

ONLINE APPENDIX

“The Russian Threat and the Consolidation of the West: How populism and EU-skepticism shape party support for Ukraine”

L. Hooghe, G. Marks, R. Bakker, S. Jolly, J. Polk, J. Rovny, M. Steenbergen, M.A. Vachudova

European Union Politics (2024), 25/3

Contents

A. DATA INSTRUMENT AND DESCRIPTIVES	3
A.1. Supplementary information on CHES surveys and the 2023 Speed CHES survey on Ukraine	3
The CHES trend survey	3
The 2023 survey on Ukraine	3
CHES selection criteria	4
A.2. Descriptives	5
Table A.1: Dependent variable	5
Table A.2: Descriptives on supporting Ukraine	5
Table A.3: Correlation matrix of the dependent variable and its components	6
Table A.4a: Operationalization of independent variables in 2023	6
Table A.4b: Additional independent variables	7
Table A.5. Correlation matrix	9
Table A. 6. Summary statistics at the party level	10
Table A.7. Support for Ukraine at country level	11
Figure A.1. The distribution of populism and EU-skepticism by governing status in 2023	12
Table A.8. The distribution of populism and EU-position by year	13
Figure A.2. Histograms of populism and EU-position by year	13
B. ADDITIONAL ANALYSES	14
Table B.1. Explaining party positioning on four types of support for Ukraine	14
Table B.2: Explaining support for Ukraine using alternative operationalizations of threat perception	15
Table B.3: The effect of a security threat on how ideology shapes support for Ukraine	16
Table B.4: Government status in 2019 and 2023 and its effect on support for Ukraine	17
Table B.5: Robustness analyses with party size and weighting for party size	18
Table B.6 : Explaining support for Ukraine (measured as a factor)	19

B.7. Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests for two pairs of distributions 20

Parties in government in 2023 vs. parties in opposition in 2023 20

Parties in (2019) and out of (2023) government vs. parties out (2019) and in (2023) government..... 21

A. DATA INSTRUMENT AND DESCRIPTIVES

A.1. Supplementary information on CHES surveys and the 2023 Speed CHES survey on Ukraine

The CHES trend survey

The Chapel Hill expert surveys (CHES) estimates party positions on ideology and policy issues, and international relations for national parties in countries across the world. The CHES-Europe TREND file covers six waves: 1999, 2002, 2006, 2010, 2014, and 2019 (Jolly et al., 2022). The number of countries increased from 14 Western European countries in 1999 to 32 countries in 2019. The number of national parties grew from 143 to 277. The 2019 survey includes all EU member states, plus parties in Iceland, Norway, Switzerland, and Turkey. Questions on parties' general position on European integration, several EU policies, general left/right, economic left/right, and social left/right are common to all CHES-Europe surveys. Recent surveys also contain questions on non-EU policy issues, such as immigration, redistribution, decentralization, environmental policy, as well as on the salience of anti-establishment and anti-elite rhetoric, salience of reducing corruption, and salience of Russian interference. CHES data and survey information are available online at <https://chesdata.eu>.

In this analysis, **we rely on the 2019 data from CHES-Europe** for specification analyses that tackle inferential challenges of reverse causality, and we use questions on parties' positions on European integration, salience of anti-establishment and anti-elite rhetoric, economic left-right and GAL-TAN. See Table A.4b for the wording of the relevant questions. The dataset is available online at

The 2023 survey on Ukraine

The main source in this analysis is a new survey, the **2023 survey on Ukraine**, which was administered from April through June 2023 and completed by 217 political scientists specializing in political parties and European integration. 2023 UKRAINE provides information about the positioning of 274 parties on Ukraine-war related policies in 30 countries, including all EU member states except Cyprus and Luxembourg (insufficient experts) -- plus Iceland, Norway, Switzerland, Turkey, and the UK. The dataset adopts the country code and party ids of the CHES Trend file and the 2019 CHES dataset, with extensions for newly covered parties. **The full dataset, alongside replication material, is available at <https://www.chesdata.eu/ches-europe>.**

	# parties		# parties		# parties
Austria	5	Greece	8	Romania	7
Belgium	11	Hungary	9	Slovakia	11
Bulgaria	8	Ireland	9	Slovenia	5
Croatia	15	Italy	8	Spain	13
Czech Republic	10	Latvia	11	Sweden	8
Denmark	12	Lithuania	11	Iceland	9
Estonia	6	Malta	2	Norway	10
Finland	9	Netherlands	17	Switzerland	7
France	11	Poland	8	Turkey	5
Germany	7	Portugal	11	UK	11

For this analysis, we employ party positioning for 29 countries (not including Turkey), we and use four questions on support for Ukraine alongside four questions on ideology (economic left-right, GAL-TAN, European integration, salience of anti-establishment and anti-elite rhetoric). Table A.4a for the wording of the relevant questions. See Table A.1 and Table A.4a for the wording of the relevant questions.

