

Citation: Liesbet Hooghe, Gary Marks, Tobias Lenz, Jeanine Bezuijen, Besir Ceka, Svet Derderyan. 2017. *Measuring International Authority: A Postfunctionalist Theory of Governance, Volume III*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

3

From Scoring to Aggregation: the MIA Dataset

Chapter One conceptualizes the authority of an international organization as two-dimensional. The first dimension is delegation. States may *delegate* authority to independent non-state political or legal bodies, which set the agenda, make final decisions, monitor compliance, and resolve disputes. Our measure of delegation taps the extent to which an IO body is independent of member states, its role in decision making, and the kinds of decisions that are delegated. The second dimension is pooling. States may *pool* authority in a collective body that makes joint decisions on behalf of the states themselves. Our measure of pooling taps the majority threshold for collective state decision making, the bindingness of decisions, the conditions under which they come into effect, and the kinds of decisions that are pooled. The contrast between delegation and pooling is captured by preposition: states delegate authority *to*; they pool authority *in*.

Delegation and pooling are crisp but abstract concepts. The scores produced in the Measure of International Authority (MIA) are akin to Lego blocks that summarize coherent ingredients of international governance that can be aggregated in different ways for different purposes. The aggregates set out in this chapter use an extensive number of observations, but with the minimum fuss. We wish to set out a valid measure that uses a wide range of information in a reasonably simple and transparent way.

The first sections of this chapter set out how we aggregate scores for delegation. We then do the same for pooling. In the second part of this chapter, we briefly summarize delegation and pooling over time and across decision areas.

Delegation

The variable, *delegation*, is an annual measure of the allocation of authoritative competences by member states to non-state bodies in an IO's decision-making process. We distinguish between political delegation (agenda setting and final decision making) and judicial delegation (dispute settlement).

We assess political delegation

a) in one or more IO bodies (assemblies, executives, general secretariats, consultative bodies, courts, or tribunals) that are

b) partially or fully, composed of non-member state actors, which

c) exercise or co-exercise authority over agenda setting or final decision making

d) in one or more of six decision areas: membership accession, membership suspension, constitutional reform, budgetary allocation, financial non-compliance, and (up to five streams of) policy making.

Judicial delegation is the conditional transfer of authority to courts, arbitrators, or tribunals. We assess judicial delegation with items that tap how obligatory and independent legal dispute settlement is, how binding, whether there is a standing tribunal, who has access, whether there is a remedy for non-compliance, and whether it can make compulsory preliminary rulings.

Non-state Actors

The first step in estimating delegation is to assess the extent to which an IO body is composed of non-state actors.

An IO body may be partially or fully independent of member states in one of three ways. It may be composed of representatives of bodies outside the executive organs of the member state, e.g. representatives of national or regional parliaments, courts, interest groups, professional associations, or international organizations.¹ Or it may be composed of one or more members of an IO body who operate under an explicit norm of independence from member state control. Or it may be an external non-state body, such as an international organization that plays an independent decision-making role in a second international organization. In each case, a non-member state actor must have full voting rights to qualify.

General Secretariat

Integral to the definition of an international organization is that it has an administration. In most cases, this is carried out by a general secretariat, a permanent core of non-state actors, established as such in an IO's foundational contract. The officials of the secretariat may be granted international diplomatic status; they may be required to take an oath of independence; and/or member states may be required to refrain from influencing officials. The alternative is where the administration is lodged in a central government ministry in one or more member states, or rotates among them. The former scores 1; the latter scores zero.

¹ We define national executive to include ministers of the central government, diplomats, military or security attachés, central bankers, civil servants, and experts representing their national government.

Assembly

Most IOs have member-state dominated assemblies, but some have independent assemblies in which some or all members are popularly elected or are selected by national parliaments, regional governments, local governments, trade unions, business associations, or other non-state groups. We scale each assembly present in an IO as follows, with the relevant score in brackets:

Q. I. How are members of the assembly selected?

- All members selected by member states (0)
- A majority, but not all, selected by member states (0.33)
- At least fifty percent of the members of the assembly are selected by parliaments, subnational governments, or other non-member state actors (0.66)
- At least fifty percent of the members of the assembly are popularly elected (1)

Executive

The composition of an executive is non-state when those who sit and vote in an executive do not receive voting instructions from their government. We assess this by examining the explicit constraints on member state command in relation to some proportion of the members of the executive. For example, one or more members of the executive may be required to take an oath of independence or may be constitutionally bound to act on behalf of the organization rather than his or her member state. We scale each executive in an IO as follows:

Q. VIII. Do members of the executive directly represent member states?

- All members receive voting instructions from a government (0)
- Fifty percent or more, but not all, members receive voting instructions from a government (0.33)
- Fewer than fifty percent of the members receive voting instructions from a government (1)

Consultative body

One or more consultative bodies composed of non-member state representatives can also exercise delegated authority. We code up to three consultative bodies composed of non-state representatives selected by national or subnational assemblies, representatives of business, trade unions, social movements, or professional experts. Consultative bodies score 1.

