

# 3

## *Multiple Identities*

Whereas the process of European integration over the past two decades has been driven mainly by economic goals, the founders of the European Union were driven by larger ambitions.<sup>1</sup> Jean Monnet, Robert Schuman, Konrad Adenauer, Paul-Henri Spaak, and Alcide de Gasperi conceived the European Union as a response to the horrors of war in Europe, as a means to tame destructive nationalism. The founders hoped to weaken national animosities by establishing an international legal order that would constrain realist anarchy. They wanted to domesticate international tensions within stable supranational institutions. Their long-term goal was to foster a European identity that would overarch and thereby temper contending nationalisms. Although the founders did not believe nationalism would be replaced by Europeanism, they were convinced that patriotism and attachment to Europe could coexist.

The founders of the EU conceived of European identity as an outcome of European integration. They were prepared to build European institutions in the absence of “Europeans.” The idea was to appeal to elites who would see the virtue of collective decision making in specific policy areas at the European level. Institution builders today do not have that luxury. European integration has become politicized. It limits the sovereignty of national states in obvious ways, and unless citizens feel some genuine attachment to the territorial community of Europe, the possibilities for further European integration will be constrained. Identity has shifted to the left side of the equation: it is no longer a passive outcome of integration but now shapes the possibility of further integration.

How, it is asked, can one legitimately allocate values if the losers do not feel they belong to the same territorial community as the winners? Decisions about who gets what often involve redistribution among groups, and those who lose will find such outcomes illegitimate if they do not identify with the larger society. Fritz Scharpf has made the point that representation and majority rule are legitimate only in the context of preexisting collective identity: “As long as the democratic legitimacy of European governance must rest primarily on the agreement of democratically accountable national governments, the citizens of countries whose governments are outvoted have no reason to consider such decisions as having democratic legitimation” (Scharpf 1996, 26).<sup>2</sup>

Some writers argue that it is not worthwhile to deepen democratic institutions to counter the democratic deficit if a Europe-wide collective identity does not exist (but see Van Kersbergen 1997). This position is taken by Anthony Smith in his recent book, *Nations and Nationalism in*

## *a Global Era:*

Nations and nationalisms remain political necessities because (and for so long as) they alone can ground the interstate order in the principles of popular sovereignty and the will of the people, however defined. Only nationalism can secure the assent of the governed to the territorial unity to which they have been assigned, through a sense of collective identification with historic culture-communities in their 'homelands.' . . . Since there is little sign that the competition of states, even in Europe, is being superseded by some completely new political order, the likelihood of the nation which forms the *raison d'être* of the state and its community of will being transcended remains remote. Even if a number of states were to pool their sovereignties and even if their national communities were to agree to federate within a single political framework, the national and its nationalism would long remain the only valid focus and constituency for ascertaining the popular will. (Smith 1995, 154—155; compare Greven 1997; see also Eatwell 1997)<sup>3</sup>

The collective identity that is necessary to underpin democratic legitimacy in Europe, however, was not intended to eclipse national identity. Jean Monnet was well aware that national identities were deep-seated among most Europeans and that any attempt to displace them was bound to fail. His goal, like most of those who came after him, was to gradually erode the vindictive elements of nationalism by planting overarching institutions that would nurture common interests.

This pragmatic conception of identity building in Europe was shared by Karl Deutsch. Integration for Deutsch meant piecemeal transfers of specific competencies to an overarching polity and gradual evolution towards a "sense of community." Deutsch argued that this was more feasible than "amalgamation," which would involve a central government with exclusive authoritative control over individuals in a given territory. Although Deutsch did not rule out the possibility that amalgamation might be the ultimate destination, he argued that it would be self-defeating to make this the explicit goal. Ambiguity about where integration was headed could be useful. In a prescient passage, Deutsch explained that "to encourage this profitable ambiguity, leaders of such movements have often used broader symbols such as 'union,' which would cover both possibilities and could be made to mean different things to different men" (Deutsch 1957, 4).

Ernst Haas came to a similar conclusion about coexistence of European and national identities. He rejected the possibility that European identity would replace national identities. Haas coined the term *asymmetrical overlapping* to describe a non-state form of governance that he saw developing in Western Europe. In a passage that presages the concept of multi-level governance, Haas identified the possibility of multiple overlapping sources of governance at different territorial levels, and corresponding "tiered multiple loyalties" (Haas 1971, 31).

