistent with the memo. At the same time, AP signals clearly that British membership is neither desirable nor expected in the near future. The fact that AP was unable to forestall de Gaulle’s double “non” to British membership cannot be proffered as evidence that de Gaulle (or France) was concealing its “true goal!”

**Comparative analysis**

It seems plausible to conclude that there is broad consistency between the articles in *Le Monde*—a prominent public manifestation of de Gaulle’s ideas and strategy—and Peyrefitte’s memorandum—allegedly the most important private exposition of de Gaulle’s ideas and strategy. At various times, Peyrefitte borrows language from the memo, and organization and ideas follow the memo. For example, Peyrefitte’s critique of the treaties as mere “traités-cadres” that need filling out by governments is prominent in both, as is his description of supranationality as ephemeral and merely of technical use, his outline of a confederation controlled by governments, his reluctance towards British accession, and his enthusiasm about a popular referendum. Lieshout et al. (2004: 103) conclude that “the central ideas in Peyrefitte’s memorandum, including the establishment of a confederation with priority for foreign policy and defense, the organization of a referendum, and the impossibility of British membership as long as Britain did not accept the existing Common Market, … were all presented in the articles in *Le Monde*.”

**De Gaulle’s true goals**

It is uncontroversial that de Gaulle’s goals were agricultural modernization and undermining supranational institutions, alongside a third, keeping Britain on the sidelines. Contentious is the claim that “de Gaulle’s European policy was aimed primarily at securing commercial advantages for French agriculture and industry, rather than realizing ideological goals” and, especially, “[the goal of opposition to supranational institutions] was self-consciously compromised to secure the CAP” (CfE: 177).

The quotes we have laid out from the memo and the *Le Monde* articles establish the significance of thwarting supranationalism and delaying UK membership. Interestingly, neither source says much about agriculture or commercial interests. Agricultural policy receives three brief mentions in the memo, as one of several policies that France seeks to develop. AP also emphasizes that this would not derive automatically from the treaty but would require a political impetus from the governments (Jouve II: 492-3). The public version in *Le Monde* mentions agriculture only once in a long list of policies in which European cooperation should go deeper than the treaty itself (427): “en élaborant notamment des politiques agricole,
commerciale et sociale, voire monétaire et fiscal, communes: autant de secteurs qui sont directement et indissolublement liés à la politique, tant intérieure qu’étrangere.”

Still, it is undoubtedly valid that agricultural modernization, and by extension, the Common Agricultural Policy, was important for de Gaulle (see also Ludlow 2005; Keeler 2000). This is corroborated in Peyrefitte’s memoirs. Peyrefitte recalls a one-on-one conversation with de Gaulle after a cabinet meeting in 1962, in which the General declares:

*Le sort de notre agriculture est désormais, après le règlement de l’affaire algérienne, notre plus grand problème. Et si nous ne régions pas, nous pouvons avoir une autre affaire d’Algérie sur notre propre sol (AP: 302).*

The fate of our agriculture is now, after the settlement of the Algerian affair, our biggest problem. And if we do not settle, we could have another Algerian affair on our own soil.

Moreover, de Gaulle reconciled himself early in his rule with the Common Market as a vehicle for modernizing the French economy. In his memoirs, Michel Debré, de Gaulle’s first prime minister from January 1959 through April 1962, recounts how this happened. A few months into his administration and faced with a French economy in freefall, de Gaulle instructed a high-powered group of economists to come up with an economic plan. They recommended abandoning classical protectionism, and de Gaulle signed on. Debré (1988: 327-8) writes:

*Le Général aspire à ‘faire du neuf.’ ... Ce choix est celui de l’ouverture des frontières, c’est à dire de l’abaissement des droits de douane, accompagné de l’élargissement, voire de la suppression d’un grand nombre de contingents. Ces mesures ne sont pas seulement dictées par le bon sens, c’est à dire la nécessité de mettre fin à un protectionnisme malthusien, elles sont aussi le symbole d’une volonté délibérée de placer la France dans la compétition internationale. Le traité sur le Marché Commun a été avant tout, pour ses négociateurs, un acte politique: l’orientation vers la supranationalité et une revanche contre l’échec de l’armée européenne. De cela le Général de Gaulle ne veut pas, mais il entend réaliser ce que le régime précédent n’aurait pas pu faire: mettre la France en mesure d’être au premier rang de l’économie européenne. ... Une grande politique bien différente de celle des signataires du projet sous-tend un choix économique.*