Delegation in Agenda Setting and the Final Decision

We identify those bodies that take part in agenda setting and the final decision in each decision area. Each body has a separate column in the dataset with a value in the row indicating the decision stage at which it participates. For the sample of seventy-six IOs in the period 1950 to

2010, this requires fourteen columns: three columns each for assemblies, executives, and consultative bodies; two columns for general secretariats; one column for the dispute settlement body; one column for individual member states; and one column for a non-state actor not captured by the preceding options (e.g. an international organization that operates as a non-state decision maker in this IO).

For agenda setting, we use the answers derived from the following questions:

- Accession Q. XVI.a. *Who can initiate the accession of new members?*
- Suspension Q. XVI.a. *Who can initiate the suspension of a member state?*
- Constitution Q. XIX.a. *Who can initiate constitutional reform?*
- Budget Q. XXII.a. *Who drafts the budget?*
- Financial compliance Q. XXIV.a. *Who can initiate proceedings on financial compliance?*
- Policy making Q. XXV.a. *Who can initiate policy? (We code up to five policy streams.)*

For final decision, we use the answers derived from the following questions:

- Accession Q. XVI.b. *Who makes the final decision on the accession of new members?*
- Suspension Q. XVI.b. *Who makes the final decision on the suspension of a member state?*
- Constitution Q. XIX.b. *Who makes the final decision on constitutional reform?*
- Budget Q. XXII.b. *Who makes the final decision on the budget?*
- Financial compliance Q. XXIV.b. *Who makes the final decision on financial compliance?*
- Policy making Q. XXV.b. *Who makes the final decision on policy? (We code up to five policy streams.)*

Policy making describes the core outputs of an IO, and many IOs have more than one policy stream that is characterized by a distinctive allocation of authority. We assess up to five streams of policy making.

Each body involved in agenda setting and in the final decision in a given decision area has a score for non-state composition as detailed above.

Aggregate Delegation in Agenda Setting

We aggregate scores for delegation in agenda setting for each of the six decision areas. The general rule is that in each decision area, we average the scores for non-state composition of all participating bodies. Our prior is that the authority of non-state actors in agenda setting is a function of the capacity of non-state actors relative to state actors to put issues on the table. Hence, the authority of non-state actors in agenda setting is a simple average of their incidence in agenda setting. This is a simple product of two sets of observations: which IO bodies participate, and what is the role of non-state actors within them?

We make one adjustment in the exceptional circumstance that agenda setting must pass through the hands of a general secretariat. In our sample, this is limited to policy making.

Where a general secretariat has the formal authority to serve as the sole gatekeeper in agenda setting in a particular stream of policy making, we average a score of 1 for the secretariat with the average score of all other bodies in that stream combined. The scores for all policy streams are then averaged to produce an aggregate score for agenda setting in policy making. If, for example, the general secretariat has the monopoly of initiative in just one of three policy streams (as is the case in today's European Union), then the calculation for monopoly of initiative applies to just one of three streams.

The aggregate score for delegation in agenda setting for an IO is then calculated as the average score for accession, suspension, constitutional reform, budget, financial compliance, and policy making. This score, like every one of its components, ranges from zero to 1.

Aggregate Delegation in the Final Decision

We use the same scores for the non-state composition of IO bodies to calculate an aggregate score for delegation in the final decision, but the calculation is simpler. Rather than average scores, we assess whether a body composed to some degree by non-state actors is in a position to block a decision. Whereas we estimate delegation in agenda setting by identifying all bodies that are involved in putting issues on the table, here we ask whether the final decision runs through a non-state actor, and if so, how non-state is its composition. So we first identify the most delegated actor in each decision area, allocate the appropriate delegation score to that actor, and then average across decision areas.² This score varies between zero and 1, as do all its components.

Delegation in Dispute Settlement

Legal or judicial dispute settlement is the third and final component of our delegation measure. Note that this measure deals with arbitration and adjudication, forms of legalized dispute settlement. It excludes diplomatic or political forms of dispute settlement involving negotiation, mediation, or conciliation by a third party which, if routinized in an IO body and involving non-state actors, are encompassed in the measure as political delegation.

Judicial or legal dispute settlement is estimated as the sum of seven components scaled from zero to 1 for up to two dispute settlement mechanisms in an IO. In most IOs, there is one mechanism, but a minority of IOs have two distinct mechanisms in which case we code both. The items are as follows with scores in brackets.³

- Can member states opt out of the dispute settlement system or is it obligatory for all member states (0, 0.5, 1)? [Q. XXVIII. *Is the dispute settlement system obligatory?*]

² Most of the time this score is zero because state actors usually monopolize the final decision, but there are numerous exceptions.

³ Appendix II contains the full questions and range of responses.

