THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

The European Commission of the Twenty-First Century

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We dedicate this book to our partners and families, who have lived through the project with us. In appreciation of your forbearance, and with our love.

Preface

The idea for this project was born in a workshop, convened by John Peterson, at the University of Edinburgh on 8–9 February 2006. John was the leader of a team working on 'The Commission and the European Civil Service' in the EU-Consent Network of Excellence, which was funded under the European Union's (EU) Sixth Research Framework. Although the discussion was relatively well informed, the academics in the room—some of us who have spent many years studying the European Commission—felt that despite the scholarly attention directed at the organization, important questions remained unanswered.

Our usual approach to conducting research on the Commission was at least partly responsible. Subject on our side to constraints of time and money, we generally try to interview as many officials as are willing to meet us and to put questions to them about whatever topic we are currently investigating. In this way over the years many of us have clocked up hundreds of interviews. Although this approach has its rewards, getting to know the Commission and its staff by traipsing through the streets of Brussels has its limitations. I suggested to John that a large-scale survey would enable us to capture the views of far more officials than we could possibly ever hope to meet face-to face and to elicit a far more representative sample of opinion and perspectives from within the organization. In this way, we could better understand the Commission and the people who work for it. The appointment of a new Secretary-General made the moment opportune.

John and I tested the idea with friends and colleagues, sounded out potential collaborators, and floated the idea with senior officeholders in the Commission. To our delight—and our surprise, in the case of the latter—all were encouraging. To cut a long story short, the breakthrough came when John found himself with an opportunity to explain the project to Commission President José Manuel Barroso at the University of Edinburgh, where Barroso was being awarded an honorary degree. As a former academic, President Barroso could see the value of the project and offered his endorsement. Catherine Day, the Secretary-General of the Commission and its highest-ranking permanent official, was equally supportive.

We were extremely grateful, not only for the green light to proceed with what has been a truly privileged experience, but also because we recognized the significance of the decision. Allowing an outside team of researchers to investigate the background, beliefs, and attitudes of staff is courageous for any organization. For a body such as the Commission that is continually in the spotlight and whose status is a source of almost daily controversy, it was especially courageous. We would be bound to uncover opinions that would be unwelcome, if not unsurprising, to senior officeholders, and stumble into the malcontents who oppose official policy, sometimes vehemently. Our admiration was only the greater as so few organizations, public or private, have been prepared to open themselves up in this way.

We have accumulated many other debts since that workshop in Edinburgh. Our first and foremost debt is to the European Commission; notably the 1901 Commission staff members who completed the online survey and in particular the more than 200 who consented to face-to-face interviews. If these respondents had not been prepared to spare their time or share their experience, the project would not have been possible. There are a number of particular individuals within the Commission, or formerly of it, to whom we are especially grateful. They include: Catherine Day, Olivier Bailly, Luc Tholoniat, Jonathan Faull, Sabine Weyand, Matthew Baldwin, Stefaan de Rynk, Daniele Dotto, Emiel Weizenbach, Emer Daly, Cesare Onestini, and Jim Cloos. Their help and support has been invaluable.

We have benefited greatly from the expertise and insight of several scholars. Charlie Jeffery offered advice at the very beginning that proved invaluable. Carolyn Ban, Morten Egeberg, Ed Page, and Jarle Trondal have been critical friends, who have encouraged us, but also forced us to reflect and rethink at key points along the way. We are grateful to the participants in countless conference panels and workshops for helpful comments and suggestions.[1] In addition, Christina Boswell, Charlotte Burns, Laura Cram, Francesca Gains, Didier Georgakakis, Miriam Hartlapp, Klaus Goetz, Gary Marks, Anand Menon, Julia Metz, B. Guy Peters, Christian Rauh, Susanne K. Schmidt and Anchrit Wille read and helped us improve early drafts of what become the chapters of this book.

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[1] They include: Council of European Studies conference, Barcelona, 24–26 June 2011 and Montreal, 15–17 April 2010; *Public Administration in the Multilevel System* session, Humboldt-Universität, Berlin, 23–24 June 2011, ECPR Pan-European Conference; European Union Studies Association, Boston, 2–3 March 2011; Europa Institute Annual Mitchell lecture, Edinburgh, 24 February 2011; EXACT Marie Curie International Training Network workshop, Edinburgh, 9 December 2010; European Group of Public Administration, Toulouse, 8 September 2010; European Consortium for Political Research Fifth Pan-European Conference, Porto, 23–26 June 2010; ARENA Research Seminar, University of Oslo, 8 June 2010 and 10 May 2010; Political Studies Association, University of Edinburgh, 1 April 2010; and EU-Consent meetings, Edinburgh, 4–6 March 2009, 20 July 2006, and 15 May 2006 and, Paris, 21–22 June 2006.

against the Euro, enabled us to make the most of a unique research opportunity. Tanja Börzel and Thomas Risse very kindly funded an authors' workshop co-hosted by the Wissenschaftzentrum Berlin für–Sozialforschung at the Freie Universitat Berlin/Kolleg-Forschergruppe, 7–8 February 2011, which gave us an important opportunity to present and discuss chapter drafts.

A number of people have worked with us or for us, or have otherwise offered their assistance. We are very grateful to Marina Shapiro for her statistical work in weighting the samples at the beginning of the project, to Elizabeth Bomberg, Rosalind Cavahagn, Pascal Duchauchoy-Creuzin, Madeleine Dobie, Anna-Lena Hogenauer, Hagen Streb, Nicholas Veron, and Sabine Weyand for helping with queries relating to the translation of the questionnaires into French and German, and to Mark Dittmer-Odell and Ines Mosgalik for stalwart assistance in the field. We have been extremely fortunate to employ an excellent research assistant in Louise Maythorne in Edinburgh and an outstanding research administrator in Vanessa Buth in Norwich. Both also participated with us in multiple interviews in Brussels; their efforts have been truly indispensable.

Members of the research team have, moreover, incurred individual debts. Michael Bauer would like to thank Philipp Studinger for his assistance with data analysis. Sara Connolly expresses her gratitude to UEA for granting her the period of study leave that enabled her to work on the project and the ongoing commitment of the University to interdisciplinary research. Liesbet Hooghe is grateful to Ben Crum, Simon Hug, Julia Langbein, Gary Marks, Jerome Schafer, Pascal Sciarini, and Jarle Trondal for comments on drafts, as well as to the Dutch National Science Foundation, the Center for European Studies at Chapel Hill, and the KFG 'The Transformative Power of Europe' for supporting her research. Hussein Kassim has learned much about the Commission from conversations with Dionyssis G. Dimitrakopoulos, Fernando Garcia Ferreiro, Anne Stevens, Handley Stevens, Martin Westlake, and, especially, Anand Menon, as well as (at the very beginning) Martin Mauthner. Colleagues at UEA, including John Street, Lawrence Hardy, Liki Koutrakou, and David Milne have offered support and encouragement at various stages of the project. Andrew Thompson would like to thank Debbie Menezes for work with data analysis.

Finally, as Principal Investigator (or 'leader') of the research team, I should like to record my gratitude to Dominic Byatt at OUP, who has been an enthusiast for the project since when we first mentioned it to him, and to Lizzy Suffling, Carla Hodge, and Howard Emmens for their work on the book's production. Above all, wholehearted thanks are owed to my six collaborators and co-authors in this epic enterprise. Both the project and this book are the product of the combined endeavour, talents, and knowledge of all the research team. It has taken its time, but here it is at last!

Hussein Kassim, Norwich, 5 December 2011

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Abbreviations

AD	Administrator
AST	Assistant
BEPA	Bureau of European Policy Advisers
DG	Directorate-General
DG ADMIN	Directorate-General for Personnel and Administration
DG AGRI	Directorate-General for Agriculture and Rural Development
DG BUDG	Directorate-General for Budget
DG CLIMA	Directorate-General for Climate Action
DG COMM	Directorate-General for Communication
DG COMP	Directorate-General for Competition
DGT	Directorate-General for Translation
DG DIGIT	Directorate-General for Informatics
DG EAC	Directorate-General for Education and Culture
DG ECFIN	Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs
DG ELARG	Directorate-General for Enlargement
DG EMPL	Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion
DG ENER	Directorate-General for Energy
DG ENTR	Directorate-General for Enterprise and Industry
DG ENV	Directorate-General for the Environment
DG HOME	Directorate-General for Home Affairs
DG HR	Directorate-General for Human Resources and Security
DG INFSO	Directorate-General for Information Society and Media
DG JLS	Directorate-General for Justice, Freedom and Security
DG JUST	Directorate-General for Justice
DG MARE	Directorate-General for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries
DG MARKT	Directorate-General for Internal Market and Services
DG MOVE	Directorate-General for Mobility and Transport
DG REGIO	Directorate-General for Regional Policy
DG RELEX	Directorate-General for External Relations
DG RTD	Directorate-General for Research and Innovation
DG SANCO	Directorate-General for Health and Consumers
DG TAXUD	Directorate-General for Taxation and Customs Union

DG TRADE	Directorate-General for Trade
DG TREN	Directorate-General for Transport and Energy
ECHO	Humanitarian Aid
EEAS	European External Action Service
EP	European Parliament
ESTAT	Eurostat
EUCIQ	The European Commission in Question (research project)
IAS	Internal Audit Service
IGC	Inter-Governmental Conference
JRC	Joint Research Centre
OIB	Infrastructures and Logistics—Brussels
OIL	Infrastructures and Logistics—Luxembourg
OLAF	European Anti-Fraud Office
SCIC	Interpretation
SG	Secretariat-General
SJ	Legal Service
TEC	Treaty establishing the European Community
TEU	Treaty on European Union
TFEU	Treaty on the functioning of the European Union

1

Introduction: The European Commission in Question[1]

The European Commission is one of the world's most powerful international administrations. With major executive and enforcement responsibilities, a key role in the management of the European Union's (EU) finances and expenditure, and a monopoly over the right to bring forward proposals in most areas of EU legislation, the Commission occupies a central position in the European Union.[2] Located at the heart of the EU's administrative system, its influence extends far beyond Brussels. As well as affecting the domestic politics and policy of the EU member states, the Commission's action has consequences for international regulation, bilateral and multilateral international negotiations, and relations between Europe and other regions of the globe. Considered historically to have been the 'engine' of European integration, it is the subject of perennial debate[3] and the object of strong, often extreme, opinion.[4]

Unsurprisingly, the Commission has attracted considerable scholarly attention,[5] but much about the organization and its staff is not well known or understood. Who, for example, are the officials who work for the Commission? What are their professional and educational backgrounds? Is the

[1] 'The European Commission in Question' (EUCIQ) is the title of the research project on which this book is based. See <http://www.uea.ac.uk/psi/research/EUCIQ>.