More recently, William Wallace has argued that “the emergence of a diffuse sense of European identity has not led to a transfer of loyalties from the national to the European level . . . . What we have observed across Western Europe over the last two decades is a shift towards multiple loyalties with the single focus on the nation supplemented by European and regional affiliations above and below” (Wallace 1990, 33; see also García and Wallace 1993; Obradovic 1966; Laffan 1996b).<sup>4</sup>


In the remainder of this chapter, we frame some expectations about sources of identity in Europe. The questions we ask are straightforward: How has the creation and deepening of the European Union shaped Europeans’ diverse territorial identities? How strong and how widespread is attachment to the European Union? How is European identity linked to national, regional, and local identities? How can one begin to explain the pattern of identities we see?

Previous quantitative analysis has focused on various measures of support for European integration rather than on issues of identity, and little systematic attention has been given to questions of multiple identities (Anderson and Kaltenhaler 1996; Eichenberg and Dalton 1993; Franklin, van der Eijk, and Marsh 1995; Mahler, Taylor, and Wozniak 1995; Gabel and Palmer 1995; Gabel 1998; Niedermayer and Sinnott 1995).

## TERRITORIAL ATTACHMENTS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

First, we present a conceptual frame for analyzing variations in territorial identity (see [figure 3.1](#)). We conceive of three basic types, each of which can be regarded as varying in any combination with the other two to describe individual territorial identity. At A in [figure 3.1](#), an individual has multiple identities, i.e., more than two coexisting identities; at B, an individual has an exclusive identity, i.e., a single identity which overwhelms all others; the third corner of the triangle—C—admits the possibility that an individual may be unattached, with little or no territorial identity whatsoever. These three possibilities cannot be ranged sensibly along a single continuum, for the *strength* of territorial identity (and therefore the distance of an individual from point C) is independent of the *character* of an individual’s identity—that is, whether the individual has an exclusive identity or multiple identities. An individual’s territorial identity may, therefore, be described as lying at some point in the triangle ABC.

[Table 3.1](#) provides an overview of attachment to different levels of territorial community for fourteen countries (the EU 15 minus Luxembourg). The table is based on *Eurobarometer* surveys conducted in November 1991 and May—June 1995. In both surveys, attachments at the local, regional, and national levels are comparably high, a noteworthy finding given the emphasis in the popular press and in much scholarly literature on national states as the prime focus for territorial identity. In five countries—Denmark, Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom—attachment to country is significantly greater than attachment at the regional or local level. These are the only countries in which national attachment exceeds subnational attachment by 0.1 or more in both surveys, or by 0.2 or more in one of the surveys. In France, Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Sweden, attachment to country is matched by subnational attachment. In the federal or federalizing societies of Austria, Belgium, Spain, and (western) Germany, country attachment is exceeded significantly by regional attachment.



**Figure 3.1 Framing Territorial Identity**

Attachment to the European Union is much weaker than attachment to smaller territorial units. The difference can be summarized succinctly. In no country is mean attachment to the EU greater than 3.0 (“fairly attached”); in no country is mean attachment to any other territorial community less than 3.0. For individual respondents, however, a slightly different picture comes into view: 30 percent of the total number of individuals in the national samples are as attached to the EU as they are to their country.

**Table 3.1 Territorial Attachment, 1991 and 1995**

	Locality		Region		Country		European Union	
	1991	1995	1991	1995	1991	1995	1991	1995
Austria		3.5*		3.7		3.5		2.3
Belgium	3.3	3.4	3.2	3.5	3.0	3.2	2.4	2.5
Denmark	3.4	3.2	3.6	3.4	3.8	3.7	2.3	2.1
Finland		3.1		3.2		3.6		2.0
France	3.1	3.2	3.3	3.4	3.4	3.4	2.6	2.6
Germany	3.5	3.5	3.6	3.6	3.4	3.3	2.4	2.3
Greece	3.7	3.8	3.8	3.9	3.8	3.9	2.5	2.4
Ireland	3.5	3.6	3.6	3.6	3.7	3.7	2.2	2.5
Italy	3.4	3.5	3.4	3.4	3.4	3.5	2.7	2.7
Netherlands	2.9	2.8	3.0	3.1	3.2	3.1	2.1	2.1
Portugal	3.7	3.6	3.7	3.7	3.7	3.7	2.5	2.5
Spain	3.7	3.6	3.7	3.6	3.5	3.5	2.7	2.4
		3.4		3.6		3.6		1.9
United Kingdom	3.2	3.2	3.4	3.3	3.5	3.4	2.2	2.1
EU 12/EU 15**	3.4	3.4	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.4	2.5	2.4

\*Coding: 4 = very attached, 3 = fairly attached, 2 = not very attached, 1 = not at all attached.