- Is the right for third-party review of dispute mediated by a political body or automatic (0, 0.5, 1)? [Q. XXIX. *Is there an explicit right to third-party review of disputes concerning member state compliance?*]
- Is the composition of the tribunal ad hoc or standing (0, 0.5, 1)? [Q. XXX. *How is the tribunal composed?*]
- Are rulings non-binding, conditionally binding, or binding (0, 0.5, 1)? [Q. XXXI. *Is adjudication binding?*]
- Who has access to dispute settlement: member states only, the general secretariat, non-state actors as well as states (0, 0.5, 1)? [Q. XXXII. *Do non-state actors have legal standing?*]
- Is there no remedy, partial remedy (retaliatory sanctions), or full remedy (direct effect) (0, 0.5, 1)? [Q. XXXIII. *Is there a remedy for non-compliance to the ruling?*]
- Is there a voluntary or compulsory preliminary ruling system (0, 0.5, 1)? [Q. XXXIV. *Is there a preliminary ruling system of national court referrals?*]

Each is estimated as the average of these seven equally weighted dimensions, so the score varies between zero and 1. If there are, for a given year, two dispute settlements, we select the most authoritative of the two.

Aggregate Delegation Score

The variable, Delegation, in the brief survey in the final section of this chapter is the unweighted average of delegation in agenda setting, delegation in final decision, and judicial delegation across six decision areas: accession, suspension, constitutional reform, budgetary allocation, financial compliance, and policy making. This statistic can be produced in two ways: by averaging decision stages within each decision area and then averaging across the decision areas, or by averaging decision areas for each decision stage and then averaging across decision stages.

The MIA dataset contains ten estimates for each IO and each year: delegation; delegation in agenda setting, delegation in final decision, dispute settlement; delegation in accession, suspension, constitutional reform, budgetary allocation, financial compliance, and policy making.

Pooling

Pooling estimates the extent to which member states share authority through collective decision making. We assess pooling

- a) in one or more IO bodies (assemblies, executives)
- b) in which member states collectively set the agenda and make final decisions

c) by pooling their authority under some decision rule with some degree of bindingness and/or requiring some form of ratification

d) in one or more of six decision areas: membership accession, membership suspension, constitutional reform, budgetary allocation, financial compliance, and (up to five streams of) policy making.

State-dominated Bodies

Member states pool authority in assemblies or executives composed of member state representatives. We score an assembly as state-dominated when most of its members are selected by member states, and meet either of the first two responses to the following question:

Q. I. How are members of the assembly selected?

- All members of the assembly are selected by member states (1)
- A majority, but not all, of the members of the assembly are selected by member states (1)
- At least 50 percent of the members of the assembly are selected by parliaments, subnational governments, or other non-member state actors (0)
- At least 50 percent of the members of the assembly are selected in popular election (0)

Because members of an executive, unlike an assembly, can be selected by a member state, but vote independently, we must probe the character of representation to determine whether an executive is intergovernmental. We score an executive as state-dominated when it meets either of the first two responses to the following question:

Q. VIII. Do members of the executive directly represent member states?

- All representatives in the executive receive voting instructions by their government (1)
- A majority, but not all members of the executive, receive voting instructions by their government (1)
- 50 percent or less of the members of the executive receive voting instructions by their government (0)

It is important to note that the composition of some IO bodies is hybrid. An IO body with a majority of member state representatives alongside one or more non-state members can feature in both pooling and delegation.

Allocate a Pooling score

To estimate the extent of pooling we consider the voting rule in a collective state-dominated body. We observe the voting rule for all bodies that play a role in agenda setting and the final decision in each decision area (Q. XVI.a to Q. XXV5.b in Appendix II). The scores range from

proposals or decisions by individual member states, which scores zero, to majority voting, which scores 1:

- Individual member states decide (0)
- A collective state-dominated body decides by unanimity/ consensus (0.33)
- A collective state-dominated body decides by supermajority (qualified majority) (0.66)
- A collective state-dominated body decides by simple or absolute majority (1)

We score automatic or technocratic decision making—decision making explicitly contracted in written rules—at the mid-point on the intergovernmentalism/supranationalism scale (0.5) on the ground that it collectively ties the hands of all IO actors, including member states.

Adjust For Bindingness and Ratification

Member states can blunt the effect of pooling on state sovereignty by making decisions that are only conditionally binding or not binding at all. They can also subject IO decisions to domestic ratification. Both steps shift the ultimate decision from the IO back to the member states. The table below lists the decision areas that may be subject to these intergovernmental constraints.

[Table 3.1. Decision areas that may be subject to ratification or bindingness]

The baseline for estimating the effect of bindingness and ratification is the pooling score produced by the voting rules. If decision making is conditionally binding or not binding, or if ratification applies, we adjust the score downwards by multiplying the baseline pooling score with a weight that varies between zero and 1. Table 3.2 shows by how much.