[2] For perspectives on changes in the Commission's influence over time, see Kassim and Menon (2004, 2010). For an alternative view of the Commission's influence, see Moravcsik (1999).

[3] For discussions of the role of the Commission, see, e.g., Lindberg (1963), Hallstein (1965), Spinelli (1967); Coombes (1970); Monnet (1978); Christiansen (1997); Lequesne (1997); Moravcsik (1999); Schmidt (2000); Shore (2000); Pollack (2003); Trondal (2008).

[4] The British conservative philosopher, Roger Scruton, charges, for example, that European Commissioners 'have the death of Europe in their hearts' (2009: 33).

[5] There are a handful of historical studies that analyse the European Commission and its predecessor bodies, beginning with Haas's seminal study of the European Coal and Steel Community (1958), and continuing with Coombes (1970) and Michelmann (1978) through to Abélès et al. (1993). Among recent studies, see Page (1997); Peterson (1999); Shore (2000); Hooghe (2001); Stevens and Stevens (2001); Dimitrakopoulos (2004); Dumoulin (2007); Franchino (2007); Suvarierol (2007); and Georgakakis (2012).

Commission an administration of lawyers? What motivates officials to pursue a career in the European Commission? What are their beliefs about the role that the Commission should play in Europe, where decision-making authority should reside, and where the European Union is heading? What have been the enduring consequences of the reform programme undertaken by the Commission under the Presidency of Romano Prodi (1999–2004) or the effects of measures implemented under José Manuel Barroso's Presidency (2004–14)? How effective is leadership and coordination within the organization? How do officials view the 2004 and 2007 enlargements and how has the experience affected the Commission? And how does the European Commission compare with other bureaucracies—both in domestic political systems and among international organizations? These questions are the starting points for the present enquiry.[6]

Their limited exploration hitherto has not prevented the spread of myths about the people or the organization. In the public mind, the Commission is populated by zealous 'Eurocrats' who want always and everywhere to extend the Union's influence and, thereby, their own power—a view also voiced routinely by some mainstream politicians and others.[7] In an era of general anti-bureaucratic sentiment (see du Gay 2000, 2005; Peters 2001), the Commission is viewed as the arch bureaucracy—remote, non-responsive, overmighty, interfering, interventionist. It is depicted as antiquated and resistant to change, combining the worst characteristics of continental European bureaucracies (Stevens and Stevens 2001; Balint et al. 2008).

There are echoes of these views in academic analyses, but a constant refrain in scholarly work is that the Commission escapes easy categorization. Studies informed by a public choice or new public management approach Commission bureaucrats as budget-maximizers or competence-expanders.[8] According to such scholarship, Commission officials are driven by a desire 'to build Europe' and thereby to increase their powers.[9] Studies from a public

[6] Hooghe (2001, 2005); Georgakakis and de Lassalle (2007); Suvarierol (2007); Bauer (2008); Ellinas and Suleiman (2011); Landfried et al. (forthcoming) study subsets of Commission officials. Carolyn Ban's (2013) forthcoming study, like the current volume, is anchored in a large-scale survey of the entire Commission.

[7] For example, Douglas (now Lord) Hurd, UK Foreign Secretary (1989–95), remarked famously in November 1991 on 'the apparent wish of the European Commission to insist on inserting itself in the nooks and crannies of everyday life' (cited in Stuart 2004:226).

[8] The theoretical proposition that bureaucrats are motivated by budget or competence maximization was developed in American public administration (Niskanen 1971; Calvert et al. 1989), but the idea has also taken hold as an analytical category in studying relations between national bureaucracies and political principals in Europe (see, for instance, Dunleavy 1990). More recently, it has been applied to the study of the European Commission (see Pollack 2003; Franchino 2007).

[9] In her study of officials in the early 1980s, Willis (1982: 4) noted that 'a key additional requirement in the early days was that staff should be devoted Europeans, who by the zeal and commitment to the goal of integration would maintain the momentum of the Commission's

administration perspective examine how the Commission compares with other bureaucracies in terms of leadership,[10] political or administrative centralization, coordination, and the capacity to adapt (Metcalfe 2000; Stevens and Stevens 2001; Kassim 2004a, 2004b, 2008). There is, of course, a tension between these approaches. While the studies predicated on a 'maximization' premise cast the Commission as a monolithic organization, those working from a public administration perspective highlight its internal fragmentation (Balint et al. 2008).

This volume takes a new look at the Commission. It investigates the origins and backgrounds of Commission officials, their career trajectories and beliefs, and the inner workings of the organization that they serve. Drawing on unique primary source material collected by the authors,[11] the chapters that follow offer a detailed examination of the European Commission at the beginning of the twenty-first century.

RESEARCHING THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION

For much of the organization's history, the literature on the Commission was sparse. Well into the 1980s, writings on the Commission opened with a ritual expression of surprise at the paucity of scholarship on the subject beyond the classic studies produced by Coombes (1970) and Michelmann (1978). Since the 1986 Single European Act, however, the literature has become so voluminous that this ritual refrain is no longer warranted.[12] Moreover, scholarship on the Commission has not only broadened, but has become more sophisticated. Analysis of the organization has moved beyond the terms of the traditional, if narrow, self-marginalizing debate between neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism (Schmidt 1996; Hooghe 2001: 1–5). Scholars writing on the Commission increasingly draw on mainstream approaches in political science (see Page 1997, 2012; Hooghe 2005a; Smith 2004), public administration (see Egeberg 2006; Trondal 2007) and other sub-disciplinary perspectives. Authors have contributed to understanding the organization's early history (Heyen and Wright 1992; Loth et al. 1998; Dumoulin 2007), key

process towards it'. Shore (2000: 140) attests to the continued importance of commitment to the European idea nearly two decades later.

10 For studies of leadership in international organizations, see Claude (1959); Cox and Jacobsen (1973); Young (1991); Barnett and Finnemore (1999); Janning (2005); Tallberg (2006); Deese (2008).

11 The project on which this book is based collected data from two main sources: an online survey, and a structured programme of interviews (see below).

12 The bibliography assembled by Szarek and Peterson (2007) testifies to the extent to which the literature on the Commission has grown.

structures and actors (Endo 1999; Joana and Smith 2002; Smith 2004; Spence and Edwards 2006; Kassim 2012), officials (Page 1997; Hooghe 2001), its internal operation (Ross 1995; Stevens and Stevens 2001; Spence and Edwards 2006; Kassim 2006), interaction with other bodies (Egeberg 2006), and the role that it plays in decision making (Pollack 1996, 1997a), policy development (Schmidt 2000; Pollack 2003) and treaty negotiations (Christiansen 2002; Falkner 2002; Beach and Christiansen 2007; Kassim and Dimitrakopoulos 2007).

Yet, despite the invaluable insights that it affords, the existing literature is limited in terms of the questions it poses and the approaches it adopts. One reason is that much of the literature has been principally concerned with estimating the Commission's relative influence in EU decision making (see Sasse et al. 1977; Schmidt 2000; Pollack 1996, 1997a, 2003; Jupille 2004). This preoccupation with the Commission as a political actor has inevitably led to a focus on the organization's interaction with other bodies rather than investigation of its own inner workings. Moreover, analyses typically proceed from the assumption that the Commission is a unitary player rather than an internally differentiated organization (Cram 1993; Hooghe 2001; Kassim and Dimitrakopoulos 2007). Such tendencies overlook the possibility that exploration of the Commission's internal processes may in fact hold the key to understanding preference formation within the organization (Hooghe 2005a; Hartlapp 2011) and thereby its external behaviour (see, for example, Kassim and Dimitrakopoulos 2007).

Some scholars have sought to open the 'black box' and have offered important insights into how the organization functions as an administration. However, these analyses have often been confined to particular groups or actors. Attention has been focused on Commission Presidents (Ross 1995; Peterson 1999, 2004), the Commission Presidency (Endo 1999; Kassim 2012), the College (Peterson 2012) or members of the Commission (Joana and Smith 2002, 2004; Smith 2003), the *cabinets* (of personal advisers to Commissioners; see Ritchie 1992; Egeberg and Heskestad 2010), middle managers (Bauer 2008), the Directorates-General (DGs) (or permanent 'services'; see Hooghe 2001), the Secretariat-General (Kassim 2006), and individual Directorates-General (Wilks 1992; Cram 1994; Cini 1996). Attempts to provide systematic overviews of the Commission, however, are somewhat sparse, and coverage of the organization's various parts somewhat uneven.