\*\*Average EU 12 and EU 15 attachments in 1995 are identical when rounded to one decimal place.

Sources: Eurobarometer 36.0 and Eurobarometer 43.1. Data for Eurobarometer 43.1 are presented in *Les Régions par la Commission Européenne* (Brussels: European Coordination Office, 1995).

Table 3.2 correlates intensity of attachment for individuals across pairs of territorial levels.<sup>5</sup> These data allow one to come to grips with an important issue in the study of territorial identity, namely, to what extent are attachments mutually exclusive or mutually inclusive? Does attachment to the nation come at the expense of EU or regional attachment? The data in table 3.2 are unambiguous on this score. Attachments are *mutually inclusive*—that is, attachment at one territorial level is associated with greater rather than lesser attachment at other levels. Individuals do not allocate a fixed sum of attachment across territorial levels. Attachment to the European Union, one’s country, region, locality, or town is not a zero-sum competition in which an increase at one level is compensated by loss of attachment at other levels. On the contrary, an individual with a relatively high attachment to one territorial community is likely to have a relatively high attachment to other territorial communities.

This finding is congruent with responses to questions asked in *Eurobarometer 38* (Fall 1992) concerning the relationship of European to national identity. Whereas 30 percent of respondents viewed the European Union as a threat to their national identity and culture, 46 percent saw it as a protection. Sixty-two percent saw “a sense of European identity as being compatible with a sense of national identity,” compared with 23 percent who envisaged their

“country’s identity disappearing over time if a European Union came about” (Reif 1993; see also Risse-Kappen 1996a).

**Table 3.2 Correlation Matrix**

EU attachment	1.000			
National attachment	.237 (.000)	1.000		
Regional attachment	.179 (.000)	.450 (.000)	1.000	
Town/village attachment	.134 (.000)	.346 (.000)	.607 (.000)	1.000

Source: Eurobarometer 36.0. Pearson correlation (P Value).


Table 3.2 reveals two additional, second-order features. First, associations between attachments are highest among contiguous territorial units. The strongest associations for any territorial level are those with the next level up or down. Second, associations across lower territorial levels are stronger than those across higher territorial levels. For example, the association between attachments at local and regional levels (0.607) is considerably stronger than at the country and EU levels (0.237).

Figure 3.2 conceptualizes territorial attachments along two dimensions: the intensity of attachment at the local, regional, national, and European levels and the multiplicity/exclusiveness of attachment, which we measure as the sum of the differences between an individual’s strongest attachment and all other attachments. Intensity varies between 1.0 (no attachment to any territorial community) to 4.0 (high attachment to one’s town or local community, region, country, and to the EU). The multiple/exclusive dimension varies from zero, where attachments across levels are equal in intensity, to 9.0, which describes the combination of a single, very strong attachment and the absence of attachment to any other level.

Combining these dimensions, we map the following groupings onto figure 3.2.

## Unattached

The first category of individuals are those without strong or fairly strong attachments to any territorial community. At the extreme, in the bottom corner in figure 3.2, are individuals who attest to no territorial attachment (1,1,1,1 in ascending size of territorial unit). As one moves up in figure 3.2, the level of attachment and its exclusiveness increase. We include in this category individuals with consistently weak attachment (2,2,2,2). Unattached individuals make up just 2.5 percent of the total sample.



**Figure 3.2 Territorial Attachment**

## Exclusive

The second category consists of individuals whose attachments are focused exclusively at one or, at most, two territorial communities. At the extreme is the individual who is very strongly attached to a single level and not at all attached at any other level (all combinations of a single 4 and three 1s). As one moves away from the extreme within the exclusive area in [figure 3.2](#), one finds individuals who have a single very strong attachment and one or two fairly strong attachments (combinations of 4,3,3,1), or, at the border, individuals who have two very strong attachments and two weak or negligible attachments (combinations of 4,4,2,2). Altogether, 8.6 percent of the *Eurobarometer* sample falls in the exclusive category.