CHES selection criteria

The standard CHES baseline for inclusion is that political parties obtained 3% or more in the national election immediately prior to the survey or had at least one representative in the national or European parliament and were still in existence at the time of the survey. For the 2023 Ukraine survey, more restrictive criteria were used in a small number of countries. When parties that otherwise did not meet the CHES threshold were included, this was done in consultation with country experts.

A.2. Descriptives

Table A.1: Dependent variable

Support for Ukraine is a 0-10 scale averaged across the four following items	
Thinking about Russia's war against Ukraine, to what extent did each party support or oppose the following over the past three months?	
Refugees (0-10)	Strongly opposed to/ Strongly in favor of allowing Ukrainian refugees to enter [country]
Weapons (0-10)	Strongly opposed to/Strongly in favor of [country] sending weapons and military equipment to support the Ukrainian army
Energy costs (0-10)	Strongly opposed to/Strongly in favor of [country] accepting higher energy costs due to the sanctions imposed on Russia
Ukrainian EU membership (0-10)	Strongly opposed to/Strongly in favor of Ukrainian membership in the European Union

Table A.2: Descriptives on supporting Ukraine

Statistics	Support for Ukraine	Refugees	Weapons	Energy	Ukraine EU membership
Minimum	0.375	0.900	0.000	0.111	0.167
p25	5.658	7.000	4.500	5.000	5.000
Mean	6.653	7.831	6.453	6.091	6.235
p50	7.384	8.500	7.500	6.750	6.667
p75	8.009	9.167	8.833	7.750	7.667
Maximum	9.754	10.000	10.000	9.714	10.000
SD	2.059	1.900	2.884	2.318	2.104

N=269 parties in 29 countries. Alpha=0.906; one factor with eigenvalue of 2.904 (chi2=833.3, prob>ch2=0.0000); r (factor, additive item) = 0.99.

Table A.3: Correlation matrix of the dependent variable and its components

	Support (scale)	Support (factor)	Refugees	Weapons	Energy costs	
support_scale	1.0000					
supportfactor	0.9896	1.0000				
Refugees	0.8278	0.8375	1.0000			
Weapons	0.8484	0.8926	0.5975	1.0000		
Energy_costs	0.9836	0.9513	0.7772	0.8104	1.0000	
Ukraine EU	0.8801	0.8870	0.7006	0.6912	0.8099	1.0000

N=269 parties in 29 countries

Table A.4a: Operationalization of independent variables in 2023

Occupied by USSR	1=country was occupied by the Soviet Union prior or during WWII (Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland); ¹ 0=country was not occupied. Source: own coding.
Common border	1=country has common land or maritime border with Russia (Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Finland, Norway); 0 = country does not share a common border. Source: own coding.
Former Russia/USSR	1=country was an integral part of Russia or the Soviet Union during the 20th century (Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania); 0=country was never an integral part of Russia or Soviet Union during the 20 th century. Source: own coding.
Populism	Position of political parties on populism on a 0-10 scale. Question: “How salient has ANTI-ESTABLISHMENT and ANTI-ELITE RHETORIC been to each party?” Average of country expert scores. Source: CHES 2023 survey. Rescaled to 0-1.
EU-skepticism	Position of a political party on European integration on a 1-7 scale. Question: How would you describe the GENERAL POSITION ON EUROPEAN INTEGRATION that the party leadership took over the past three months? Average of country expert scores. Source: CHES 2023 survey. Rescaled to 0-1 and order reversed so that higher values indicate stronger opposition.
In government	Takes on a value of 1 if a party was in government during February-April 2023, the three months prior to fielding the survey. Source: own coding.
Economic left-right	Position of the political party on economic left-right ideology on a 0-10 scale. Question: “Parties can be classified in terms of their stance on ECONOMIC ISSUES such as privatization, taxes, regulation, government spending, and the welfare state. Parties on the economic left want government to play an active role in the economy. Those on the economic right want a reduced role for government. Where did political parties stand on ECONOMIC issues in the last three months?” Average of country expert scores. Source: CHES 2023 survey.