A further limitation concerns the tendency to treat the Commission as a *sui generis* or singular administration. In the older literature, this inclination reflected a preoccupation with the capacity of the Commission to fulfil its treaty-given mission to drive integration forward (see Coombes 1970)—a particular concern in the 1960s and 1970s. However, even where the emphasis has not been on the Commission's developmental role, scholars have been distinctly wary of comparing the Commission with other bureaucracies. Works such as Balint et al. (2008) are rare exceptions. Such restraint is surprising, since public bureaucracies have much in common. They perform generic functions and confront similar challenges. Even if they operate in distinct institutional environments, modern bureaucracies offer policy advice, and implement and enforce policy. Similarly, as organizations, there is much that they share. They must, for example, motivate staff and manage interdepartmental coordination. No organization if it is to survive, moreover, can avoid adapting to changing pressures and demands from outside and from within. These common tasks and challenges would appear to provide obvious grounds for comparison, and though data on other administrations is often difficult to find,[13] the failure of scholars working on the Commission to draw on taxonomies, concepts, models, or theories from the comparative study of bureaucracies or of organizations is hard to explain (Metcalfe 2000 is one of few exceptions).

The paucity of studies comparing the Commission and other international administrations is especially surprising. Despite some early attempts in this direction (see, especially, Siotis 1964), it is only in the recent past that scholars, for example, Bauer and Knill (2007), Balint et al. (2008) and Trondal et al. (2010), have sought to undertake more systematic comparisons. Still rarer are comparisons between the Commission and national administrations,[14] or theoretically-inspired case studies focused on the Commission (see Bauer 2002). Although some recent comparative work on administrative reform does include the Commission as a case study (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2000; 2004, 2011; Bauer and Knill 2007), such research is sparse.

An additional limitation relates to source material. Many studies are based on secondary sources, which can be constraining. Those drawn on primary materials often base their extrapolations on small-sample surveys or informal interviews.[15] This approach may make it possible to generate hypotheses, but is not usually sufficient to test them confidently. For this purpose larger, representative, datasets are necessary, as they increase the chances that findings will be robust.

[13] The scarcity of data has led some scholars of public administration to resort to ingenious efforts to draw comparisons between national administrations (see, e.g., Peters 2003: chapter 3, especially Tables 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3). However, the OECD now regularly publishes systematic cross-national data on aspects of public management, such as public governance, public employment and management, and budgeting and public expenditures, which makes informed comparison considerably easier.

[14] There is a literature on how national administrative models have influenced the shape and practices of the Commission (see, e.g., Stevens and Stevens 2001; Ritchie 1992; and Page 1997).

[15] Coombes (1970) quotes from interview material, but does not state how many interviews were conducted within the organization, or with whom, while Michelmann (1978) conducted 172 formal interviews with Commission officials. His study draws on responses to two questionnaires: one, to which 604 responded, was administered to 1200 officials in grades A4 to A7; the other, to which 320 responded, was administered to 334 Heads of Unit and other A3s. Page (1997), by contrast, is based on analysis of the biographical data of 2,300 officials of grade A4 or above extracted from *The European Companion* and *Who's Who*. Hooghe (2001) conducted 137 semi-structured interviews from a population of 200 senior officials. Stevens and Stevens (2001) draw on over forty. Ban (2013), who conducted a survey administered to several thousand officials, offers the one study that can, like this book, draw on a large-scale survey.

Responding in large part to the limitations of the existing literature, this book departs in four respects from previous work. First, it approaches the Commission primarily as an organization or administration. Instead of focusing on its role and influence in decision making, this volume is concerned with the Commission's staff and with the organization's internal operation. Second, instead of directing attention to individual parts of the Commission, this book examines the organization as a whole in an attempt to understand both its vertical and horizontal dynamics. Third, the study draws upon an established conceptual repertoire in comparative public administration to pose questions about the Commission familiar to students of bureaucracies—for example, about how and why officials use personal networks, the availability and circulation of information within the organization, and the attitudes of bureaucrats to politics, internal administrative reform, and external political reform.[16] Where data permits, the book attempts to compare the Commission with other administrations. Finally, rather than relying on secondary sources, this study is based on primary material generated by the research team. At the empirical core of the book is a 'once-in-a-generation' survey of Commission staff, complemented by more than two hundred interviews conducted by the project team.

THE AIMS OF THE BOOK

The book's central ambition is to develop an understanding of the Commission that builds on the experience, testimony, and insight of the people who work for the organization. It aims not only to examine the internal functioning of the Commission and its personnel, but also to explore the beliefs and behaviour of officials. In particular, it investigates how the Commission has responded to two major challenges: administrative reform and enlargement. The volume is not structured around a single dependent variable, but attempts to develop a multi-perspectival understanding of the organization. It proceeds from the premise that, in order to gain a full picture of an organization, it is insufficient merely to examine structures and procedures. Attention needs also to be paid to the origins, experience, and attitudes of its staff.

The eight chapters that follow address five themes.[17] Chapter 2 examines the background and career experience of Commission personnel. It asks: Who

[16] See, e.g., Armstrong (1973); Dogan (1975); Aberbach et al. (1981); Page and Wright (2000); Pollitt and Bouckaert (2004, 2011); Bauer and Knill (2007); Gains and John (2010).

[17] This volume is co-authored. Each chapter has a primary author who is the first named as follows: Chapter 1 is co-authored by Hussein Kassim (general introduction), Andrew Thompson (survey and mixed methods), Liesbet Hooghe (beliefs: a conceptual framework), and Sara Connolly (independent variables); Chapter 2 Sara Connolly and Hussein Kassim; Chapter 3 John Peterson, Sara Connolly, and Andrew Thompson; Chapter 4 Liesbet Hooghe; Chapter 5

are the people who work for the organization? At what stage in their professional life do they join the Commission, and why? Where do they come from and what expertise do they bring? What is their career trajectory thereafter? Such concerns have been of long-standing interest in the literature on public administration, where scholars have investigated the social origins of the servants of the state[18] and the extent to which public bureaucracies are representative of the communities that they serve (see, for example, Kingsley 1944; Van Riper 1958). They have also reflected on the skills that public service requires, and whether these should be developed before or after entry (Boussaert et al. 2001: 87–96).

In the case of the Commission, however, there have been relatively few attempts to investigate the backgrounds of officials. The exception is nationality, where since the early days of the European Communities member governments have been concerned to ensure that a fair share of their nationals are recruited by the organization. The limited interest in other characteristics of Commission staff, such as their educational backgrounds or professional experience, however, has allowed accepted wisdoms about officials to go unchallenged and untested, among them the belief that the Commission is populated by law graduates or that its officials are likely to have spent their entire career in the public sector. Such perceptions are, of course, not neutral. They imply that the Commission is an inward looking and defensive organization, short on creativity, and lacking the diversity of experience or expertise needed to meet the challenges of a changing world.

Examinations of the career paths of Commission officials are also surprisingly scarce. Discussions of career development feature routinely in the study of administration, but detailed analyses of career-building and of horizontal and vertical mobility in the European Commission are rare.[19] Little is known, for example, about the number of Directorates-General in which an official is likely to serve in the course of a career, how long it takes for an entry-level recruit to advance to a middle or senior management post, whether the nationals of some member states progress more rapidly than others, or whether men achieve promotion more quickly than women. These issues and their implications for the Commission and for officials are investigated in Chapter 2. As well as examining the educational and professional

Renaud Dehousse and Andrew Thompson; Chapter 6 Hussein Kassim, John Peterson and Sara Connolly; Chapter 7 Hussein Kassim, John Peterson and Sara Connolly; Chapter 8 Michael Bauer, Sara Connolly, and Hussein Kassim; Chapter 9 John Peterson, Sara Connolly, and Andrew Thompson; Conclusion: Hussein Kassim, Liesbet Hooghe, John Peterson, Michael Bauer, Sara Connolly, and Andrew Thompson.

18 See, e.g., Halsey and Crewe (1968); Armstrong (1973); Aberbach et al. (1981); Kessler (1986); Derlien and Mayntz (1988); Quermonne (1991).

19 Exceptions are Michelmann (1978); Page (1997); on the College of Commissioners, see Döring (2007).

backgrounds of staff, it looks at their motivations for joining the Commission and investigates career mobility within the organization. It considers the extent to which the Commission has genuinely become a career civil service, where staff members join at entry level and make their way up through the ranks to middle and senior management positions.

Chapter 3 addresses how officials navigate the Commission. The way in which individuals negotiate the workplace has been a long-standing interest of students of public administration and scholars of organizations.[20] The formal and informal contacts that they form and how they use these connections are an important aspect of employee behaviour, whether in the public or the private sector. In the literature on the Commission, the general importance of informal networks has often been explained as a reaction to the insistence on formal hierarchy (see, for example, Spence 1994; Shore 2000: 196–200). Existing studies have examined networks as an instrument of leadership (Ross 1995) or coordination, or have emphasized the tendency of officials to construct informal networks with fellow nationals (Suvarierol 2007). There has, however, been little systematic investigation of how Commission officials view personal networks, on what basis—for example, nationality, language, or party affiliation—contacts are established, and what functions they perform. Drawing on responses to a series of questions posed in the online survey and in follow-up interviews, Chapter 3 addresses these issues.

The two chapters that follow examine the beliefs of Commission officials. While there are a significant number of empirically-informed analyses of beliefs held by national bureaucrats that follow seminal works by Aberbach et al. (1981), Mayntz (1984), Suleiman (1984), Derlien and Mayntz (1988), Mayntz and Derlien (1989), Derlien (2003), and Schwanke and Ebinger (2006),[21] comparable studies of Commission officials are scarce. Chapter 4 charts Commission officials' views on the governance, ideological direction, and policy responsibilities of the European Union. Influenced by the bureaucratic politics approach, the tendency in the EU literature has been to assume that officials are inclined towards federalism, want to centralize power in Brussels, and instinctively support the 'Community method', a conception of the Union that places the Commission at the heart of European integration.[22] Chapter 4 tests and challenges these assumptions. Chapter 5, by contrast, focuses on the constituency of Commission officials who support the 'Community method'. With the status, role, and powers of the Commission challenged by other EU

[20] On networks within organizations, see Brass (1984); Morgan (1986); Burt (1992); Degenne and Forsé (1999); Cross et al. (2001); McPherson et al. (2001); Kilduff and Tsai (2003), Cross and Parker (2004); Wasserman and Faust (2007).