The bolded row in Table 3.2 lists the weights for bindingness that apply to budgetary decision making and policy making. The relevant questions in the coding scheme are *Q. XXIII. Is financial decision making binding?* and *Q. XXVI. Are policy decisions binding?*

The bolded column in Table 3.2 list the weights for ratification that apply to accession, constitutional reform, and policy making. The relevant questions in the coding scheme are *Q. XVII. Is ratification on accession by existing member states required?* *Q. XX. Is ratification of constitutional reform required?* and *Q. XXVII. Is ratification of policy required?*

For policy making, which can be subject to both ratification and bindingness, the weight that we use is the product of the cells of Table 3.2, and we repeat this for each policy stream in an IO. Hence, if a policy stream produces decisions that are conditionally binding (bindingness = 0.75) and that require ratification by a subset of member states to be binding on those member states that ratify (ratification score = 0.5), the multiplier is $0.75 \times 0.5 = 0.375$.

[Table 3.2: Weights for bindingness and ratification]

Pooling in Agenda Setting and the Final Decision

As for delegation, we aggregate agenda setting by decision area: accession, suspension, constitutional reform, budgetary allocation, financial compliance, and policy making.

For pooling, as for delegation, we distinguish between agenda setting and final decision making. We have scores at each decision stage for each intergovernmental body based on whether they vote by majority, supermajority, or consensus/ unanimity. The score for policy making averages up to five policy streams.

To produce a summary score for agenda setting we average the scores for all participating state bodies in each decision area. We then apply the weights for bindingness and ratification where relevant for a decision area. The aggregate score for pooling in agenda setting averages scores for these six decision areas, and the score ranges between zero and 1.

To produce a summary score for the final decision, we first identify all bodies that participate in the final decision in a given decision area and apply their pooling score. We use only the score for the most intergovernmental body in each decision area, on the ground that this is the strongest point at which member states can control the outcome. In policy making, we average the scores of the most intergovernmental body across the policy streams. Next, we adjust the scores in each policy area for bindingness and ratification. The summary score for pooling in the final decision is the average across the six policy areas, ranging between zero and 1.

Aggregate Pooling Score

The variable, Pooling, is the unweighted average of pooling in agenda setting and pooling in final decision. This statistic can also be obtained by aggregating agenda setting and pooling by decision area, and averaging across decision areas.

The MIA dataset contains nine estimates for each IO and each year: pooling; pooling in agenda setting, pooling in final decision; pooling in accession, suspension, constitutional reform, budgetary allocation, financial compliance, and policy making.

A First Look at Delegation and Pooling

What does the Measure of International Authority (MIA) reveal about the distribution of authority across international organizations? We begin by summarizing the data for pooling and delegation and then we present descriptive statistics over time, by decision area, and for each IO.

Delegation and pooling can be estimated as latent factors or as summated rating scales. Factor analysis uses the available information more efficiently by weighting each indicator according to its contribution to the score for a given IO. Summated rating scores, by contrast, have the virtue of being unaffected by the composition of the sample. Both methods produce aggregate delegation and pooling scores using components for each decision area—accession,

suspension, constitution, budget, financial compliance, and policy—as described in the previous section. Each component is scaled 0–1, where zero is pure intergovernmentalism and 1 is pure supranationalism.

Principal components analysis yields two latent variables with eigenvalues greater than 1 corresponding to delegation and pooling (Table 3.3). These latent variables capture the bulk, 60 percent, of the variance in the twelve indicators.

[Table 3.3: PCA analysis, about here]

Table 3.4 is a correlation matrix for these factors and additive delegation and pooling scales produced by summing the scores across the six decision areas. The Cronbach’s alpha for the additive scale for pooling is 0.80 and 0.90 for delegation, indicating very high internal consistency. To use the analogy with which we started this chapter, the Lego blocks we chose to produce measurements of delegation and pooling form coherent objects. In the remainder of this chapter, we use the additive scales, which, as Table 3.4 shows, are very highly correlated with the comparable predicted components from the PCA.

[Table 3.4: Correlation matrix, about here]

We begin by taking a look at aggregate trends over time.⁴ Figure 3.1 displays the mean delegation scores for the fifty-one IOs in our sample that were in existence for the entire 1975 to 2010 period. In these years, the number of IOs increased as well. The background bars and the Y-axis on the right show the rise. Figure 3.2 displays the same information for pooling. Both delegation and pooling remained stable until the mid-1980s, at which point they increased substantially. The rise in delegation is markedly steeper than that for pooling. The mean delegation score inches up from 0.16 in 1975 to 0.18 in 1992 and then grows rapidly to 0.24 in 2010, equivalent to replacing ad hoc interstate arbitration with a standing tribunal that can hear cases filed by private parties and can authorize retaliatory sanctions. The mean pooling score goes from 0.29 in 1975 to 0.30 in 1992 and then climbs steadily to 0.35 in 2010. This rise is equivalent to relaxing the final decision from consensus to super majoritarian voting or from super majoritarian voting to simple majority in two decision areas. It is also equivalent to replacing policy instruments that are conditionally binding and require ratification by all (e.g. conventions) with directly binding instruments (e.g. acts, directives, or regulations).⁵