## Multiple

The final category consists of individuals who express strong or very strong attachments to territorial communities at three or all four levels. At the extreme is the individual with a very strong attachment to every territorial level (4,4,4,4). As one moves to the left in [figure 3.2](#),

multi-attachment diminishes. At the border in this category we include individuals with fairly strong attachments if they are consistent across all levels (3,3,3,3) and individuals who have very strong attachments if they are not peaked (i.e., combinations of 4,4,4,3). Individuals with multiple identities constitute 29.1 percent of the sample.

These groupings can be conceived in ideal—typical terms. The further one moves to the right in [figure 3.2](#), the more multi-attached one is, the further to the top the more singularly attached, and the further to the bottom the more unattached. The precise boundaries of these categories are arbitrary. We do not include an individual with a 3,3,4,4 pattern of attachment in the multiple-identity category or one with 3,2,2,1 as unattached or one with 4,3,3,3 as exclusive. Our aim is to chart basic alternatives knowing that there will inevitably be gray areas between them.

Our larger purpose is to ask the reader to engage identity from a multi-level standpoint. Just as national states in Western Europe form only one part of a multi-level polity that stretches beneath and above them, so national identities form one element in a more complex multi-level pattern encompassing local and regional as well as supranational identities. This much is evident from the data presented here. How identities interact, how they change over time, and how they influence political activity are questions that lead us beyond *Eurobarometer* data (Haesly forthcoming). To make progress with such questions, one must dig deeper. In the next section we examine evidence concerning regional and national identities in Catalonia and the Basque Country, and in the final section we engage macrohistorical issues of identity formation.

## A NOTE ON CHANGE

The data presented in [table 3.1](#) suggest that territorial attachment taps deep-seated and therefore relatively stable orientations. Aggregated to the country level, shifts of just 0.3 points on a four-point scale are rare. There are only three shifts of this magnitude and two shifts of 0.2 points among the forty-eight pairs of data points in [table 3.1](#). In the remaining forty-three cases, the change, rounded to one decimal place, is 0.1 or less.<sup>6</sup> Of course, the two time periods may straddle a valley or a peak, but the similarity across these time points separated by almost four years indicates that attachments to territorial communities tap diffuse loyalties that are more stable than preferences concerning the benefits of membership in the European Union.

Given the restricted time period for which commensurate questions were asked in *Eurobarometer* surveys, we must turn to other sources to probe change in territorial attachments. Some regional surveys for individual countries include questions on regional and national identity that have been repeated over longer time periods, and while they cannot give a general picture, they provide one line of sight into the issue of temporal change (Marks and Llamazares 1995; Marks and Llamazares forthcoming).<sup>7</sup>

A question analyzed by Juan Linz in his study of identities in the Basque Country and Catalonia (1986) was repeated in surveys carried out by the *Centro de Investigaciones sobre la Realidad Social* from 1991 through 1994. The first survey was conducted in 1979, the year



in which Catalonia and the Basque Country were granted special status in the Spanish constitution. The second set of surveys was conducted roughly a decade after the establishment of regional governments in the Basque Country and Catalonia. [Tables 3.3](#) and [3.4](#) show the overall frequencies of territorial identities in these regions.

**Table 3.3 Identities in the Basque Country (in percentages)**

	1979	1991—1994
1—Only Basque	38	27
2—More Basque than Spanish	12	20
3—As Basque as Spanish	26	31
4—More Spanish than Basque	6	5
5—Only Spanish	14	10
Don't Know/Didn't Answer	4	7
Total	100	100
N	[1011]	[802]

*Sources:* The frequencies for 1979 are from Linz 1986, 51. The mean frequencies for the period 1991—1994 are derived from five surveys conducted by the *Centro de Investigaciones sobre la Realidad Social* (CIRES) in June 1991 (525 cases), June 1992 (67cases), January 1993 (69 cases), January 1994 (69 cases), and June 1994 (70 cases). The question was: “In general would you say that you feel more Basque than Spanish, as Basque as Spanish, or more Spanish than Basque? (1) Only Basque, (2) More Basque than Spanish, (3) As Basque as Spanish, (4) More Spanish than Basque, (5) Only Spanish, (6) Do not know, (7) Do not answer.”