¹ Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania were occupied in June 1940 and annexed in August 1940. Parts of Finland were occupied during the Continuation War (June 1941-September 1944). As a result of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, eastern Poland was occupied from September 1939 until June 1941.

GAL-TAN	Position of the political party on socio-cultural GAL vs. TAN ideology on a 0-10 scale. Question: Parties can be classified in terms of their views on social and cultural values. 'LIBERTARIAN' or 'POSTMATERIALIST' parties favor expanded personal freedoms, for example, abortion rights, divorce, and same-sex marriage. 'TRADITIONAL' or 'AUTHORITARIAN' parties reject these ideas in favor of order, tradition, and stability, believing that the government should be a firm moral authority on social and cultural issues. Where did political parties stand on LIBERTARIAN/TRADITIONAL issues in the last three months?" Average of country expert scores. Source: CHES 2023 survey.
US alliance divergence	Absolute difference between country A voting in the United Nations from US voting (averaged for 2016-2020). Voting is arrayed on a single dimension that reflects state positions toward the US-led liberal order. Votes are aggregated by UN session. A year in the dataset covers a UN session, which runs from September through late Spring or early Summer the following calendar year; hence the Ideal-points estimates for 2020 capture voting that took place between September 2020 through July 2021. We exclude the voting records for 2021 to eliminate the confounding influence of a series of UN votes on Russia, Ukraine, and the war during Spring 2022. Estimating voting over a longer time period of 10 years produces virtually identical patterns (r=0.99). Source: idealpointall as estimated by Bailey, Strezhnev, and Voeten (2017), data updated through 2023 is available from: https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=hdl:1902.1/12379 . Rescaled to 0-1.
Liberal democracy	Liberal democracy score averaged for the years 2016-2021. Source: v2x_libdem as estimated by Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) (Coppedge et al. 2023). This combines the two indices liberal and polyarchy. The Liberal index assesses how individual and minority rights are protected against the tyranny of the state or the majority is respected in a country (equality before the law and individual liberties v2xcl_rol, judicial constraints on the executive v2x_jucon, legislative constraints on the executive v2xlg_legcon). The polyarchy index assesses the level of electoral democracy (freedom of association thick v2x_frassoc_thick, clean elections v2xel_frefair, freedom of expression v2x_freexp_altinf, elected executive v2x_elecoff, and suffrage v2x_suffr) (Coppedge et al. 2018), downloaded from https://v-dem.net/data/the-v-dem-dataset/ . Rescaled to 0-1.
Russian gas dependency	Percentage of gas imports from Russia (figures for 2021). Source: ACER calculation based on Eurostat Comext and EnC Secretariat data, downloaded from ACER website (https://aegis.acer.europa.eu/chest/dataitems/214/view)
Vote (party size)	Vote proportion received by the party in the national election held most closely prior to the survey. Source: own coding from Wikipedia.

N=269 political parties in 29 countries.

Table A.4b: Additional independent variables

Government status	1= in government 2019, in government 2023; 2 = in opposition 2019, in government 2023; 3 = in government 2019, in opposition 2023; 4= in opposition in 2019 and 2023
--------------------------	----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Populism 2019	Position of political parties on populism on a 0-10 scale. Question: “How salient has ANTI-ESTABLISHMENT and ANTI-ELITE RHETORIC been to each party?” Average of country expert scores. Source: CHES 2019 survey file. Rescaled to 0-1.
EU-skepticism 2019	Position of a political party on European integration on a 1-7 scale. Question: How would you describe the GENERAL POSITION ON EUROPEAN INTEGRATION that the party leadership took over the past three months? Average of country expert scores. Source: CHES 2019 survey file. Rescaled to 0-1 and order reversed so that higher values indicate stronger opposition.
Economic left-right 2019	Position of the political party on economic left-right ideology on a 0-10 scale. Question: “Parties can be classified in terms of their stance on ECONOMIC ISSUES such as privatization, taxes, regulation, government spending, and the welfare state. Parties on the economic left want government to play an active role in the economy. Those on the economic right want a reduced role for government. Where did political parties stand on ECONOMIC issues in the last three months?” Average of country expert scores. Source: CHES 2019 survey file (https://chesdata.eu).
GAL-TAN 2019	Position of the political party on socio-cultural GAL vs. TAN ideology on a 0-10 scale. Question: Parties can be classified in terms of their views on social and cultural values. ‘LIBERTARIAN’ or ‘POSTMATERIALIST’ parties favor expanded personal freedoms, for example, abortion rights, divorce, and same-sex marriage. ‘TRADITIONAL’ or ‘AUTHORITARIAN’ parties reject these ideas in favor of order, tradition, and stability, believing that the government should be a firm moral authority on social and cultural issues. Where did political parties stand on LIBERTARIAN/TRADITIONAL issues in the last three months?” Source: CHES 2019 survey file (https://chesdata.eu).
Family	Party family 1 TAN/Radical Right 2 Conservatives 3 Liberal 4 Christian-Democratic 5 Socialist/Social-Democratic 6 Radical Left 7 Green 8 Regionalist/ Minority 9 No family 10 Confessional 11 Agrarian/Centre