[21] In addition to Hooghe (2001, 2005) and Ban (2013), mentioned above, Ellinas and Suleiman (2011) is also based on a survey; for analysis from an anthropological angle, see Abélès et al. (1993) and Shore (2000).

[22] Preston (1995); Devuyst (1999); Wallace (2010); Dehousse (2011).

institutions, most notably the European Council and the European Parliament, this chapter examines how adherents of this conception have responded and investigates their views on a series of other issues.

Chapters 6 and 7 examine respectively leadership and coordination. Chapter 6 investigates leadership under the Barroso Commission. Although the period during which Jacques Delors held the Commission Presidency (1985–95) was covered by a number of important studies (Grant 1994; Ross 1995; Endo 1999; Drake 2000), Commission leadership since 1995 has attracted considerably less attention, despite the contrasting styles of Delors's successors on the one hand and the successive treaty reforms that have strengthened the office since the Treaty of Amsterdam on the other. Chapter 6 examines the extent to which José Manuel Barroso has been able to realize his vision of presidential leadership, looks at how his Presidency is perceived at different levels of the organization, and considers how officials rate Commission Presidents from Delors to Barroso along four dimensions: setting a policy agenda, effectively managing the house, delivering on policy priorities, and defending the Commission in the EU system.

Chapter 7 looks at coordination in the organization. This theme has featured in many studies of the Commission, but few scholars have sought systematically to investigate the effectiveness of vertical and horizontal coordination at political and administrative levels (though see Kassim and Peters 2008). This chapter compares the views of *cabinet* members and staff in the services. It examines relations between the *cabinets*, between Directorates-General, and between *cabinet* members and services as seen from both sides. It also considers the changing role of the Secretariat-General and the attitudes of Commission personnel to its rising profile.

The chapters that follow examine how two major challenges—administrative reform and enlargement—have affected attitudes and work practices. Chapter 8 investigates the views of officials on administrative reform. Although the Kinnock–Prodi reforms implemented between 2000 and 2005 have attracted considerable scholarly attention (Levy 2003, 2004, 2006; Kassim 2004a, 2004b, 2008; Levy and Stevens 2004; Bauer 2006; Ellinas and Suleiman 2007, 2008),[23] neither the attitudes of officials towards the reforms nor their impact on the organization has been charted in detail. This chapter examines both.

Chapter 9 addresses the 'big bang' enlargement of 2004 and 2007. Existing research has focused mainly on how it affects the working of the EU institutions and the Commission's legislative role (see for example Dehousse et al.

[23] The programme of administrative reform implemented during this period is referred to as the 'Kinnock–Prodi reforms' throughout. As Reform Vice-President, Neil (now Lord) Kinnock led the process, but Commission President Romano Prodi also introduced a number of important measures.

2006; Best et al. 2008; Odell 2010). There has been much less analysis of perceptions from within the organization on how the Commission handled the recruitment of officials from the new member states or the institutional consequences of enlargement, or how enlargement has affected the Commission's internal functioning. Moving beyond early assessments (Peterson 2008; Peterson and Birdsall 2008), this chapter investigates whether officials from the new member states are distinct in terms of their beliefs and attitudes, and gauges the effect on the organization.

SOURCES, MIXED METHODS, AND TESTIMONY AS RESOURCE AND OBJECT

The book draws on original primary material created by the project team. The findings it reports are based on three main sources of data (see Figure 1.1):

- a once-in-a-generation online survey administered in the autumn of 2008,
- a series of interviews with a sub-set of self-selected respondents to the online survey conducted between January and March 2009, and
- a structured programme of follow-up interviews with senior officials carried out between May and November 2009.



Fig. 1.1. The survey methodology

The study was conducted entirely independently of the Commission. However, the project team benefited from cooperation with members of the *cabinets* of Commission President José Manuel Barroso and Commissioner for Administration (and Vice-President) Siim Kallas, as well as officials in the Commission's Secretariat-General and the evaluation unit in the Directorate-General of Personnel and Administration. Together they provided access to the personnel data needed to generate a representative online survey and representative follow-up interviews. Importantly, the team sought and secured full academic independence in the design and conduct of the survey and subsequent interviews.[24]

The Surveys

The online survey is at the project's heart.[25] The questionnaire, which is reproduced in the appendices asked respondents for information about their background, motivation for joining the Commission, career experience, economic and cultural values, preferred conception of the EU as a political system, and their views on the internal operation of the Commission, administrative reform, and enlargement. Where appropriate, questions were informed by those used in earlier surveys of national civil servants to allow comparability, and of Commission officials in order to permit longitudinal analysis. Thirty-five Commission officials assisted with the piloting and pre-testing of successive versions of the questionnaire, and YouGov, the market research agency, which created the link to the online version, offered advice on the structure and presentation of the survey.

The project was concerned mainly with staff involved in policy. The online survey targeted *cabinet* members and administrators (AD)—one of two categories of permanent officials in the Commission[26]—in services with policy or policy-related responsibilities.[27] A stratified random sample of 4,621

[24] As a condition for carrying out the project, the research team undertook to comply with the data protection rules governing officials of the European administration. Members of the research team also agreed to guarantee the anonymity of respondents and to treat the responses of interviewees as confidential. As well as signing a confidentiality agreement concerning use of the data, members of the research team committed themselves to ensuring that it would not be possible to identify a particular individual from the comments or remarks cited or the description of the respondent or interviewee given in any published output.

[25] In line with recent practice, an internet survey was chosen in order to maximize response rates and provide greater protection of anonymity. Internet surveys are more versatile in format, easier to administer, and more error-proof than other instruments. In addition, they are particularly well-suited for elite actors, who value their efficiency and flexibility.

[26] For a description of the status of a permanent official and these two roles, see <http://ec.europa.eu/civil_service/job/official/index_en.htm>.

[27] Assistant-grade officials and officials working in translation, interpretation and support services were excluded. As the result of a technical error, however, the survey was inadvertently sent to a number of translators. As the project was concerned with officials working in policy-related Directorates-General, responses from translators do not feature in the analyses reported

Table 1.1. Targeted and achieved sample relative to the total population of the Commission in 2008 and in 2011.

Sample Group	Population Size (2011)	Population Size (2008)	Target Sample Size	Achieved Sample Size	
	N	N	n	n	%*
Cabinet members*	199	203	203	54	27
Senior Managers (DG/DDG/ Directors) and Advisers/ Assistants to Directors-General	339	482	482	195***	40
Middle Managers (HoU)	1,163	1,081	1,081	429	40
Principal Administrators, Administrators	10,530	12,964	2,855	1,149	40
Other/preferred not to say				74	
TOTAL	12,032 + Cabinet	14,730	4,621	1,901	41

* Approximate percentages.
** Cabinet members may be classed as permanent or temporary officials.
*** Senior Managers (114) and Advisers (81)

officials—or approximately a quarter of 14,730 administrators employed in Brussels and Luxembourg in September 2008—as well as all *cabinet* members,[28] were included.[29] The targeted sample included all members of cabinets, all senior and middle managers (n = 1,563), and a random sample of other AD staff (i.e. administrators not holding management positions) in 31 policy-related DGs (n = 2,855). It was proportionate to gender, age together with length of service and nationality of officials, but it oversampled officials from the twelve newest member states (by 25 per cent) to make possible meaningful comparisons between them and officials from member states that joined before 2004). Table 1.1 shows the population at the time of the survey in autumn 2008 (and 2012 for an updated comparison), target sample, and achieved sample for the on-line survey of all policy-related AD staff in the Directorates-General, plus members of cabinets.

The achieved sample was 1,901, representing a 41 per cent response rate. It is interesting to note that approximately 40 per cent of each category of seniority responded, apart from *cabinet* members, for whom the response

below. Neither proportional iterative fitting (see below) nor, therefore, the representativeness of the results was affected.

28 *Cabinet* members may be permanent officials or employed as temporary agents (see <http://ec.europa.eu/civil_service/job/temp/index_en.htm>, accessed 8 May 2012).

29 'Seconded national experts', also called 'detached national experts' <http://ec.europa.eu/civil_service/job/sne/index_en.htm>, were not included in the sample. It is not known how many 'temporary staff in research', who can work in permanent posts under the research budget in six DGs (Research, Information Society, the Joint Research Centre, Energy and Transport, Enterprise and Fisheries) were included in the sample.

rate was just over a quarter. As some sub-populations—for example, nationals from the smallest member states—were marginal, a process of iterative proportional fitting was implemented to weight the data to reflect the true population proportions of each category within the stratification as closely as possible. This ensured that the achieved sample, on which the analysis presented in the chapters that follow is based, is representative of seniority, gender, age and length of service, nationality, and officials from the 'old' (that is, the EU-15) and 'new' (the EU-12) member states.

One hundred and twenty-four respondents to the online survey volunteered for further participation in the study. Interviews were conducted with sixty of this self-selecting sample, for two purposes. The first was to test interpretations of the responses to the online survey. The second was to inform the design of the interview templates for the follow-up interview programme. A mix of open and closed questions was used.

Prior to carrying out the elite group interviews, a purposive sample of eleven expert advisers in diverse roles within the Commission was chosen to illuminate or clarify certain aspects of how the organization worked. The intent was to ensure that questions would be meaningful to respondents and would produce greater insights into the functioning of the Commission. The sample comprised Heads of Unit (4), advisers (3), members of *cabinet* (2), a Director, and a policy officer.