**Table 3.4 Identities in Catalonia (in percentages)**

	1979	1991—1994
1—Only Catalan	13	16
2—More Catalan than Spanish	11	20
3—As Catalan as Spanish	33	37

4—More Spanish than Catalan	6	10
5—Only Spanish	28	16
Don't Know/Didn't Answer	9	1
Total	100	100
N	[1232]	[1299]

*Sources:* The frequencies for 1979 are from Linz 1986, 43; the frequencies take into consideration the 9 percent of people who did not answer this question. Mean frequencies for the period 1991-1994 are from five surveys conducted by CIRES in June 1991 (533 cases), June 1992 (191 cases), January 1993 (190 cases), January 1994 (193 cases), and June 1994 (192 cases). The question was as follows: "In general, would you say that you feel more Catalan than Spanish, as Catalan as Spanish, or more Spanish than Catalan? (1) Only Catalan, (2) More Catalan than Spanish, (3) As Catalan as Spanish, (4) More Spanish than Catalan, (5) Only Spanish, (6) Do not know, (7) Do not answer."

Tables 3.3 and 3.4 reveal that the percentage of people who have balanced multiple identities—that is, who claim to be both Spanish and Basque or both Spanish and Catalan—increased slightly from 1979 to the early 1990s, by 5 percent in the Basque Country and 4 percent in Catalonia. In the Basque Country, multiple identities rose 12 percent from 1979 to the period 1991—1994. In the Catalan case, such identities rose 17 percent in the same period.

In both Catalonia and the Basque Country, the proportion of the population that regarded themselves as exclusively Spanish was small: 10 percent in the Basque Country and 16 percent in Catalonia. There was an even larger shift away from exclusive regional identity in the Basque Country, from 38 percent in 1979 to 27 percent in the early 1990s (Llera 1993).<sup>8</sup> A significant proportion of Basque citizens no longer view Basque and Spanish identities as incompatible.

The Basque Country and Catalonia are unusual regions in that they have strongly rooted ethnic cultures and distinctive languages, strong regionalist political parties, and entrenched regional governments. But it is worth stressing that the data reveal a shift not toward exclusive regional identity but toward multiple identities. The responsibilities of regional governments in these regions increased considerably during the 1980s at a time of intensive regional mobilization, and the outcome, as these surveys reveal, was multiple rather than exclusive territorial attachment. Neither survey posed questions about European attachments, but they suggest that the creation of European-level institutions may have deepened multiple identities that include a European component.

## EXPLAINING TERRITORIAL IDENTITY

How and why do identities change over time? To answer this question, one must analyze the effects of macrosocietal factors including, above all, war, culture, socioeconomic interaction, and political institutions. In this section we evaluate the prospects for the development of multiple identities that include a stronger European component.

## War

Territorial attachments have been shaped more by organized coercion—above all, war and colonial domination—than by any other factors. The solidarity produced within a territorial group engaged in coercive conflict with another group is perhaps the strongest social glue there is. Almost every account of the rise of nationalism and national states in Western Europe, and, more broadly, of ethnic consciousness in a variety of industrial and preindustrial settings, emphasizes the causal role of coercive conflict as a source of identity. As Anthony Smith summarizes in his wide-ranging survey of the sources of nationalism and ethnicity, “protracted wars have been the crucible in which ethnic consciousness has been crystallized” (Smith 1981, 75; see also Sahlins 1989).

Coercive conflict not only deepens ethnic or national identity but usually makes those identities more exclusive. First, war eliminates attachments that overarch the contending communities. War creates an extreme “us versus them” mentality in which those who have some overarching identity with both communities are forced to make a choice (Hobsbawm 1994). Second, a war among states weakens substate attachments as it strengthens attachment to the warring community as a whole. Historically, national war has helped to integrate diverse groups into multiethnic societies such as the United States and the Soviet Union. Similarly, war has had the effect of nationalizing territorially diverse societies such as the United Kingdom, France, and Spain. International war not only ratchets up the state’s capacity to extract and mobilize resources in a society but also deepens commitment to the national community in a way that squeezes out other identities. War strengthens exclusive identity; it presses individuals towards the B corner of [figure 3.1](#).

One of the distinctive features of Western Europe over the past half century is that it has not been the site of major international war. This historically anomalous situation provides, we believe, a key to understanding the development of multi-level governance. The study of identity in Western Europe is therefore the study of identity in the absence of its most powerful source. The absence of war has meant the absence of an immensely powerful influence toward exclusive identity, leaving causal space for a variety of other influences that have had the net effect of sustaining multiple identities. The past half century has been one of diffusion—diffusion of authoritative competencies among multiple levels of government, and diffusion of individual identities among local, regional, national, and supranational territorial communities.