N=232 parties in 29 countries.

Table A.5. Correlation matrix

	Support for Ukraine	Occupied by USSR	Common border with Russia	Former Russia/USSR	Populism	EU-skepticism	In government	Econ Left-Right	GAL-TAN	US alliance divergence	Liberal democracy
Support for Ukraine	1										
Occupied by USSR	0.163**	1									
Common border Russia	0.191**	0.810***	1								
Former Russia/USSR	0.131*	0.891***	0.722***	1							
Populism	-0.748***	0.012	0.010	0.002	1						
EU-skepticism	-0.744***	-0.088	-0.036	-0.079	0.725***	1					
In government	0.318***	0.061	0.048	0.098	-0.399***	-0.219***	1				
Econ Left-Right	0.256***	0.072	0.071	0.066	-0.240***	-0.161**	0.184**	1			
GAL-TAN	-0.450***	0.040	-0.005	0.038	0.430***	0.551***	-0.040	0.333***	1		
US alliance divergence	-0.063	-0.063	0.096	-0.036	-0.019	-0.008	0.111	-0.031	-0.082	1	
Liberal democracy	0.100	-0.080	0.080	0.100	-0.155*	0.157*	0.133*	-0.012	-0.090	0.166**	1
Russian gas dependency	-0.086	0.365***	0.178**	0.339***	0.056	-0.090	0.053	0.071	0.127*	0.056	-0.426***

N=269 parties. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table A. 6. Summary statistics at the party level

	Mean	Median	25 th percentile	75 th percentile	SD
Support for Ukraine	6.653	7.384	5.658	8.009	2.059
Occupied by USSR	0.167	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.374
Common border Russia	0.234	0.000	0.000	1.000	0.424
Former Russia/USSR	0.138	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.345
Populism	0.453	0.400	0.220	0.720	0.278
EU-skepticism	0.362	0.278	0.125	0.611	0.283
In government	0.294	0.000	0.000	1.000	0.456
Econ Left-Right	0.516	0.514	0.337	0.709	0.231
GAL-TAN	0.470	0.429	0.221	0.706	0.277
US alliance divergence	0.592	0.591	0.522	0.719	0.208
Liberal democracy	0.736	0.793	0.682	0.890	0.232
Russian gas dependency	0.301	0.126	0.000	0.575	0.331


N=269 parties in 29 countries. The DV (support for Ukraine) ranges from 0.375 (min) to 9.754 on a 0-10 scale. All independent variables are rescaled from 0 to 1 and hence range from 0 to 1.