Follow-up face-to-face interviews were conducted with officials drawn from a stratified sample. The sample included the following: all Commissioners, all Directors-General, a random sample of middle managers, and two members of each *cabinet*. In terms of the achieved sample, interviews were conducted with 5 Commissioners, 28 *cabinet* members, 42 senior managers, and 77 middle managers.[30] A template set of questions was constructed for each, customized as appropriate for each target constituency (the templates used for Commissioners, *cabinet* members, and middle and senior managers are included as appendices).[31] These interviews helped to provide an insight into the possible causal mechanisms that underlie the statistical associations revealed by the online survey. The aim was also to ensure comparability with classic attitudinal research in comparative public administration, which has mainly relied on semi-structured qualitative interviewing and used *ex post* coding.

The surveys were conducted against the background of important developments inside and outside the Commission (see Figure 1.2). The Lisbon Treaty's protracted ratification ran for more or less the whole period of the online survey and into the period of face-to-face interviews. The financial

[30] Five expert advisers were consulted.

[31] All involved a mix of open and closed questions, except for the Commissioner template featuring exclusively open questions. The data from the closed questions was aggregated and is cited throughout the text.



Fig. 1.2. Timeline: administration of surveys and EU developments

crisis broke out some months before the online survey was activated. Internally, the Career Development Review (CDR), the system of appraisal introduced as part of the Kinnock–Prodi reforms, was re-examined in late 2007 and a major amendment was introduced in 2008. The new system was rolled out and became operational throughout the fieldwork period.

A mixed methods design

The use of data from two different sources was a distinctive part of the project's design. The large-scale survey made it possible to collect the views of nearly two thousand respondents, providing rich data for statistical analysis. The semi-structured interviews, meanwhile, generated more modest quantitative data, but also source material for qualitative analysis. This use of mixed methods performs three functions. The first is expansion beyond the quantitative data, since interviews make it possible to consider issues that are more usefully explored discursively. Second, the interviews offer complementarity. They help interpret results, resolve puzzling findings, and understand why officials respond as they do. Triangulation—the third—is used occasionally to corroborate the findings using both sources of evidence.

Mostly, in the chapters that follow, interview material performs the function of complementarity. It serves to offer insights into the reasoning behind the quantitative data. For this reason, quotations from the interviews are cited to give a sense of the range of views within the organization rather than their frequency or distribution. However, the interviews were also used to examine the views of officials on issues that are more usefully explored face to face. For whichever purpose it is cited, the interview material quoted in the chapters that follow has been anonymized.

The combination of data sources and the mixed methods approach deliver a richer product than is possible by exclusive reliance on a single method. Although all the chapters report descriptive statistics and most use multivariate analysis in examining the quantitative data, the particular analysis that is undertaken, the sources used, and the combination of methods varies from chapter to chapter. The examination of personal networks in chapter 3, beliefs in chapter 4, and the 'Community method' in chapter 5 draw almost exclusively on data from the online survey. By contrast, the discussions of nationality (chapter 2), leadership (chapter 6), coordination (chapter 7), reform (chapter 8), and enlargement (chapter 9) use responses to the online survey, data from the interviews, and interview testimonies. The mixed methods approach is arguably best exemplified in these five chapters. The specific usage, however, also varied. Expansion featured in discussion of personal contacts and networking (chapters 3 and 5), *cabinets*, their role and functioning (chapter 7), leadership (chapter 6), and reform (chapter 8). Complementarity was employed to explore nationality (chapter 2), beliefs and partisanship (chapter 4), coordination (chapter 7), and leadership (chapter 6). Triangulation, meanwhile, was used most extensively in examination of leadership (chapter 6).

Variation in the extent to which mixed methods were employed and in the specific usage can be explained mainly by the differences in scope between the online survey and the interview questionnaires (see appendices 1–5). Some topics featured only in one or the other. For example, questions about professional and educational background, career progression, views about the scope of EU competencies, and the detail of administrative reform were asked only in the online survey. By contrast, questions on the operation and role of the *cabinets* featured prominently in the face-to-face interviews.

One final point is important. For the purposes of analysis, the text that follows frequently distinguishes between middle and senior managers, on the one hand, and administrators on the other. In formal terms, however, all are administrators. No easier shorthand is in common currency.

Testimonies as resource and object

The coverage of a multiplicity of themes of varying ontological type is a feature that distinguishes the book. In the existing literature, studies tend either to investigate the beliefs of officials (see, for example, Hooghe 2001) or to

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examine factors and procedures relating to Commission personnel and the organization and its structures (see Page 1997; Stevens and Stevens 2001; Spence with Edwards 2006). This volume aims to do both. It proceeds on the premise that the testimony of officials offers insight into the functioning of the Commission and that the views and experience of the people who work for the organization offer a key to understanding its functioning. It rejects as excessively rigid the epistemological claim that soliciting the preferences of interview-subjects offers a glimpse only into an assumptive world.

The chapters that follow report the responses from the online survey and (in most chapters) the interviews. They examine the distribution of opinion among respondents on the various issues on which they have answered questions and use the data as evidence to test hypotheses drawn from the existing literature. They then seek to explain the distribution of attitudes among respondents. With respect to the former, the claims are theme-specific. There is no single overarching thesis that links the themes addressed. This is not so in regard to the beliefs expressed by respondents, where there are general theories transcending particular subjects about why officials adopt the positions that they do. Hypotheses derived from these theories, detailed below, are tested in the chapters that follow.

BELIEFS: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

This study examines the rich palette of attitudes and beliefs held by Commission officials on several subjects, and aims to shed light on the variation in the positions they take. The approach is guided by two basic principles.[32] The first is that men and women are rational beings who are in general motivated by values and beliefs as well as rational interest.[33] Values or beliefs are mostly acquired through socialization and learning, and interests are acquired in a process of more or less bounded calculation. Sometimes beliefs and interests combine to reinforce particular attitudes; sometimes they pull in different directions.[34] Second, men and women almost always live and work in a

[32] For general discussions, see Searing (1994); Chong (2000). For applications to the Commission, see Hooghe (2001, 2005a); Bauer (2008).

[33] An alternative approach is to elide the distinction between values and interests (see Chong 2000), by conceptualizing people as bounded rationals (Simon 1985). This kind of approach usually defines rationality thinly as responding to apparent cost–benefit considerations. While appealing in principle, such an approach is impractical to implement. What are the boundaries of thin rationality? What cannot be reduced to cost–benefit? What is, in other words, *not* rational? The approach here differs in that it sets out posts in the sand by defining *a priori* what is meant by rational interest. This makes it possible to formulate falsifiable expectations.

[34] This study follows standard definitions in political psychology on values, beliefs and attitudes (Feldman 2003; Taber 2003). *Values* refer to 'enduring beliefs that a specific mode of

multiplicity of institutional contexts. For Commission officials, the institutional contexts are territorial (especially, but not only, national) and functional. The push-and-pull of territorial and non-territorial loyalties and interests can change attitudes.

Socialization and utility maximization

Socialization theory states that individuals acquire attitudes by internalizing the values of the groups or institutions in which they live or work. This view emphasizes affective group ties—identities—and longstanding personal dispositions. What motivates individuals is, in March and Olsen's (1989) well-known phrase, 'a logic of appropriateness' or in Börzel and Risse's terms (2009) 'normative rationality'. Utility maximization theory, in contrast, maintains that attitudes reflect the desire to maximize utility. Individuals hold particular views because they are rational in the light of costs and benefits. March and Olsen describe this as a 'logic of consequentiality'; others call it 'instrumental rationality'.

The operationalization of these theories requires definition. Thus, for the purposes of this study, utility is defined in terms of career benefits and national benefits: Commission officials can be expected to consider how reforms may affect their career chances or the material situation of their country. How to understand utility is intensely debated. Proponents of thick rationality conceive of utility in terms of individual wealth maximization, while proponents of thin rationality take the view that any object or value can be maximized, so long as individuals act consciously and consistently (Kato 1996; Levi 1997; Yee 1997). This study takes a less demanding position. Utility refers to material interests, such as career interests, rather than to wealth maximization. Commission officials have more generous remuneration packages than some public officials (though

conduct or end-state of existence is personally or socially preferable to an opposite or converse mode'; examples are the values of liberty, social justice, ambition, responsibility, success. It is common to look for how people prioritize values, and political ideologies are one way in which individuals can summarize how they rank-order values. *Beliefs* refer to statements about how the world is. A belief can be equated with knowledge if the belief is true, and if the believer has a justification (plausible assertions or evidence) for believing it is true. *Attitudes* are statements about how the world should be (or not be); attitudes reflect how much an individual likes (or dislikes) a person, place, thing, or event. Beliefs are statements about what is believed to be; attitudes are judgments. In this study, the dependent variables are mostly attitudes towards particular objects: on reform, enlargement, coordination, leadership, EU policy-making, etc. Sometimes they are beliefs—statements about what officials think is true—as for example on actual EU policy scope, on the role of the Secretary-General, or on the decline or increase in power among the institutions. Most of the time, values and beliefs (or belief systems, such as political ideology or governance views) are among several plausible sets of independent variables that could shape attitudes.

not to their counterparts in the private sector), which may reduce the appeal of salary rises and increase that of promotions or prestige assignments.

In practice, individuals are often motivated by a combination of norms and utility. Utility maximization prevails when attitudes are perceived to have material consequences that can be estimated with some accuracy, are large enough to matter, are transparent, and when an individual's choice is likely to affect the outcome (Sears and Funk 1991; Young et al. 1991). Socialization is most likely when the opposite holds. Hence utility maximization can be expected to shape attitudes on matters that affect career chances, such as administrative reform, coordination in the Commission, career development, or work practices. Attitudes on diffuse beliefs, such as EU governance, EU ideology, the Community method, or the policy scope of the European Union, can be expected to be subject to socialization.