War shapes identity, but it is possible, indeed plausible, that identity shapes a community’s willingness to go to war. To the extent that individuals in European countries share an attachment to an overarching European Union, we may hypothesize that they will be less likely to engage in coercive conflict against each other and less bellicose in expressing their separate identities. This takes us back to the origins of European integration. Support for the European Union as a means to avoid war among European states appears to be enduring; when individuals are asked why they favor European integration, consistent majorities cite “peace” as the strongest reason (Reif 1993).

For the two centuries or more leading up to World War II, war making in Western Europe

helped crystallize national territorial communities. The absence of interstate warfare in the second half of the twentieth century has opened the field to other influences that might otherwise have been overwhelmed, including transnational social interaction and economic integration, and we discuss these below.

## Culture

Important streams of theorizing about identity emphasize culture—particularly language, ethnicity, religion, and social transactions—as key to territorial attachment (Smith 1981, 1995; Puhle 1994). With respect to language and ethnicity, the European Union is extraordinarily diverse and is likely to remain so. To the extent that ethnic or linguistic commonalities are requisites for shared territorial identity, one would not expect to see multiple identities that encompass Europe as a whole.

The most influential line of theorizing, associated with Karl Deutsch, hypothesizes that territorial identities are shaped as populations integrate socially and economically (Deutsch 1953, 1957). In this view, common identities result from shared experiences and culture, which arise from processes of social and economic interaction among individuals. From a Deutschian standpoint, then, there are grounds for expecting a shift in the direction of a European identity with the increase in intra-European trade and commerce, the decline of border controls, the vast increase in travel within Europe, the creation of Europe-wide political institutions, educational exchanges, and so forth. All of these factors, according to the Deutschian model, contribute to gradual cultural homogenization and increased personal trust among Europeans, thereby leading to shared identity (Stone Sweet and Sandholtz 1997; Shore 1993).

One must pay detailed attention to intervening factors, however, to evaluate whether an increase in the intensity of individual interaction will deepen shared identity. As Deutsch himself stressed, there are many examples in which increased social interaction leads to intercommunal hostility. Economic integration, particularly in investment, was extremely high and growing in Western Europe during the early 1900s, but it was followed by World War I. In recent years, international migration, another form of social interaction, has exacerbated, not reduced, exclusive identities. As Suzanne Berger has observed: “The conjunction of rising global flows of capital with new immigrant flows across borders once politically closed has heightened sensitivities everywhere to territorial facts, the control of frontiers, and national sovereignty” (1994, 117—118). Political parties of the far right campaign on the immigrant issue and attempt to link it to opposition to European integration. Identities do not just happen to people but are imagined communities that are politically contested. To understand the process leading from social transaction to territorial identity, one must engage cognitive frameworks and choices of the individuals involved (Anderson 1983).

Scientific progress in this field demands a disaggregated approach. To what extent, for example, have student exchanges within the EU had a measurable effect on the identity of participants? How have identities been influenced (if at all) by European cable television, structural funding in the poorer regions of the EU, travel abroad, or living in a border region? These are just a few basic questions that are essential building blocks for a theory linking

cultural convergence to multiple identities, yet we have little systematic information that bears on them.

The European Union cannot draw either on solidarity resulting from coercive conflict or on ethnic or linguistic commonalities, and these are by far the most powerful bases of territorial identity. This alone may explain the relative weakness of European identity at the national or subnational level. But it would be premature to stop here, for one still needs to explain the positive level of attachment to the EU among significant minorities in the 1990s and the increase in multiple identities that has occurred in particular regions such as Catalonia and the Basque Country.

## **Economic Interest**

Instead of arguing that the sheer density of transnational transactions shapes identities, a number of writers have linked individual economic prospects under international market integration to support for the European Union. Extending this line of argument, one can hypothesize that territorial identity is influenced by perceptions of economic prospects under alternative local arrangements.