Table A.7. Support for Ukraine at country level

country	Mean	Median	Minimum	Maximum	SD
Denmark	7.780	7.789	7.042	8.363	0.407
Poland	7.743	8.683	1.953	8.842	2.366
Finland	7.722	7.693	6.311	8.393	0.641
Estonia	7.721	8.800	3.375	9.425	2.347
Belgium	7.638	8.275	4.850	8.550	1.374
Sweden	7.389	7.741	6.360	7.879	0.641
Iceland	7.315	7.417	6.458	8.000	0.572
Latvia	7.209	7.908	3.333	9.423	2.124
Norway	7.165	7.275	5.292	8.208	0.843
Slovenia	7.117	7.417	5.500	8.250	1.035
UK	6.913	7.050	5.313	8.083	0.970
Croatia	6.825	7.433	2.161	9.281	1.828
Netherlands	6.821	7.958	0.583	9.142	2.450
Lithuania	6.903	6.879	4.188	9.423	2.124
Switzerland	6.491	7.500	1.750	8.250	2.207
Spain	6.432	7.038	4.701	8.559	1.371
Germany	6.421	7.736	1.830	8.843	2.619
France	6.392	7.500	2.400	8.375	2.040
Italy	6.326	6.690	3.446	8.571	2.057
Slovakia	6.303	7.781	0.698	9.754	3.191
Romania	6.293	6.667	2.708	8.342	1.788
Bulgaria	6.062	6.638	0.375	9.025	3.154
Hungary	5.846	6.713	2.138	7.417	1.778
Czech Republic	5.764	7.000	0.889	9.028	3.360
Portugal	5.738	6.958	2.033	7.950	2.228
Ireland	5.641	5.908	3.175	7.000	1.394
Austria	5.138	5.500	1.400	7.225	2.231
Malta	4.800	4.800	4.508	5.092	0.412
Greece	4.549	4.325	1.083	7.925	3.019
Total	6.653	7.383	0.375	9.754	2.056

Figure A.1. The distribution of populism and EU-skepticism by governing status in 2023

These histograms plot the variation in populism and EU-skepticism among governing and opposition parties in 2023. While opposition parties tend to be, on average, more populist and, to a lesser extent, EU-skeptic, there is substantial variation in populism and EU-skepticism among them as there is among governing parties. This is apparent from the range and standard deviation in each of the subgroups, produced in the table below the figure.



Note: N=269 political parties in 29 European countries.


Statistics	Populism		EU-skepticism	
	In opposition	In government	In opposition	In government
Minimum	0.050	0.000	0.000	0.000
Mean	0.524	0.282	0.402	0.266
p50	0.518	0.233	0.333	0.191
Maximum	1.000	0.850	1.000	1.000
SD	0.271	0.212	0.292	0.236

Table A.8. The distribution of populism and EU-position by year

Table A.8 and Figure A.2 below illustrate that the distributions of party positions on populism and the EU have not changed interestingly over the past 3 waves of the CHES survey. This is of particular interest given the highly polarizing nature of the war in Ukraine and the potential for expert biases to affect these placements. These distributions have remained stable over time and there is no evidence of meaningful differences pre/post the war in Ukraine in terms of summary statistics or the shape of the distributions.

Statistics	Populism			EU-position		
Year	2014	2019	2023	2014	2021	2023
Minimum	0.50	0.20	0.00	0.00	1.00	1.00
Mean	4.34	4.29	4.53	5.00	4.90	4.82
p50	3.78	3.77	4.00	5.58	5.40	5.33
Maximum	10.0	9.90	10.0	7.00	6.94	7.00
SD	2.6	2.57	2.78	1.72	1.78	1.70

Figure A.2. Histograms of populism and EU-position by year



B. ADDITIONAL ANALYSES

Table B.1. Explaining party positioning on four types of support for Ukraine

	(1) HOSTING REFUGEES	(2) SENDING WEAPONS	(3) ACCEPTING HIGHER ENERGY COSTS	(4) EU MEMBERSHIP FOR UKRAINE
SECURITY THREAT (between-country effects)				
Occupied by USSR	0.27 (0.43)	1.69° (0.86)	0.73° (0.40)	0.95* (0.40)
IDEOLOGY (within-country effects)				
Populism	-1.67*** (0.44)	-1.82** (0.62)	-2.53*** (0.50)	-1.29** (0.49)
EU support	-2.71*** (0.47)	-4.79*** (0.66)	-3.34*** (0.53)	-3.99*** (0.52)
In government	0.28° (0.16)	0.32 (0.22)	0.38* (0.19)	0.36* (0.18)
CONTROLS				
Between-country effects				
US alliance divergence	0.23 (0.74)	-4.15** (1.47)	-0.96 (0.69)	0.25 (0.68)
Liberal democracy	0.33 (0.73)	2.44° (1.43)	1.88** (0.69)	-0.82 (0.68)
Russian gas dependency	-0.32 (0.54)	-1.62 (1.06)	-0.23 (0.50)	-0.89° (0.49)
Within-country effects				
Economic left-right	-0.54 (0.34)	2.65*** (0.46)	1.33** (0.39)	0.80* (0.38)
GAL-TAN	-1.50*** (0.35)	0.66 (0.48)	-0.97* (0.40)	-0.89* (0.39)
Constant	10.14*** (0.74)	7.99*** (1.44)	7.20*** (0.71)	8.75*** (0.70)
Observations	269	269	269	269
Between R-squared	0.27	0.48	0.56	0.24
Within R-squared	0.69	0.67	0.72	0.70
Overall R-squared	0.61	0.58	0.69	0.62
Intra-class correlation	0.36	0.56	0.23	0.24

Note: 269 parties for 29 countries. Standard errors in parentheses; ***p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ° p<0.1.