The General aspires to 'do something new'... This choice is to open the borders, i.e. to lower customs duties, accompanied by increasing, or even lifting of a large number of quotas. These measures are not only dictated by common sense, i.e. the need to put an end to Malthusian protectionism, they are also the symbol of a considered desire to make France internationally competitive. The Common Market treaty was above all, for its negotiators, a political act: an orientation towards supranationality and a revenge against the failure of the European army. That is certainly not what General de Gaulle wants, but he intends to achieve what the previous regime would not have been able to do: to put France in a position to become a first-rung economic power in Europe. ... A high politics goal that is very different from that of the Treaty’s signatories forms the foundation of an economic choice (327-8).
Both excerpts—both referenced by AM (though not quoted)—corroborate the importance of economic interests for de Gaulle. However, it is a leap of faith to read into this de Gaulle’s “primacy” for agricultural and commercial interests or his willingness to “self-consciously” “compromise” his opposition to supranationalism. Let us re-read the excerpts in context.

AP’s memoirs recount how de Gaulle labels agriculture France’s biggest problem at the end of a cabinet meeting, one of many in 1962 dominated by British accession. But the monologue around this remarkable statement signals that de Gaulle was a) persuaded by British prime minister MacMillan’s assurances that Britain could swallow a common policy on agriculture and the Common Market, and b) concerned more about the geopolitical differences between Britain and the Six. Is Britain willing to become independent from the Americans, and deny the US meaningful access to its nuclear weapons—just like France? It is illuminating to listen to the monologue, and note, at the end, AP’s own assessment (1994: 301-303):

AP: Vous croyez vraiment MacMillan prêt à bouleverser les courants d’échanges, les habitudes des consommateurs?
GdG: Il me l’a affirmé. Il prétend qu’autrefois, il était inimaginable de se présenter à une élection ou on aurait été accusé de vouloir le pain cher; mais qu’aujourd’hui, ça ne compte plus. ... L’Angleterre de Kipling est morte. ... Les jeunes considèrent que leur avenir est lié désormais à celui de l’Europe. Ce nouvel état d’esprit marque, selon lui, un changement fondamental, qui apparaîtrait dans tous les milieux, dans tous les partis. Les hommes d’affaires britanniques se prépareraient, eux aussi, au Marché commun. ...

AP: MacMillan est-il vraiment prêt à adhérer au plan Fouchet ... ?
GdG: Il a abondé dans mon sens. ... Alors, je lui ai dit carrément: ‘Notre volonté est de devenir indépendants par rapport aux Américains. Y êtes-vous prêts?’ Il m’a répondu que les jeunes en Angleterre et lui-même pensaient comme nous. ... [I]l est tellement déterminé, que j’aurais été désobligeant si je l’avais découragé complètement. J’ai quand même conclu en lui disant que, quand on hésite sur les buts à poursuivre, mieux vaut ne pas s’engager.

Then de Gaulle zooms into the geopolitical chasm between the UK and France, most obvious in their stance on nuclear weapons:

Si l’Angleterre se contente de mettre dans l’OTAN une petite partie de ses forces et garde l’essentiel en réserve sur son territoire sous son seul commandement, ainsi que sa force de frappe, alors nos conceptions sont identiques. Mais ce n’est pas la conception qui prévaut à l’OTAN, où l’on remet purement et simplement aux mains des Américains la défense de l’Europe, nucléaire ou conventionnelle. Ça ne sert à rien de faire l’Europe ...
AP: Dès ce moment, il est clair qu’il mêle inextricablement, dans son attitude à l’égard de la Grande-Bretagne, la question économique, la question politique et la question nucléaire.⁴

Translation:

AP: Do you really believe MacMillan is ready to upset the flow of trade, consumer habits?

GdG: He told me so. He argues that formerly it was unimaginable to stand for an election where one could have been accused of wanting expensive bread; but today it does not matter anymore... Kipling's England is dead. ...Young people believe their future is now linked to that of Europe. This new state of mind marks, according to him, a fundamental change, which is palpable in all circles, in all parties. British businessmen would also be preparing for the Common Market...

AP: Is MacMillan really ready to join the Fouchet plan? ...