Literature on the political economy of market integration allows one to relate individual location in the economy to EU attachment. A basic conclusion of this literature is that less-skilled workers in protected sectors of domestically oriented industry stand to lose the most under market integration and that owners of export-oriented capital stand to gain the most. The primary reason is that labor is far less mobile than internationally oriented capital, both across economic sectors and geographically. Owners of capital are able to shift the use of their productive resource in response to market pressures far more effectively than can workers. Although, in principle, freedom of movement exists for labor across national borders, such freedom is limited by cultural and linguistic barriers. The effects of contrasting mobility are amplified by international competition for capital. National governments have a strong inducement to give special consideration to the political demands of international capital because it is so mobile. In seeking to retain existing capital and attract new capital, governments compete to provide a favorable regime for owners of capital, presumably at the expense of other factors of production. Finally, market integration has consequences for the relative organizational power of workers vis-à-vis employers. Employers, particularly those in export-oriented industries, can counter the demands of organized labor by moving—or threatening to move—investment to more accommodating labor markets elsewhere. Workers have been unable to redress their relative immobility by establishing transnational union organizations that encompass workers in relevant product markets.

These expectations are supported by Gary Marks and Richard Haesly in a multivariate logistic analysis of 1991 *Eurobarometer* data (Marks and Haesly 1996). The authors find that individual attachment to the EU is significantly associated with class position, sense of economic well-being, and respondents' orientation towards the single market. Such relationships hold when controlling for education, political knowledge, and a variety of other individual background variables. This finding is consistent with the work of Agusti Bosch and

Kenneth Newton and others cited in this chapter, although in none of these studies are the relationships particularly strong (Bosch and Newton 1995; Gabel 1998; Niedermayer and Sinnott 1995). Marks and Haesly find that class, sense of economic well-being, and orientation toward the single market account for slightly less than 60 percent of variation in individual attachment to the EU.

A substantial body of research suggests a link between economic evaluations and support for European integration. One way to interpret the evidence is to say that specific support for economic integration spills over into generalized support for European political institutions. This has a precedent: pride in German economic performance after World War II contributed to diffuse loyalty toward the democratic institutions of the Federal Republic. If this process took hold in the European Union, it would be possible to speak of an economic route to European attachment.

## Political Institutions

A tradition in political philosophy has argued that identity may arise not only from the in-group reinforcement of war or cultural commonality but also from shared political institutions. Formal political institutions—in particular, parliaments, executives, courts, and civil services—may provide a focus for identity as symbols of territorial community and as channels for political participation and policy making.<sup>9</sup>

If this hypothesis is valid, one would expect to find that patterns of attachment reflect the distribution of political competencies across subnational, national, and supranational political institutions. Federal polities should have relatively high levels of regional attachment and unitary polities should have relatively high levels of national attachment. [Table 3.1](#) confirms this hypothesis. The only countries for which regional attachment is higher than national attachment are Austria, Belgium, Germany, and Spain—federal or federalizing countries.

By the same logic, one would expect to see a deepening of European identity as the scope of competencies in the EU has increased. But this has not happened. While there is evidence that support for the EU edged up, at the rate of about one-fifth to one-quarter of one percent per year until the late 1980s (Bosch and Newton 1995), this trend has not continued in the post-Maastricht era. The overall level of EU attachment fell slightly between 1991 and 1995, whereas levels of specific support for European integration declined more sharply.

If there is a link between political institutions and identity, it must be more subtle. Perhaps the *quality* of participation makes a difference for the development of identity. The European Union has come to exercise broad-ranging competencies, but its political institutions are focused much more on policy outputs than on democratic participation (Scharpf 1999). While the EU's democratic institutions have been deepened over the past two decades, turnout in EU Parliamentary elections has declined from 63 percent in 1979 to less than 50 percent in 1999. We know that individuals who participate more, have greater political knowledge of the EU, and have high levels of subjective political competence tend to be more attached to the EU (Marks and Haesly 1996; Gabel 1998). The effects of political institutions on identity may

depend on the extent to which shared citizenship becomes meaningful.

One cannot assume that the causal link between political institutions and identity goes in one direction. It is just as plausible to hypothesize that identity influences political institutions as it is to hypothesize that political institutions influence identity. Regional identities may not only result from federalism but may contribute to the establishment of a federal system in the first place. In the Basque Country and Catalonia, strong regional identity preceded federalizing reforms from 1982. However, as [tables 3.3](#) and [3.4](#) reveal, Basque and Catalan identity has deepened with the creation of regional political institutions. The relationship between political institutions and identity appears to be mutually reinforcing.