Table B.2: Explaining support for Ukraine using alternative operationalizations of threat perception

VARIABLES	FORMER Russia/USSR	COMMON BORDER with Russia	COMMON BORDER with Ukraine or Russia
SECURITY THREAT (between-country effects)			
Former Russia/USSR	0.64 (0.44)		
Common Border		0.91** (0.27)	0.74** (0.27)
IDEOLOGY (within-country effects)			
Populism	-1.84*** (0.45)	-1.91*** (0.44)	-1.85*** (0.44)
EU-skepticism	-3.70*** (0.47)	-3.64*** (0.46)	-3.70*** (0.46)
In government	0.34* (0.17)	0.34* (0.16)	0.34* (0.16)
CONTROLS			
Between-country effects			
US alliance divergence	-1.14° (0.67)	-1.26* (0.54)	-1.21* (0.60)
Liberal democracy	0.76 (0.69)	0.72 (0.56)	1.27* (0.60)
Russian gas dependency	-0.70 (0.49)	-0.65° (0.38)	-0.62 (0.42)
Within-country effects			
Economic left-right	1.07** (0.34)	1.05** (0.34)	1.06** (0.34)
GAL-TAN	-0.67° (0.35)	-0.66° (0.35)	-0.68° (0.35)
Constant	8.71*** (0.68)	8.69*** (0.57)	8.08*** (0.66)
Observations	269	269	269
Between R-squared	0.43	0.59	0.55
Within R-squared	0.74	0.74	0.74
Overall R-squared	0.69	0.72	0.71
Intra-class correlation	0.28	0.18	0.23

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; ***p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ° p<0.1.

Table B.3: The effect of a security threat on how ideology shapes support for Ukraine

	(2)	(3)
SECURITY THREAT (between-country effects)		
Occupied by USSR	0.96* (0.48)	0.92** (0.42)
Occupied X Populism	-0.09 (0.71)	
Occupied X EU-skepticism		-0.00 (0.69)
IDEOLOGY (within-country effects)		
Populism	-1.87*** (0.45)	-1.88*** (0.44)
EU-skepticism	-3.67*** (0.47)	-3.66*** (0.47)
In government	0.33* (0.17)	0.34* (0.17)
CONTROLS		
Between-country effects		
US alliance divergence	-1.04° (0.62)	-1.04° (0.61)
Liberal democracy	0.88 (0.61)	0.88 (0.61)
Russian gas dependency	-0.80° (0.44)	-0.80° (0.44)
Within-country effects		
Econ Left-Right	1.06** (0.35)	1.06** (0.34)
GAL-TAN	-0.66° (0.36)	-0.67° (0.36)
Constant	8.53*** (0.63)	8.53*** (0.63)
Observations	269	269
Between R-squared	0.52	0.52
Within R-squared	0.74	0.74
Overall R-squared	0.71	0.71
Intra-class correlation	0.24	0.24

Standard errors in parentheses; ***p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ° p<0.1.

Table B.4: Government status in 2019 and 2023 and its effect on support for Ukraine