[Figure 3.1 Delegation 1975-2010 about here]

[Figure 3.2 Pooling 1975-2010 about here]

These aggregate trends mask wide variation across decision areas. Delegation is considerably higher in budgetary allocation and policy making than in suspension, constitutional reform, financial compliance, or accession (Figure 3.3). Framing the budget and initiating policy are day-to-day concerns in which non-state actors, including particularly the IO secretariat, often play a large role. By contrast, suspension, financial compliance, accession, and

⁴ Appendix III contains the delegation and pooling scores, and the scores of their chief components, for each IO over time.

⁵ This assumes that the supermajority decision rule in the state-dominated body remains unchanged.

constitutional reform are extraordinary matters, often involving high politics, and in most IOs they are the preserve of member state dominated bodies.

Our measures of delegation increase across the board, with the largest proportional increases in suspension and financial compliance, reflecting mounting concern among democracies with imposing the rules of the international game on recalcitrant states. This could be done by introducing an automatic rule-based system disciplining a state in arrears, by extending the competence of the secretariat to begin proceedings, or by strengthening dispute settlement. The latter two options involve more delegation.

[Figure 3.3: Delegation by decision area, 1975-2010, about here]

The extent of delegation varies widely across IOs, as can be seen from beanplots which visualize the distribution density for all seventy-six IOs in our sample in 2010. Each plot traces the density of the distribution which is mirrored to form a polygon (Kampstra 2008). The horizontal lines in Figure 3.4 show averages, and the dashed line is the sample average across the decision areas. The common pattern is an elongated normal distribution, skewed to lower values in accession, suspension, constitutional reform, and financial compliance. Budgetary allocation and policy making are the most elongated. These are the decision areas in which delegation varies most widely, from IOs having powerful secretariats, non-state assemblies, and well developed courts, to those dominated by member state executives.

[Figure 3.4: Beanplots for delegation by decision area, 2010 about here]

When we chart the distribution of IOs across the decision stages of delegation (Figure 3.5), we witness an extraordinary—and revealing—diversity. Delegation in agenda setting is normally distributed. This is the phase in which non-state actors, including particularly general secretariats, may play an important role in discovering areas of cooperation and in framing alternative courses of action. In sharp contrast, the distribution in the final decision is squat and skewed to zero. Member states tend to be jealous of final control and deny non-state bodies a formal vote at the final stage of decision making. However, some conspicuous non-state bodies—including the European Parliament, the East African Legislative Assembly, and the Executive Council of the World Meteorological Organization—break this general pattern. General secretariats are almost always confined to agenda setting. But here again, there are exceptions. We detect two instances where the secretariat makes the final decision. Between 1952 and 1967, the European Coal and Steel Community's High Authority decided on the budget and made the final call on some policy decisions, and since 2004 the Commonwealth's general secretariat has been taking the final decision on financial compliance.

The distribution in dispute settlement is completely different from that in agenda setting or the final decision. It is extremely dispersed with marked bimodality (Hooghe et al. 2014). One group of mostly weak regional IOs and global IOs responsible for standard setting clusters at zero. The remaining IOs are dispersed across the intermediate and high range. At the high end of the scale are IOs, such as the European Union, the Central African Economic and Monetary Union, the East African Community, and the Andean Community, with a supranational court that has two or more of the following: a standing tribunal with mandatory

coverage, binding rulings, direct effect, a preliminary rulings procedure, and the possibility for private actors to initiate proceedings.

[Figure 3.5: Bean plots for delegation by decision phase, 2010 about here]

Figure 3.6 displays boxplots, which allow one to compare how delegation within the seventy-six IOs in our sample has varied between 1950 and 2010. At one extreme, the Central Commission for the Navigation of the Rhine and the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation have never shifted from zero on our delegation scale. Others, such as NATO, the OECD, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) have moderate, but stable, levels. Forty-nine IOs, however, have shifted over time, and twenty-five have minimum and maximum scores that range over at least one tenth of the entire scale. The most dynamic IOs are regional organizations: the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the refounded East African Community (EAC2), the Central American Integration System (SICA), and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). It is interesting to note that there is almost no association between an IO's overall or median level of delegation and the extent to which it has changed over time. Delegation, as we measure it in the MIA, does not appear to feed on itself. However, the general trend has been increasing delegation. Forty-four of the forty-nine IOs that have experienced change have increased delegation in the time we observe them.