GdG: He has agreed with me. ... So, I told him bluntly: 'Our desire is to become independent from the Americans. Are you ready?' He replied that the young people in England and himself thought as we did. ... [He] is so determined that I would have been insulting if I had completely discouraged him. I nevertheless concluded by saying that when one hesitates on the goals to pursue, it is better not to commit.

Then de Gaulle focusses on the geopolitical chasm between the UK and France, most obvious in the commitment on nuclear weapons:

If England is content to put a small part of its forces in NATO and keep the essentials in reserve on its territory under its sole command, as well as its strike force, then our world views are identical. But this is not the prevailing view in NATO, where the defense of Europe, nuclear or conventional, is purely and simply handed over to the Americans. That is useless for Europe ...

AP: From that moment onwards, it was clear to me that he inextricably mixes, in its attitude towards Great Britain, the economic question, the political question and the nuclear question.

While de Gaulle is suspicious of MacMillan’s guarantees that he will not torpedo the Common Market or common agricultural policy (in 1962, still merely a plan on the drawing table), geopolitical distrust hovers darkly over economic concerns. Of course, all three – economics, politics, and defense—point in the same direction, and this makes it tricky to definitively adjudicate which of these three weighs most heavily in de Gaulle’s European policy. AP’s own assessment leaves that matter open, and we are inclined to follow him. However, it seems safe to conclude that it is incorrect to infer from this source that economics trumped geopolitics.

⁴ Aware that AP’s conclusion sits awkwardly with his thesis of the primacy of commercial interests, AM flags it in footnote 37 as the one statement that contradicts his account.
Debré’s memoirs are much less detailed than AP’s. There is no dialogue here, just a summary of thoughts attributed to de Gaulle. Still, it is interesting that Debré ends his ruminations with the reflection that “A high politics goal that is very different from that of the Treaty’s signatories constitutes the foundation of [sous-tient] an economic choice.” The sentence suggests that geopolitics was driving economics rather than the other way around.

The analysis in this section engages a mere three of AM’s twenty-one sources cited in footnote 44 on page 180, which is the key note buttressing the argument that economic interests were primary to geopolitical ideas. According to Lieszout et al. (2004: 123-24), seventeen of the eighteen other sources are incorrectly referenced.

*Context of the memorandum*

The circumstances around the memorandum’s creation further shrink the scope for deliberate deception. First, Peyrefitte published the four opinion pieces in *Le Monde* (September 14, 15, 16, 17, 1960) two weeks after the memo, which, under the overarching title “L’Avenir de l’Europe,” set out the Gaullist vision of an anti-supranationalist and intergovernmentalist Europe wary of British accession. And while the articles do not address at length the virtues of a common agricultural policy or the common market, it is implicit that AP (and hence presumably de Gaulle) supported both. If the intention was to conceal de Gaulle’s true goals, the articles in *Le Monde* blow de Gaulle’s cover. Recall that AP wrote these at the behest of de Gaulle who wanted to educate the public by reaching out to “la grande presse.”

We assessed above the likelihood of deception in the memo, and we judged this minimal. However, even if the memorandum contained deception that we overlook, it did not stay undercover for long. The memo was leaked to the press at the end of August, reportedly accidentally, and reproduced by *Agence d’Europe*, a news outlet with close ties to the European Commission (Peyrefitte 1994: 70). It was reprinted two years later (with minor edits) by *La Dernière Heure*, a Belgian newspaper, and this is the version in the public domain at the time of AM’s writing (Jouve 1967, II: 489-499, with a list of small editorial differences between the original memo and the 1962 version). Peyrefitte’s strategy of deception, to the extent it was concealed in this memo, was out in the open from the get-go.

Finally, AP recalls the conversation with de Gaulle that prompted the latter to instruct the memo. Peyrefitte’s recollection highlights de Gaulle’s geopolitical concerns. De Gaulle summoned him on July 13, 1960, to explain how France could better protect its national sovereignty against the European treaties. At two instances, de Gaulle wonders whether France should pull out of Euratom and he is deeply suspicious of the EEC. While de Gaulle mentions a common agricultural policy and recognizes the advantages of the common market, at no point does he signal he is prepared to trade national sovereignty to secure these commercial interests. It is true that AP talks him back from pulling out from Euratom and the EEC, but this is the only “compromise” de Gaulle appears willing to consider. Instead of pulling out of Euratom, AP recommends that France, the sole nuclear power, simply neglects to pool its resources in Euratom. As for the Treaty of Rome, he points out it functions under unanimity until 1967, and France reserves the right to refuse to transition to majority voting at that point. De Gaulle
neither accepts nor rejects this reading but shifts gear to rail against the threat of supranationalism in foreign and defense policy. De Gaulle ends on a positive note with suggesting that, at some point in the future, a comprehensive confederation is possible. It is difficult to overestimate de Gaulle’s deep concern with national sovereignty. Below are two extended excerpts from AP’s memoirs—the first at the beginning of the conversation, and the second at the end:

Le Général appelle mon attention, à son tour, sur le caractère confidentiel de cet entretien, puis il va droit à ce qui l’inquiète:

GdG: Après le rejet de la Communauté européenne de défense, les inspirateurs de cette entreprise ont fui comme la peste les mots de ‘supranationalité’ et de ‘fédéralisme.’ Ils ont compris qu’ils couraient à un nouvel échec s’ils y allaient franco. Mais ils n’ont pas changé de convictions. Ils sont bien décidés à établir, comme ils disent, les États-Unis d’Europe, avec un super-gouvernement fédéral, composé des actuelles commissions, qui surplomberait des gouvernements provinciaux, les actuels gouvernements des États, lesquels ne s’occuperaient plus que des questions secondaires.

AP: C’est le système Monnet. Il consiste précisément à créer des situations dont on ne peu sortir qu’en accroissant la dose de supranationalité. Chaque difficulté nouvelle nous entraîne dans un engrenage qui pousse un peu plus à l’Etat fédéral et dessaisit un peu plus les gouvernements nationaux.

GdG: Cela, nous n’en voulons pas! Cela ne se fera pas! Ce serait une stupidité! Des deux traités de Rome, je ne sais pas lequel est le plus dangereux. Le traité sur Euratom est plus qu’inutile, il est nuisible. Je me demande s’il ne faut pas le dénoncer. Et puis, il y a le Marché commun. C’est une union douanière, qui peut nous faire du bien, à condition qu’on réalise le Marché commun agricole, qui n’y est pas institué, et quelques autres politiques communes, qui ne sont même pas esquissées. Mais il comporte aussi des prétentions, ce qu’on appelle ses ‘virtualités supranationales,’ qui ne sont pas acceptables pour nous. ‘Supranationalité,’ c’est absurde! Rien n’est au-dessus des nations, sinon ce que leurs États décident ensemble! Les prétentions des commissaires de Bruxelles à vouloir donner des ordres aux gouvernements sont dérisoires! Dérisoires! (AP: 66-67).

Then AP explains how France can work within the treaties to “rendre inopérante la dose de supranationalité incluse dans les deux traités de Rome – Marché commun et Euratom” [render inoperative the dose of supranationality in the two Rome Treaties—common market and Euratom]. Having listened to all that, de Gaulle exclaims:

GdG: Il faut nous garder du risque d’être débordés. Harmoniser les intérêts pratiques des Six, organiser leur solidarité économique vis-à-vis des tier, c’est bien. Mais il n’est pas question de passer, selon la même méthode, du domaine économique à je ne sais quelle ‘intégration’ de la politique, de la diplomatie, de la défense. Ce sont des billevesées. Nous n’allons pas nous laisser déposséder de nos pouvoirs. Nous n’allons pas nous laisser inféoder! La France ne se confond pas!
Les Monnet et autres Pleven considèrent que la France n’est qu’un petit pays: qu’elle ne fait pas le poids pour jouer un rôle mondial; qu’elle n’a donc qu’à se soumettre aux autres. ...

Je n’exclus pas, pour plus tard, une confédération, qui serait le couronnement d’un patient effort pour dégager une politique commune, une diplomatie commune, une sécurité commune, au bout d’une longue période ou les six Etats auraient pris l’habitude de vivre ensemble. Je vais faire des propositions dans ce sens à Adenauer. Mais ça ne pourra se faire que par les concertation des gouvernements légitimes. Et non par des technocrates apatrides (AP: 68-69).

Translation:

The General calls my attention, in turn, to the confidential nature of this interview, then he goes straight to what worries him:

GdG: After the rejection of the European Defense Community, the inspirers of this enterprise have avoided like the plague the words 'supranationality' and 'federalism.' They realized that they were risking a new failure if they went straight for it. But they have not altered their convictions. They are determined to establish, as they say, the United States of Europe, with a federal super-government, made up of the current commissions, which would look down on the provincial governments, the present national governments, which would only take care of secondary matters.