	(1)	(2)	(3)
GOVERNMENT STATUS AND IDEOLOGY			
<i>Government status = 1 0 (Govt 2019 and Opposition 2023) (Reference)</i>			
0 1 (Opposition 2019 and Govt 2023)	0.76** (0.28)	-0.41 (0.56)	-0.49 (0.49)
1 1 (Govt 2019 and 2023)	0.53° (0.29)	-0.26 (0.51)	-0.36 (0.46)
0 0 (Opposition 2019 and 2023)	0.40° (0.24)	0.31 (0.48)	0.11 (0.42)
Populism	-2.35*** (0.50)	-3.57*** (0.88)	-2.29*** (0.48)
EU-skepticism	-3.36*** (0.51)	-2.66*** (0.48)	-4.78*** (1.03)
INTERACTION GOVT STATUS X POPULISM: 1 0 (Govt 2019 and Opposition 2019) X Populism			
0 1 (Opposition 2019 and Govt 2023) X Populism		3.56** (1.31)	
1 1 (Govt 2019 and 2023) X Populism		1.90° (1.11)	
0 0 (Opposition 2019 and 2023) X Populism		0.08 (0.88)	
INTERACTION GOVT STATUS X EU-SKEPTICISM: 1 0 (Govt 2019 and Opposition 2019) X EU-skepticism			
0 1 (Opposition 2019 and Govt 2023) X EU-skepticism			4.61** (1.40)
1 1 (Govt 2019 and 2023) X EU-skepticism			2.69* (1.12)
0 0 (Opposition 2019 and 2023) X EU-skepticism			0.88 (0.95)
CONTROLS			
<i>Between-country effects</i>			
Occupied by USSR	0.95** (0.32)	1.02*** (0.22)	1.06*** (0.26)
US alliance divergence	-1.16* (0.57)	-0.99* (0.38)	-1.16* (0.46)
Liberal democracy	0.95 (0.59)	0.76° (0.42)	1.16* (0.50)
Russian gas dependency	-0.70° (0.41)	-0.79** (0.27)	-0.76* (0.33)
<i>Within-country effects</i>			
Economic left-right	0.88* (0.38)	1.04* (0.27)	0.77* (0.38)
GAL-TAN	-0.49 (0.38)	-0.60 (0.39)	-0.43 (0.38)
Constant	8.28*** (0.66)	8.73*** (0.64)	8.64*** (0.67)
Observations	230	230	230
Between R-squared	0.58	0.68	0.67
Within R-squared	0.73	0.73	0.74
Overall R-squared	0.70	0.72	0.72
Intra-class correlation (ICC)	0.17	0.00	0.08

Note: Coefficients for a multilevel linear model with random effects for 230 parties nested in 29 countries.

Table B.5: Robustness analyses with party size and weighting for party size

	(1) Multilevel regression with random country effects and controlling for party size (vote)	(2) Linear regression with country dummies, weighted by party size (vote)
Occupied by USSR	0.92** (0.30)	14.34*** (3.94)
Populism	-1.99*** (0.44)	-1.17** (0.47)
EU-skepticism	-3.49*** (0.46)	-4.13*** (0.51)
In government	0.24 (0.18)	0.58*** (0.15)
Economic left-right	1.09** (0.35)	0.76* (0.36)
GAL-TAN	-0.80* (0.36)	-0.20 (0.38)
US alliance divergence	-1.05* (0.52)	5.21 (3.34)
Liberal democracy	0.86° (0.52)	12.96*** (3.37)
Russian gas dependency	-0.80* (0.37)	-9.77** (3.14)
Vote (last national election)	0.95 (0.81)	
Constant	8.53*** (0.54)	-4.89 (4.88)
Country dummies	NO	YES
Observations	269	262
Within R-squared	0.74	
Between R-squared	0.48	
Overall R-squared	0.71	0.78
Intra-class correlation (ICC)	0.15	

Note: Standard errors in parentheses, ***p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ° p<0.1.

Table B.6 : Explaining support for Ukraine (measured as a factor)

	(1)	(2)	(3)
SECURITY THREAT (between-country effects)			
Occupied by USSR	0.37*	0.39**	0.39**
	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.14)
IDEOLOGY (within-country effects)			
Populism	-0.98***	-1.22***	-0.92***
	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.20)
EU-skepticism	-1.58***	-1.52***	-1.85***
	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.23)
In government	0.16*	-0.15	-0.12
	(0.08)	(0.13)	(0.11)
In govt X Populism		0.90**	
		(0.31)	
In govt X EU-skepticism			0.93**
			(0.28)
CONTROLS			
Between-country effects			
US alliance divergence	-0.36	-0.34	-0.39
	(0.26)	(0.25)	(0.24)
Liberal democracy	0.49°	0.50*	0.59*
	(0.26)	(0.25)	(0.24)
Russian gas dependency	-0.25	-0.27	-0.26
	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.17)
Within-country effects			
Economic left-right	0.50**	0.52**	0.45**
	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)
GAL-TAN	-0.40*	-0.39*	-0.37*
	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)
Constant	0.75***	0.83***	0.78***
	(0.27)	(0.26)	(0.25)
Observations	269	269	269
Within R-squared	0.74	0.75	0.75
Between R-squared	0.56	0.58	0.61
Overall R-squared	0.72	0.73	0.73
Intra-class correlation (ICC)	0.18	0.17	0.16

Note: Coefficients for a multilevel linear model with random country effects for 269 parties nested in 29 countries. Standard errors in parentheses, *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, ° $p < 0.1$.