[Figure 3.6: Boxplots for delegation, 1950-2010, about here]

Turning to pooling, Figure 3.7 reveals that pooling varies widely across decision areas. On average, it is strongest in budgetary allocation. A score of 0.5 would result if member states had no possibility of opting out of budgetary decisions drafted under supermajority and decided by consensus. Accession, financial compliance, and policy making are moderately pooled, with constitutional reform and suspension at the low end for reasons that have to do with their implications for national sovereignty.

Average levels of pooling in accession, constitutional reform, and policy making have increased only marginally among the fifty-one IOs that existed from 1975 to 2010. Pooling in budgetary allocation, and particularly in suspension and financial compliance have, however, increased perceptibly. One reason for the rise in pooling in suspension and financial compliance, as suggested above, was a growing willingness to use IOs to punish transgressors of international law. The Commonwealth is a case in point. In 1995 it set up a procedure to assess infringement of constitutional rule with authority—used in the case of the Fiji Islands—to suspend or expel a recalcitrant member state.

[Figure 3.7: Pooling by decision area, 1975-2010 about here]

The distribution of IOs for pooling in the six decision areas can be gauged by the beanplots in Figure 3.8. The distributions here are noticeably more diverse than those for delegation. At one extreme, the distribution for IOs in suspension is highly skewed to zero, with a long tail reaching the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) which can suspend a member state on a vote by two-thirds of its Board of Governors and General Conference. The distributions for constitutional reform and policy making are also wide-bodied at lower values with long tails for higher values. In the remaining decision areas, IOs are more evenly dispersed,

with two or three humps, as in budgetary allocation and financial compliance. The bimodal distribution in financial compliance is particularly marked, indicating that a minority of IOs do not pool at all, while most pool authority to a considerable degree.

[Figure 3.8: Beanplots for pooling by decision area in 2010 about here]

Figure 3.9 compares beanplots for pooling in agenda setting and the final decision. The distributions are similarly normal with a slight skew to lower values. Average pooling is significantly higher (with 95 percent confidence) in the final decision because, in contrast to agenda setting where it is common to give individual member states the right to initiate, the final decision is almost always taken by a collective IO body.⁶ An average of 0.35 on the final decision is equivalent to a state-dominated IO body taking binding decisions on the budget by supermajority and by consensus in the other five decision areas with no ratification. Interestingly, pooling is relatively high in the final decision compared to agenda setting, whereas in delegation it is the other way around. Delegation is strongly agenda focused; pooling is tilted to the final decision.

[Figure 3.9: Beanplots for pooling by decision stage in 2010 about here]

Figure 3.10 displays box plots for pooling for all IOs in the dataset between 1950 and 2010. As with delegation, most of the change has been upward over time. We detect an increase of pooling in thirty-seven IOs, a decline in twelve IOs, and stasis in twenty-seven. Interestingly, the panel on the left reveals much more change than the one on the right: change is most widespread at low to intermediate levels of pooling. The organizations that have changed the most are those with low initial values, including the uniquely dynamic Intergovernmental Organization for International Carriage by Rail (OTIF)—now “intergovernmental” in name only—which entered the dataset in 1950 with a score of 0.04 and in 2010 scored 0.54. In general, high levels of pooling tend to be the result of initial design. With the exception of the World Health Organization (WHO), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), and the League of Arab States (LOAS), the change in pooling is very small or non-existent in the upper third of our sample.

The organizations that pool most extensively tend to be task-specific and global. They include the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and the International Maritime Organization (IMO). UNESCO and ICAO, both with a median pooling score above 0.60, have abolished the national veto in all six decision areas.

[Figure 3.10: Boxplots for pooling, 1950-2010, about here]

Figure 3.11 maps the 76 IOs in our sample on delegation and pooling in 2010 and reveals that these distinctive forms of IO authority are weakly associated ($r=0.14$). This might be surprising to those familiar with the European Union or the WTO which have high levels of both delegation and pooling. However, these IOs are far from representative. Let us take a closer

⁶ Individual member states are final decision makers in just one percent of more than 21,000 decisions coded in our dataset.

look at three less studied IOs—the International Maritime Organization (IMO), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)—to illustrate how pooling and delegation can vary independently.

The International Maritime Organization (IMO) has extensive pooling and weak delegation. It was established in 1958 as a UN special agency for maritime safety. Following the Torrey Canyon disaster of 1967 it was tasked also with marine environmental standard setting (Nordquist and Moore 1999). Its main purpose is to provide a venue for negotiating conventions and international regulations. These become binding once two-thirds of the members have ratified. Ratification has been made less restrictive since 1972 when the IMO began using the tacit consent procedure whereby a member state is presumed to have ratified unless it objects within a set time period. The new rule was introduced because reaching the two-thirds hurdle became increasingly difficult as membership expanded beyond the initial group of shipping nations. Simple non-weighted majority voting is the decision rule in its intergovernmental Assembly and Council for regulations and conventions, the budget, and suspension of nonpaying members. This places the IMO in the top ten percent of our sample on pooling. However, delegation to independent non-state bodies is minimal. Aside from co-drafting the budget as a junior partner to the Council, the IMO's 300 strong staff provides secretarial support for the organization's technical intergovernmental committees.