Territorial and functional contexts

It is unlikely that the Commission determines officials' attitudes. Unity of purpose is fictional in any public administration, but there is good evidence that this maxim is particularly true regarding the Commission (Spierenburg 1979; Cini 1996; Page 1997; Kassim and Dimitrakopoulos 2007). As discussed in later chapters, fragmentation in services and agencies, geographical dispersion in Brussels and across the European Union, relatively weak horizontal coordination and stronger vertical coordination are not conducive to forging a homogeneous, single-purposive service. Directorates-General (DGs) or groups of DGs develop distinctive institutional environments. Rather than a single-purpose service, the Commission is a conglomerate of DG coalitions.[35]

Moreover, the wider political context is salient in Commission officials' daily work. Commission officials are players in a political system in which authority is shared across territorial levels (Peterson and Bomberg 1999; Hooghe and Marks 2001; Bartolini 2005). They are attuned to national environments—governments, administrations, interest groups, public opinion, parties—as well as to European-wide contexts, which are to some extent ideological. Contestation between market liberals and social democrats, social liberals and conservatives, and materialists and post materialists permeates EU policy-making (Marks and Steenbergen 2004; Hix 2005; Kriesi et al. 2008; Manow et al. 2008; van Apeldoorn et al. 2009).

Commission officials work in an institutional context where functional loyalties and interests related to the Commission, the Directorate-General

[35] Hypotheses about how Directorates-General coalesce into functional groups with coherent attitudes are discussed below.

		Institutional context	
		FUNCTIONAL	TERRITORIAL
Logic of influence	SOCIALIZATION	***Commission socialization*** *(length of service)* ***DG socialization*** *(e.g. years in a DG core activity; market-correcting DG; market-enhancing DG)* ***Positional socialization*** *(e.g. years in an administrative primary function; years in a cabinet)* ***Political ideology*** *(left/right; liberal/conservative)* ***Governance beliefs*** *(supranationalismvs. other; Community method supporters)*	***Enlargement socialization*** *(EU–12 vs. EU–15; accession wave)* ***National political system*** *(e.g. national experience with multi-level governance)* ***Career in national admini -stration*** *(length of career)*
	UTILITY MAXIMIZATION	***Bureau-maximization*** *(e.g. works in: a spending DG; management* DG; power DG) ***Positional maximization*** *(e.g. works currently as senior official; works in a cabinet; works in an implementation job)*	***Enlargement utility*** *(EU–12 vs. EU–15)* ***National utility*** *(e.g. net beneficiary vs. net contributor; country size; governance efficacy)*
CONTROLS		***Selective recruitment (pre-Delors, Delors, interregnum, Barroso recruits)*** ***Self-selection (motivation)*** ***Age, Gender, Education,*** ***International education, prior career, multiple nationality***	

Fig. 1.3. Possible sources of influence on officials' attitudes

(DG), the *cabinet*, or their position in the hierarchy compete with territorial loyalties and interests related to national administrations, national political systems, and national publics. Philosophical belief systems pertaining to the role of government in the economy and people's lives also play a role. These represent the building blocks for attitude formation in the Commission. By combining type of institutional context (territorial or functional) with logic of influence (socialization or utility maximization), a series of possible influences on Commission officials' attitudes can be highlighted.

Overview

Figure 1.3 summarizes these possible sources of influence on officials' attitudes. Table 1.2 operationalizes these as independent variables. How officials are influenced, and with what results, are questions taken up in subsequent chapters. Here the rationale for each variable is set out.

Table 1.2. Operationalization of independent variables

Commission socialization	Years in the Commission for each respondent. *Source*: self-reporting (Q4).
Age	At the time of the survey (2008-year of birth). *Source*: self-reporting (Q123).
DG core activity	Classification of services and DGs on the basis of whether the core function is spending (management), legislation (producing new legislation), regulation and enforcement (upkeep and enforcement of acquis/comitology), internal support services, or external relations. *Source*: coding on the basis of the Commission's Annual Management Reports, in which each DG explains its functions and activities and sets out its budget, and self-reporting (Q116). This information is summarized in seven responses: Spending DG; Regulatory DG; Legislative DG; Internal DG; External DG; Spending and regulation DG; Spending and legislative DG.
DG spending levels	Classification of DGs based on the levels of spending reported in the Commission's Annual Management Reports. Levels of spending are classified as high if they are above €10,000 million, large if they are between €1,000 million and €10,000 million, medium if they are between €300 million and €1,000 million and small if they are below €300 million. *Source*: coding on the basis of the Commission's Annual Management Reports, in which each DG explains its functions and activities and sets out its budget, and self-reporting (Q116).
Management DG	Dichotomous variable taking on the value of 1 if a respondent works in a management DG, defined as being DG Budget, DG Admin, Internal Audit, Anti-Fraud Office, and the Secretariat-General. *Source*: self-reporting (Q116).
Market-enhancing DG	Dichotomous variable taking on the value of 1 if a respondent works in a DG with responsibility in market-enhancing area of policy, i.e. competition, economic and financial affairs, enterprise and industry, internal market services, taxation and customs union, trade. *Source*: self-reporting (Q116).
Market-correcting DG	Dichotomous variable taking on the value of 1 if a respondent works in a DG with responsibility in market-correcting area of policy, i.e. development, education and culture, employment and social affairs, environment, EuropeAid, health and consumer protection, humanitarian aid, regional policy, research. *Source*: self-reporting (Q116).
Power DG	Dichotomous variable taking on the value of 1 if a respondent works in a policy area with strong Commission initiative—a policy area meets certain criteria on level and scope of EU authority. Using a five-point scale developed on the basis of formal Treaty rules by Börzel, policies score 3 or higher on level of authority (3 = shared EU and national competencies) and 3.75 or higher on scope (3.75 = exclusive right of Commission initiative + full judicial review + codecision). Policy scores are averaged across the Amsterdam, Nice and Constitutional Treaties and then allocated to the most closely associated DG. Non-policy DGs (e.g. legal service, Secretary-General) are scored 0). *Source*: Börzel (2005) and self-reporting (Q116).

Current position	Summarized in four responses: Member of cabinet; Senior manager = Director-General, Deputy Director-General, Director, Adviser; Middle-manager = Head of unit; Administrator. *Source*: self-reporting (Q20).
Primary function	Administrative primary functions: steering jobs, relational jobs, implementation jobs, support jobs. *Source*: self-reporting (Q23).
Cabinet experience	Dichotomous variable taking on the value of 1 if a respondent is currently working in a cabinet *or* has previously worked in a cabinet. *Source*: self-reporting (Q20 and Q24_1).
Left/Right ideology	Individual responses on an 11-point scale (0 to 10, 5 is the mid-point) reporting personal philosophy; standardized around the mean. 'People often think of themselves in terms of their personal philosophical stance on economic issues. Some favour an active role for government on economic policy questions. Others look primarily to markets. Where would you place yourself in terms of economic philosophy?' *Source*: self-reporting (Q125).
Liberal/Conservative ideology	Individual responses on an 11-point scale (0 to 10, 5 is the mid-point) reporting personal philosophy; standardized around the mean. 'People often think of themselves in terms of their personal philosophical stance on social and cultural issues. Many people who consider themselves liberal tend to favour expanded personal freedoms on (for example) abortion, same-sex marriage and so on People on the conservative side tend to favour more traditional notions of family, morality, and order. Where would you place yourself in terms of social-cultural philosophy?' *Source*: self-reporting (Q126).
EU governance beliefs: • *supranationalists* • *state-centrists* • *institutional pragmatists* • *other*	Four dichotomous variables that categorize officials according to their views on the appropriate balance of power among Commission, member states, and European Parliament. Four types are constructed from responses on two survey questions. *Source*: self-reporting (Q127 and Q128); see chapter 4 and Hooghe (2012) for details.
EU-15 or EU-12	Variable that takes on a value of 1 if a respondent is a citizen of one of the fifteen older member states and a value of 2 if a respondent is a citizen of one of the twelve newest member states. *Source*: self-reporting (Q120).
Accession wave	Five-way classification based on accession waves, whereby 1 = 1952 (founding six, EU 6); 2 = 1973 (Denmark, Ireland, UK: first enlargement), 3 = 1981 and 1986 (Greece, Spain, Portugal: Mediterranean enlargement), 4 = 1995 (Austria, Finland, Sweden: Northern enlargement), 5 = 2004 and 2007 (ten former communist countries + Cyprus, Malta: CEE +). *Source*: self-reporting (Q120).
Country size	Country's population in 2008 (in '000s). *Source*: Eurostat.
Governance efficacy	Country average for 1996–2006. Government effectiveness is one of six measures developed by the Worldwide Governance Indicators project by the World Bank. These aggregate indicators are based on hundreds of variables measuring various dimensions of governance, taken from 35 data sources provided by 33 different organizations. The data reflect the views on governance of public sector, private sector and NGO experts, public opinion and firm surveys. *Source*: Kaufmann, Kraay, Mastruzzi (2009) (<http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp>).