AP: It's the Monnet system. It consists precisely of creating a situation that can only be overcome by increasing the dose of supranationality. Each new difficulty leads us into a cycle that pushes a little more towards the federal state and divests the national governments a little more.

GdG: That we do not want! That will not happen! It would be stupid! Of the two treaties of Rome, I do not know which one is the most dangerous. The Euratom Treaty is more than useless, it is harmful. I wonder if we should denounce it. And then there is the Common Market. It is a customs union, which can do us good, provided that we realize the Common Agricultural Market, which is not yet established, and some other common policies, which are not even sketched out. But it also includes pretensions, what are called its 'supranational virtualities,' which we cannot accept. 'Supranationality,' it's absurd! Nothing exists above the nations, except when the states decide it together! The pretentions of the commissioners in Brussels that they can give orders to the governments are derisory! Derisory!

Then AP explains how France can work within the treaties to “rendre inopérante la dose de supranationalité incluse dans les deux traités de Rome – Marché commun et Euratom” [render inoperative the dose of supranationality in the two Rome Treaties—Common Market and Euratom]. Having listened to all that, de Gaulle exclaims:

GoG: We have to be watchful not to be overwhelmed. Harmonizing the practical interests of the Six, organizing their economic solidarity vis-à-vis third parties, that’s good. But it is not a question of passing, in the same way, from the economic domain to—I don’t know some kind of 'integration' of politics, diplomacy, defense. This is
madness. We will not let ourselves be deprived of our powers. We will not let ourselves be made subservient! France does not get confused!

The Monnets and other Plevens believe that France is just a small country: it does not carry the weight to play a global role; that she can only but submit to others. ...

I do not exclude, for later, a confederation, which would be the culmination of a patient effort to realize a common policy, a common diplomacy, a common security, after a long period when the six states would have gotten used to living together. I will make proposals in this sense to Adenauer. But that can only be done through the collaboration (concertation) of legitimate governments. And not by stateless technocrats.

Conclusion

This note assesses the veracity of two claims made by AM in the key section of CfE entitled “France: De Gaulle’s deliberate deception” (CfE: 176-97). First, that de Gaulle was “primarily concerned not with geopolitical ideas, but with French commercial interests, particularly those of agriculture” (CfE: 185). In that vein, he was willing to compromise his anti-supranational ambitions to achieve the CAP. Second, that de Gaulle engaged in an “elaborate and deliberate deception designed to maintain the illusion of a positive European vision” (CfE: 177). De Gaulle’s alternative intergovernmentalist vision, his delay of British accession, and the Fouchet plan were part of this deception strategy.

We revisit three key supportive sources identified by AM -- Peyrefitte’s memo, Peyrefitte’s four articles in Le Monde, and Peyrefitte’s memoirs (alongside some additional sources highlighted by AM)—to evaluate the thesis.

We arrive at a conclusion similar to Lieshout et al. (2004), that the evidence supporting deception is weak.

With respect to the commercial interest/ supranationality trade-off, we can corroborate that:

- de Gaulle and his government supported the Common Market and were in favor of a Common Agricultural Policy;
- de Gaulle appears to have been dissuaded by his staff from exiting the Treaties because France had much to gain by staying in;
- de Gaulle’s opposition to supranationalism was uncompromising and was salient in his European policy. We find no evidence in the sources to infer that the General or his government were willing to compromise or soften their opposition on supranationalism for commercial interests. On the contrary, the excerpt from AP’s memoirs on British accession reveals that, for de Gaulle, reluctance to admit Britain was driven more by geopolitical differences than by commercial concerns.

With respect to the smoke screen of a positive European vision, we can corroborate that:
- de Gaulle and his government were indeed advised to formulate, and sell, a positive and *alternative* vision for Europe;

- this vision was a path to a confederal Europe, which was to be a) a multi-stage process, b) determined by governments, c) with potentially majority voting and decision making across a wide range of areas in the future; and d) legitimized with a European-wide referendum, that to in some undefined future. This plan was intergovernmentalist and anti-supranationalist, and it seems to genuinely reflect de Gaulle’s true goals;

- the public presentation of this vision in *Le Monde* is substantively identical to the private vision as summarized in AP’s memoirs and AP’s memo.

References