By contrast, the Economic Community of West African States has extensive delegation, but limited pooling. ECOWAS was created in 1975 by fifteen former British and French colonies to promote a common market, and has since branched out to become a peace and security player in West Africa. ECOWAS' high delegation score is owed to its general secretariat, court, and parliament. Its general secretariat is a collegial body that also functions as ECOWAS' chief executive "responsible for the smooth running and for protecting the general interest of the Community" (2006 Memorandum, Art. 12). It drafts the annual budget, sets the agenda in suspension and financial compliance, and has a monopoly of initiative in all policy areas except peacekeeping (2006 Memorandum, Art. 12). The ECOWAS Community Court of Justice is the third-most authoritative court in our dataset (preceded only by the European Court of Justice and the Economic and Monetary Community of Central African States' Court of Justice). It can hear disputes on a broad swathe of issues including human rights, hear cases brought by private individuals, provide preliminary rulings upon the request of national courts, and make rulings with direct effect (Alter, Helfer, McAllister 2013). The ECOWAS parliament is the third delegated actor, and unusually for a consultative body, it must be consulted on constitutional reform. However, member states have preserved the national veto in collective bodies in every policy area except peacekeeping, where the member-state dominated Mediation and Security Council can deploy election monitors, mediators, and peacekeepers by two-thirds majority. ECOWAS is in the top-decile of our sample on delegation and in the bottom third on pooling.

The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) scores almost zero on delegation and pooling. SAARC was founded in 1985 by Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan and four neighboring countries to promote trust and cooperation in some technical areas, and in 2006 was tasked with trade liberalization. All decisions are taken by consensus, usually by the Intergovernmental Council of Ministers or its Standing Committee. Common projects are not

binding and conventions signed by SAARC members bind only those that subsequently ratify. The SAARC Secretariat has no formal agenda setting role in any of the areas we monitor. As one commentator observes, the Secretariat “hardly exercises even the modest role assigned to it by the Charter. It has only occasionally been involved in the preparation of documentation for important meetings” (Ashan 2006: 146).

[Figure 3.11: Delegation and pooling in 2010, about here]

We conclude this preview of the MIA dataset with summary statistics for the components of delegation and pooling for the seventy-six IOs in the dataset from 1950 to 2010.

[Tables 3.5 and 3.6: Descriptive Statistics, about here]

Several commonalities between delegation and pooling stand out when one compares the mean levels across decision areas. There is least delegation and pooling on average in suspension and constitutional reform. These are two bastions of state sovereignty. There is the most delegation and pooling on the budget, a decision area which has to do with the ordinary operations of most IOs. Policy making is relatively high on both delegation (second highest) and pooling (third highest) for similar reasons. Accession and financial compliance discriminate between delegation, which is relatively low, and pooling which is relatively high.

Overall there is slightly more variation in delegation than in pooling, taking the mean levels in account. The coefficients of variation describe variability relative to the mean of the distribution. Interestingly, decision areas and decision stages with the lowest means tend to have the largest coefficients of variation. Variation among IOs is relatively large for those components of authority which are the most difficult to achieve. So we see, on average, little delegation in the final decision, but there are some IOs which rise above. The same is true of pooling on suspension. The association between the mean and the coefficient of variation for the twelve decision areas in delegation and pooling combined is -0.71 . International organizations are particularly diverse in areas of stark national sovereignty.

Perhaps the functional pressures for delegation and pooling are more persistent in day-to-day policy and financial matters than for quasi-constitutional matters. Who should we allow in our club? How shall we punish violators? Who can rewrite the IO contract? Member states intent on preserving their freedom of action may refuse to subject these matters to the rule of law. But not always, and not consistently over time. When do states delegate? When do states pool authority? What drives member states to sometimes relax and sometimes tighten control? These are puzzles for another book.

The MIA cannot answer such questions. What it can do is reveal patterns of international authority that have hitherto remained murky. The need for such information arises from the immense difficulty in bringing observation into contact with theory. In the social sciences, theories often run far beyond the data necessary to confirm or disconfirm them. Human ingenuity in devising coherent models of the world is perhaps no less great in the social sciences than in the natural sciences, but the information we have at our disposal to discipline and inform theory is usually far poorer. Our purpose is to provide a range of conceptually coherent observations, which can be assembled—like Lego blocks—in diverse ways for diverse purposes.