(*continued*)

Table 1.2 Continued

Multilevel governance	Regional authority index for each member state (average for ten years, 1996–2006), a measure of the extent of self-rule and shared rule for each intermediate tier of regional government. Standardized around the mean. *Source*: RAI dataset by Hooghe et al. (2010).
Community method supporters:	Dichotomous variable that categorizes officials according to their views on the Community method, based on their responses to two survey questions. *Source*: self-reporting (Q128 and Q130); see chapter 9 for details.
Career in national administration	Years of prior service in national/regional/local administration. *Source*: calculated from self-reported career history (Q10_2 and Q12 (banded), whereby 1 = up to 1 year, 1.5 = 1 to 2 years, 4 = 2 to 5 years, 8 = 5 to 10 years, 13 = 10 to 15 years, 18 = more than 15 years).
Pre Delors recruits	Dichotomous variable taking on a value of 1 entered the Commission before the Delors presidency (i.e. before 1985). *Source*: calculated on the basis of self-reported entry to the Commission (Q4).
Delors recruits	Dichotomous variable taking on a value of 1 entered the Commission under the Delors presidency (i.e. between 1985 and 1995). *Source*: calculated on the basis of self-reported entry in the Commission (Q4).
Interregnum recruits	Dichotomous variable taking on a value of 1 if entered the Commission under the Santer or Prodi presidency (i.e. between 1996 and. 2004). *Source*: calculated on the basis of self-reported entry in the Commission (Q4).
Barroso recruits	Dichotomous variable taking on a value of 1 if entered the Commission under the Barroso presidency (i.e. from 2005). *Source*: calculated on the basis of self-reported entry in the Commission (Q4).
Motivation	Series of 12 dichotomous variables extracted from the question: 'Why did you choose to follow a career in the European Commission? (Please choose as many as are relevant). Options: Job stability; Promising career prospects; Competitive remuneration; Commitment to Europe; Commitment to a particular policy area; Quality of the work; I was asked to apply.' On the basis of spontaneous answers on 'other' we created the following additional categories: I liked the international aspects of the job; My professional development/training made this a logical choice; Family/personal reasons; Because public service is important to me; I want to influence policy. *Source*: self-reporting (Q2).
Gender	Dichotomous variable whereby 0 = male and 1 = female. *Source*: self-reporting (Q124).
Education	The responses to the question of main subject of degree are grouped into six responses: 1 = Law, 2 = Economics and business, 3 = Politics, International relations or another social science; 4 = Arts and the humanities; 5 = Mathematics, computing, engineering, physical or life science; 0 = no response or prefer not to say. *Source*: self-reporting (Q7 and Q8).
International education	Dichotomous variable that takes a value of 1 if the respondent studied outside his country of citizenship. *Source*: self-reporting (Q9).

Prior experience	Series of 12 dichotomous variables extracted from the question: 'What career did you follow before joining the European Commission? (Please choose as many as are relevant) Options: International organization, Non-EU; National civil service; Party politics; Trade union or social movement; private enterprise, liberal professions; education and research; journalism and PR; Other EU organization; None; Other, prefer not to say'. *Source*: self-reporting (Q10_1 to Q10_12).
Multiple nationality	Dichotomous variable where 0 = if respondent has one nationality and 1 = if respondent has dual or multiple nationality. *Source*: self-reporting (Q122).

The Commission as Context

The most immediate environment for officials is the Commission as an organization. Two basic processes guide how and why experiences within the organization shape attitudes of Commission officials. These processes are particularly salient for younger officials:

Commission socialization. The assumption in neofunctionalist and intergovernmental theories of European integration is that the Commission is pro-integrationist. This supposition harks back to Jean Monnet (1978), one of the EU's 'founding fathers', who instilled pro-European values and objectives in creating the institution. The socialization logic expects officials to internalize these norms as they work longer in the Commission.

Bureau-maximization. Utilitarian reasoning builds on public choice theory to argue that bureaucrats support bureau-maximizing strategies—budget expansion, bureaucratic discretion, better status and work conditions—in order to maximize career benefits (Niskanen 1971; Calvert et al. 1989; Dunleavy 1991; Moe 1997; Pollack 2003).[36]

It is possible that socialization or bureau-maximization lead Commission officials to want *in general* more EU competences, greater Commission autonomy, or larger Commission budgets. However, socialization and bureau-maximization can also work at a disaggregated level: the policy area, the DG, the position. Furthermore, officials do not join the Commission as blank slates. They have particular philosophical views and they are shaped by experiences or laden with interests related to their national or regional background.

[36] The power of socialization or utility maximization varies inversely with age and experience. New experiences are more formative when a person has few relevant prior experiences (Searing et al. 1976; Levy 2003). Utility calculations lose salience as officials grow older because anticipated career benefits decrease as retirement approaches.

Policy field and DG

The problems that confront officials, and the legal frameworks in which they are addressed, diverge sharply across services. At the time the survey was conducted, the Commission was composed of 26 Directorates-General, 19 services and six executive agencies. How does a DG shape an official's attitudes?

DG core activity. DGs tend to have a core activity (see Table 1.3), which can be expected to influence an official's views on, for example, administrative reform or the EU's policy scope. Regulation and enforcement is the primary activity of health and consumer protection, internal market, or competition. Preparing legal rules is central in the DGs for employment, environment, justice and home affairs, transport, and energy. The EU's budget of €141.5 billion (2010 figures) is spent mainly in regional policy, agriculture, research, development, and aid. The field of external relations is sometimes described as its own universe with four big planets: trade, external relations (DG RELEX, since 2010 partitioned), development, and enlargement. A relatively diverse group of DGs and services are concerned with institutional and internal affairs, including personnel management, inter-service coordination, budget, statistics, legal support, and financial control. Some DGs are strongly present in more than one activity, and they are coded accordingly.

Management. DGs vary in the extent to which management is central to their task description. Historically, the European Commission has been less a manager and more 'the engine of European integration' on account of its constitutionally guaranteed monopoly of legislative initiative and its competence to bring infringement proceedings (Tallberg 2000, 2002; Pollack 2003; Dehousse 2011). These powers set it apart from national administrations and all but a handful of international administrations.[37] However, over the past decade the Commission has become more attentive to administrative performance (Kassim 2004a, 2004b, 2008; Bauer 2007; Cini 2007). Services with a primary role in monitoring managerial performance can be expected to frame distinctive attitudes.

Legal competence. Commission policy-making is regulated by a strict legal framework. Some services, such as competition or trade, handle supranational competencies, while others deal with intergovernmental issues. Sometimes the differences run within DGs, but most services have a dominant trait. DG Employment mostly operates through soft law, even though the gender equality unit, which was part of this DG until moved to Justice, Fundamental Rights and

[37] Exceptions include the Commission de la Communaute Economique et Monetaire de l'Afrique Centrale (CEMAC), the European Economic Area (EEA), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the Southern African Development Community (SADC), where the organ that is the functional equivalent of the European Commission has the monopoly of legislative initiative. In the European Economic Area (EEA), the European Commission itself exercises a near-monopoly (Hooghe et al. forthcoming).

Table 1.3. Classification of Directorates-General by function (2009)

Directorates-General	Staff	Primary or first task	Secondary or second task	Total budget (€millions)	Total spending (€ millions)
Administration (ADMIN)[1]	604	Internal Services (100%)		€932.4	€932.4
Agriculture and Rural Development (AGRI)	943	Regulatory (75%)	Enforcement (25%)	€54893.2	€49160.2
Budget (BUDG)	397	Internal Support (100%)		€276.7	€276.7
Communication (COMM)	489	Internal Support (100%)		€212.8	€210.1
Competition (COMP)	669	Enforcement (75%)	Regulatory (25%)	€87.7	€87.7
Development (DEV)	269	External (100%)		€3974.0	€3974.0
Economic and Financial Affairs (ECFIN)[3]	471	Regulatory (100%)		€430.2	€414.8
Education and Culture (EAC)	494	Spending (100%)		€1403.1	€1366.1
Employment, Social Affairs, Equal Opportunities (EMPL)[3]	618	Legislative (50%)	Spending (50%)	€11184.5	€11199.3
Enlargement (ELARG)	216	External (75%)	Spending (25%)	€1078.6	€1414.7
Enterprise and Industry (ENTR)[2]	741	Spending (50%)	Regulatory (50%)	€660.8	€570.6
Environment (ENV)[2]	561	Legislative (100%)		€460.0	€367.8
EuropeAid (AIDCO)	568	Spending (100%)		€5476.9	€4459.3*
European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF)[3]	340	Internal Support (100%)		€78.4	€74.2
External Relations (RELEX)[2]	645	External (100%)		€3112.1	€3112.1
Fisheries and Maritime Affairs (MARE)	266	Regulatory (75%)	Spending (25%)	€976.9	€695.3
Health and Consumer Protection (SANCO)	675	Regulatory (100%)		€664.7	€573.1
Humanitarian Aid (ECHO)	160	Spending (100%)		€796.3	€796.3
Informatics (DIGIT)	396	Internal Support (100%)		€141	€141
Information Society and Media (INFSO)	803	Spending (50%)	Regulatory (50%)	€1510.4	€1353.7
Internal Audit Service (IAS)	84	Internal Support (100%)		€1.7	€1.7
Internal Market and Services (MARKT)	417	Regulatory (75%)	Enforcement (25%)	€64.4	€64.4
Joint Research Centre (JRC)	1763	Research (100%)		€370.8	€365.7**
Justice, Freedom and Security (JLS)[5]	433	Legislative (75%)	Spending (25%)	€924.6	€675.8
Legal Service (SJ)	545	Internal (100%)		€182.2	€182.2
Regional Policy (REGIO)	355	Spending (100%)		€38514.3	€38514.3***
Research (RTD)	1210	Spending (100%)		€4659.7	€4514.6

(*continued*)

Table 1.3. Continued

Directorates-General	Staff	Primary or first task	Secondary or second task	Total budget (€millions)	Total spending (€ millions)
Secretariat-General (SG)[3]	465	Internal Support (100%)		€182.2	€182.2****
Taxation and Customs Union (TAXUD)	366	Regulatory (100%)		€129.8	€104.9
Trade (TRADE)	445	External (75%)	Regulatory (25%)	€78.5	€77.0
Transport and Energy (TREN)[3, 6]	913	Legislative (50%)	Spending (50%)	€2735.4	€2284.2
SCIC and DGT	701 + 2,220	Internal Support (100%)		€374.5	€374.5

Notes: Classification is based on DG's own categorization of strategic objective. Secondary categories are included only where such activities are prominent or repeatedly noted. Where first and secondary typologies are given as both 50%, neither is considered primary. Budgetary figures provided by DG BUDG and refer to the year 2009 (<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/budget/data/D2010_VOL4/EN/index.html>).