## CONCLUSION

Systematic comparative historical investigation is necessary to make headway on the issues raised in this chapter. How are territorial identities formed in war? How have territorial identities arisen in the process of state building? What kinds of social interaction foster the creation of identities? What are the effects of economic integration and political institutions on identities? How do identities constrain war making, social interaction, economic integration, and political reform? We have raised more questions than we have provided answers.

Identity does not happen to people, but arises as they are socialized in communities and cope with new challenges or opportunities. In the European Union today, national identities are being actively mobilized by political parties, particularly on the extreme right, that campaign against perceived threats to the nation and against European integration. Most mainstream parties are resisting these ethnocentric appeals, as we observe in chapter 10. It would make little sense to model identity as if it was an objective function of social interaction or political institutionalization.

One can draw some firm conclusions from the evidence we have presented. A large minority of Europeans has multiple identities. In several countries, regions and localities evoke stronger attachments than the nation. While European attachment is significantly weaker on average than attachment to other territorial communities, large minorities declare themselves to have a fairly strong attachment to the European Union. Identities to these territorial communities are, in general, mutually *inclusive*, not mutually exclusive. That is to say, there is no intrinsic trade-off between national and European identities. Individuals who have relatively strong attachments to their country tend also to have relatively strong attachments to the European Union. The European Union is a multi-level polity based on multiple identity.

Our understanding of the causal processes underlying these findings is incomplete, to say the least. However, it is clear that identity formation under European integration will not replicate that under state building. It is not simply that ethnic and cultural heterogeneity in the European Union is far greater than was the case in any European country, but also that the forces of change are different. European integration has been driven by economic goals rather than by war making, and as a result its ability to forge new identities appears to be much weaker.

## NOTES

1 We are indebted to Richard Haesly for ideas and *Eurobarometer* data. We also wish to thank Leonard Ray, Jeffrey Anderson, Paul Pierson, Mark Pollack, and Joao Espada for comments.

2 Our point of departure in this chapter is to explore the extent and sources of multiple identity, which include identity at the European level. A second response is the one taken by Philippe Schmitter who sets out to explore the scope for democracy in the absence of an overarching shared identity:

[W]hy should individuals (and, for that matter, organizations) in the Euro-Polity have to be “nationals” in some sense in order to act like citizens? Why could they not be loyal to a common set of institutions and political/legal principles rather than to some mystical charismatic founder or set of mythologized ancestors? . . . That, it seems to me, is the major issue. Not whether the eventual Euro-Polity will be able to reproduce on an enlarged scale the same intensity of collective sentiment that was once characteristic of its member nation-states, but whether it can produce an encompassing system of stable and peaceful political relations without such a passionately shared identity or community of fate. (Schmitter 2000, 28)

3 For a trenchant criticism of the exclusive focus on national identity and the notion that democratic legitimacy depends on a homogenous *Volk*, see Weiler, Haltern, and Mayer 1995.

4 Multiple identity in a system of multi-level governance bears some resemblance to Ernest Gellner’s description of *pre-national* identity:

A great diversity and plurality and complexity characterizes all distinct parts of the whole: the minute social groups, which are the atoms of which the picture is composed, have complex and ambiguous and multiple relations to many cultures; some through speech, others through their dominant faith, another still through a variant faith or set of practices, a fourth through administrative loyalty, and so forth. When it comes to painting the political system, the complexity is not less great than in the sphere of culture. Obedience for one purpose and in one context is not necessarily the same as obedience for some other end or in some other season. (Gellner 1983, 139)

5 This table and the data for [figure 3.2](#) were prepared by Richard Haesly.

6 Because the data for 1995 are rounded to a single decimal place in the source used here, we have done the same to data for 1991. This section is drawn from Marks and Llamazares 1995.



7 We wish to thank Ivan Llamazares for this data.

8 Some surveys also indicate that the proportion of the Basque population who consider themselves exclusively Basque has decreased over the last fifteen years. According to such surveys, from 1979 to 1989, the percentage of those who considered themselves “only Basque” decreased from 39.7 to 35.9 percent, while the percentage of those who considered themselves “more Basque than Spanish” increased from 12.6 to 17.8 percent. See Llera 1993, 183.

9 The political sources of identity constitute an element of civic, as distinct from ethnic, nationalism. Whereas civic attachment is open to multiple identities, as conceptualized here, ethnic attachment is usually exclusive. On this distinction, see Keating 1996; Laffan 1996b.