Table 3.1: Decision areas that may be subject to ratification or bindingness

	Ratification	Binding
Accession	√	
Suspension		
Constitutional reform	√	
Budgetary allocation		√
Financial compliance		
Policy making	√	√

Table 3.2: Weights for bindingness and ratification

		BINDINGNESS		
		BINDING	CONDITIONALLY BINDING	NOT BINDING
RATIFICATION	Weight	1.00	0.75	0.25
NO RATIFICATION	1.00	1.000	0.750	0.250
RATIFICATION BY SUBSET & BINDING ON ALL	0.75	0.750	0.563	0.188
RATIFICATION BY SUBSET & BINDING ON SUBSET	0.50	0.500	0.375	0.125
RATIFICATION BY ALL	0.25	0.250	0.188	0.063

Table 3.3: Factor analysis

Components	Two-factor solution	
	Delegation	Pooling
Delegation in accession	.416	-.022
Delegation in suspension	.376	.042
Delegation in constitutional reform	.436	-.011
Delegation in budgetary allocation	.425	.030
Delegation in financial compliance	.342	.062
Delegation in policy making	.419	-.011
Pooling in accession	.012	.439
Pooling in suspension	-.006	.402
Pooling in constitutional reform	.046	.410
Pooling in budgetary allocation	-.119	.442
Pooling in financial compliance	.048	.461
Pooling in policy making	.056	.249
Eigenvalue	4.21	3.01
Explained variance (%)	0.35	0.25

Note: Principal components factor analysis, promax rotation, listwise deletion. $N = 3295$ (all IOs between 1950 or establishment to 2010). The highest score for each dimension is in bold.

Table 3.4: Correlation matrix

	Delegation (additive)	Delegation (PCA)	Pooling (additive)	Pooling (PCA)
Delegation (additive scale)	1			
Delegation (PCA)	0.999	1		
Pooling (additive scale)	0.276	0.279	1	
Pooling (PCA)	0.289	0.291	0.996	1

Note: N=3,295


Table 3.5: Descriptives on delegation

	Mean	Median	Coefficient of variation	Min	Max	Q25	Q75
By decision area							
Delegation on accession	0.141	0.143	1.150	0	0.778	0	0.191
Delegation on suspension	0.109	0.119	1.123	0	0.643	0	0.167
Delegation on constitutional reform	0.130	0.125	1.110	0	0.644	0	0.191
Delegation on budgetary allocation	0.322	0.333	0.625	0	1	0.167	0.443
Delegation on financial compliance	0.138	0.143	1.179	0	0.667	0	0.191
Delegation on policy making	0.272	0.249	0.671	0	0.917	0.167	0.360
By decision stage							
Delegation in agenda setting	0.231	0.208	0.661	0	0.708	0.135	0.333
Delegation in final decision	0.052	0	2.227	0	0.55	0	0
Dispute settlement	0.274	0.286	1.077	0	1	0	0.500
DELEGATION (additive scale)	0.185	0.179	0.731	0	0.651	0.061	0.261

Table 3.6: Descriptives on pooling


	Mean	Median	Coefficient of variation	Min	Max	Q25	Q75
By decision area							
Pooling on accession	0.355	0.330	0.693	0	1	0.125	0.540
Pooling on suspension	0.137	0	1.857	0	1	0	0.165
Pooling on constitutional reform	0.209	0.165	0.959	0	0.75	0.040	0.330
Pooling on budgetary allocation	0.439	0.330	0.723	0	1	0.165	0.660
Pooling on financial compliance	0.305	0.165	1.082	0	1	0	0.580
Pooling on policy making	0.312	0.250	0.690	0	1	0.165	0.375
By decision stage							
Pooling in agenda setting	0.253	0.222	0.748	0	0.749	0.083	0.375
Pooling in final decision	0.332	0.316	0.612	0	0.790	0.179	0.538
POOLING (additive scale)	0.293	0.287	0.633	0	0.728	0.138	0.425

Figure 3.1: Delegation, 1975-2010




Note: N=51 IOs that were in existence 1975 to 2010.

Figure 3.2: Pooling, 1975-2010




Note: N=51 IOs that were in existence 1975 to 2010.

Figure 3.3: Delegation by decision area, 1975-2010




Note: N=51 IOs that were in existence 1975 to 2010.

Figure 3.4: Beanplots for delegation by decision area, 2010




Note: N=74 IOs for 2010.

Figure 3.5: Beanplots for delegation by decision stage, 2010




Note: N=74 IOs for 2010.

Figure 3.6: Boxplots for delegation, 1950-2010




Note: N=76 IOs for 1950-2010. The boxplots summarize the median, interquartile range, and 95 percentile whiskers for the values that each IO takes on delegation across its years of existence in our dataset. The circles mark outside values beyond the range of the whiskers.

Figure 3.7: Pooling by decision area, 1975-2010




Note: N=51 IOs that were in existence 1975 to 2010.

Figure 3.8: Beanplots for pooling by decision area, 2010




Note: N=74 IOs for 2010.

Figure 3.9: Beanplots for pooling by decision stage, 2010



Note: N=74 IOs for 2010.

Figure 3.10: Boxplots for pooling, 1950-2010



Note: N=74 IOs for 2010.