1 From 2010, DG Human Resources (HR)
2 From 2010, new DG Climate Action (CLIMA) formed from parts of DGs ENTR, ENV, and RELEX
3 Data from 2010 Annual Management Plan (AMP). AMPs for 2008 and 2009 not available
4 Activities funded by budgets of other DGs.
5 Split into DG Home Affairs (HOME) and DG Justice (JUST) 2010
6 Split into DG Transport (MOVE) and DG Energy (ENER) 2010
* = General EU budget for external ssistance managed by EuropeAid
** = direct research
*** = combined figure, including Secretariat General
**** = combined figure, including Legal Service

Source: Annual Management Plans, European Commission Directorates-General (various), 2008, 2009

Citizenship in January 2011, can rely on well-developed Court jurisprudence. DG Competition is the Commission's supranational power house with the authority to conduct dawn raids, break up monopolies, forbid mergers, and fine countries or multinationals, although the DG's small directorate on state aid works closely with member states. DGs with strong legal competence—power DGs—might plausibly induce officials to hold distinctive attitudes (Hooghe 1999).

Policy principles. Policy-making concerns the allocation of values. DG Market's mission is to deepen market competitiveness by, for example, reducing red tape, while DG Employment's objective is to watch over equity and fairness in the market through regulation. The former may not inevitably be incompatible with the latter, but different sets of values—competitiveness and equity—are privileged in certain policy contexts.

Position

A second source of variation relates to the positions that officials occupy in the Commission's hierarchy. Each position comes laden with distinct expectations, experiences, and interests. Three sources of positional difference are important:

Current position. Senior officials engage routinely in tasks that rarely concern junior officials: they lead and motivate a team, set strategic priorities, take responsibility for the DG's finances and budget, negotiate with member states, stakeholders, or the European Parliament, represent the Commission to the outside world, defend their DG in inter-service battles, and interact with their Commissioner and the College. Conversely, senior officials do not tend to accumulate expertise on a problem, manage a dossier from cradle to maturity, author green or white papers, write executive summaries, participate in technical working groups on a regular basis, or immerse themselves in a policy area for a lifetime.

Administrative function. The Directorate-General for Administration classifies all positions in four task categories: steering jobs, relational jobs, implementation jobs, and support jobs. This classification has been adopted in this study in the expectation that type of activity may shape attitudes.

Cabinet experience. Cabinets are the heart and soul of Commission politics; here European objectives, member state priorities, and policy-making meet. Officials may become *cabinet* members because they possess the values and attitudes that make a *cabinet* member successful, or they may acquire these values on the job. The bottom line is that officials who have had *cabinet* experience are likely to hold different attitudes from those who have not.

Values and beliefs

A third source is the 'set[s] of beliefs about the proper order of society and how it can be achieved' (Erikson and Tedin 2003). Human beings care about consistency between their core beliefs and their attitudes about specific objects. The role of three sets of core beliefs is considered:

Economic left/right. The European Commission has been alternately attributed a bias in favour of market integration (van Apeldoorn et al. 2009; Scharpf 2010) and market-correcting policies (Majone 1996). To what extent do Commission officials' personal beliefs about the role of government in markets predispose their attitudes?

Liberal vs conservative. With the expansion of Europeanization to asylum and immigration, citizenship, culture, education, and foreign policy, EU policy-making is affecting European societies' identities. It is difficult to conceive of Commission officials as neutral arbiters, all the more so because European integration has been understood as a project that emphasizes cosmopolitanism and progressive social values (Inglehart 1977; Vachudova and Hooghe 2009; Risse 2010).

EU governance. How the EU should be governed, and by whom, is contested. This book pursues two lines of enquiry to categorize divergent opinions. One asks how Commission officials conceive of the appropriate balance of power among Commission, member states, and European Parliament: supranationalism, state-centrism, or institutional pragmatism (Hooghe 2012). A second considers the Community method, which has formed the constitutional foundation for the Commission's special role in the European construct (Dehousse 2011).

Territoriality and nationality

Previous research has found that territoriality, and in particular nationality, profoundly shapes the way a person thinks about European issues (Hooghe 2001, 2005; Beyers 2005). The challenge is to theorize what it is about being British, Bulgarian or Belgian that makes this so.

EU-12. For the purposes of this study, EU-12 refers to the twelve member states that joined the European Union in 2004 or 2007. These recent members can be expected to have distinctive interests and values stemming from the collective break with communism and authoritarianism (Kitschelt 1992; Kitschelt et al. 1999; Vachudova 2005; Rohrschneider and Whitefield 2009).[38] Socialization and utility combine to suggest that EU-12 officials have distinctive attitudes on a range of EU issues.

Accession wave. Each enlargement writes its own history in anticipated benefits, hopes, and contestation (Dehousse et al. 2006; Peterson and Birdsall 2008). Hence the discourse that accompanies each accession is distinctive, and these discourses may frame perceptions in the aftermath.

[38] The island-states of Cyprus and Malta experienced non-communist authoritarian rule for a period of their post-colonial past.

Country size. By virtue of its size, EU government can produce public goods with transnational economies of scale (Alesina and Spolaore 2003). Small countries can expect to benefit more in trade, security, insurance against asymmetrical shocks, bargaining power, scale in research, or tackling transnational problems. Small countries can also use the European Union to tie down bigger powers.

Governance efficacy. European government may be perceived as a substitute for national government if the latter is ineffective (Sanchez-Cuenca 2000). Member states differ widely in their governing capacity, and officials from countries with less effective public authorities may have reason to desire a stronger Europe or a stronger Commission.

Multilevel governance. Individuals from federal or regionalized countries are familiar with sharing authority, and extending shared rule to the European level encounters fewer habitual barriers (Hooghe 2001; Risse 2005). It is also less costly to implement since it builds upon, rather than challenges, the status quo. A stronger Europe, European Commission, or more EU competencies should come easier to individuals from multilevel polities.

Career in national administration. National bureaucrats often develop a sense of national public service, adopt particular national administrative styles, and are linked into national networks (Suleiman 1984; Page 1997). Commission officials who worked in a national administration or as diplomat prior to joining the Commission could be primed towards less Europe, less Commission initiative, and a more modest Commission (Egeberg 1999; Hooghe 2001).

Additional influences

Selective recruitment. In the past, senior officials were not infrequently parachuted by fiat of the Commissioner, often after consulting the member state with an interest in the position (Page 1997). The so-called 'Delors mafia', as top officials hired under Jacques Delors were sometimes labelled, was formed this way, and a sizeable number became stalwarts of the Delors agenda (Ross 1995). Commissioners and national governments no longer have discretion to tailor recruitment to their political agenda, but while strict rules minimize, they cannot entirely eliminate, selective recruitment. We examine whether the Barroso Commission has geared recruitment to officials sympathetic to managerial reform (Georgakakis and de Lassalle 2008).

Self-selection. Prior research has demonstrated that top officials are much more likely to have an attachment to Europe than either national elites or public opinion (Hooghe 2005). It is plausible that candidates for Commission jobs are more favourable to the goals of European integration than non-candidates. To take account of self-selection, officials were asked why they joined the Commission (Searing 1994).

Controls: Controls for the purposes of this study are age, gender, type of education, international education, prior professional experience, and multiple nationality. Controls gain theoretical meaning in relation to particular objects. For example, in chapter 8, it is hypothesized that economics graduates and officials with a private sector background are favourably disposed to an administrative reform that strengthens managerial principles.

The chapters that follow test hypotheses informed by the conceptual schema set out in Figure 1.3 in order to explain variation in the views held by Commission officials on particular issues. A subset of the above variables is used in both descriptive and multivariate analyses throughout.

CONCLUSION

The extensive literature on the European Commission that has emerged in recent years provides a starting point for this study. However, as the above discussion has contended, existing scholarship has significant limitations. First, it has mostly focused on the Commission as a political actor rather than as an administration or organization. It may well be that the Commission's ability to be an effective political actor is determined—perhaps quite directly—by how well its administration works. Second, past research has overwhelmingly focused on part of the organization—its President, a particular DG, or how it has handled a particular policy or piece of legislation—rather than the Commission as a whole. One frequent effect is that existing work falls victim to the familiar 'blind men and elephants' problem (see Puchala 1971): it is assumed that the whole resembles one of a number of differing parts. Third, the Commission is often portrayed as unique or *sui generis*, which in key respects it is, but this characterization tends to preclude comparison with other administrations, national and international. The Commission may have exceptional powers for an international administration, but it performs many of the same tasks and functions undertaken by all bureaucracies and confronts similar challenges.

Finally, and most importantly, existing research on the European Commission draws on 'small n' samples. Most studies are based on small numbers of interviews or rely on secondary literature or official EU publications. To conduct a 'large n' study of the sort that is presented in this volume requires exceptional access to the Commission itself, as well as the committed efforts of a 'large n' of its officials. It also needs significant funding and calls for a large research team, with diverse, but complementary, skills.[39]

[39] Kassim, Peterson, and Dehousse have conducted research of a mainly qualitative character, while Bauer and Hooghe have used both qualitative and quantitative methods in their work. Connolly is an economist, experienced in applied econometric techniques, while Thompson is a specialist in quantitative methods.