B.7. Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests for two pairs of distributions

This appendix evaluates the similarity of distributions of two pairs of government/opposition party samples on populism and EU-skepticism. We use the two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution. The KS test statistic (D in bottom row) is defined as the maximum value of the difference between A and B's cumulative distribution functions (CDF). The null hypothesis is that both groups were sampled from populations with identical distributions. It tests for any violation of that null hypothesis -- different medians, different variances, or different distributions. The p-value in the bottom row indicates the probability that the null hypothesis *cannot* be rejected. The approximate p-values ksmirnov calculates are based on the five-term approximation of the asymptotic distributions derived by Smirnov (1933). For smaller samples, the exact value may be more accurate, so we also report it here.

Parties in government in 2023 vs. parties in opposition in 2023

The first set of tables compares parties in opposition (A) and parties in government (B) in 2023. We call this the larger-sample comparison. The dimensions of interest are EU-skepticism and populism respectively. The results show that, on both variables, government and opposition parties are distinctly different and unlikely to be drawn from the same distribution (p-values are 0.003 and 0.000 respectively).

Table B.7a: Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests for the larger-sample comparison

```
ksmirnov EU-skepticism in 2023, by (govt2) exact
Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution functions
```

Smaller group	D	p-value	Exact
0 in opposition	0.0000	1.000	
1 in government	-0.2496	0.001	
Combined K-S	0.2496	0.002	0.002

Note: Ties exist in combined dataset;
there are 111 unique values out of 269 observations.

```
. ksmirnov populism in 2023, by (govt2) exact
Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution functions
```

Smaller group	D	p-value	Exact
0 in opposition	0.0000	1.000	
1 in government	-0.4470	0.000	
Combined K-S	0.4470	0.000	0.000

Note: Ties exist in combined dataset;
there are 141 unique values out of 269 observations.

The first row in each table tests the null hypothesis that *EU-skepticism (Populism)* for Opposition parties does not contain smaller values than for Government parties; the largest difference between parties from the two groups is 0.00 (0.00). The second row tests the null-hypothesis that *EU-skepticism (Populism)* for Opposition parties does not contain larger values than for Government parties; the smallest difference is -0.25 (-0.45). The first null hypothesis cannot be rejected, and the second null hypothesis is rejected.

Parties in (2019) and out of (2023) government vs. parties out (2019) and in (2023) government

The second set compares two subsamples from the dataset: parties that were in opposition in 2019 and in government in 2023 (A) with parties in government in 2019 and in opposition in 2023 (B). We call this the smaller-sample comparison. The dimensions of interest are again EU-skepticism and populism. The results show that, with respect to EU-skepticism, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected at conventional levels of significance ($p=0.114$). On populism, the null-hypothesis that both samples are drawn from the same distribution can only be narrowly rejected with a p-value of 0.04. This confirms the much greater comparability of those two samples compared to the samples analyzed above.

Table B.7.b: Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests for the smaller-sample comparison

ksmirnov EU-skepticism
Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution functions

Smaller group	D	p-value	Exact
Opp 2019, Govt 2019 (A)	0.3005	0.057	
Govt 2019, Opp 2023 (B)	-0.0414	0.947	
Combined K-S	0.3005	0.114	0.089

Note: Ties exist in combined dataset; there are 48 unique values out of 64 observations.

ksmirnov populism
Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution functions

Smaller group	D	p-value	Exact
Opp 2019, Govt 2019 (A)	0.3517	0.020	
Govt 2019, Opp 2019 (B)	0.0000	1.000	
Combined K-S	0.3517	0.040	0.029

Note: Ties exist in combined dataset; there are 46 unique values out of 64 observations.


The KM test works by comparing cumulative frequency distributions among samples. We plot these here in Figure B.7A, which allows visual inspection of the distributions both within each panel and across panels. The top panels plot the cumulative distribution of the values of EU-skepticism for both two pairs of samples: the smaller-sample comparison of parties in & out government vs. out & in government (panel A) and the larger-sample comparison of opposition and government parties in 2023 (panel B). The bottom two panels do the same for populism.

Looking first at the top two panels, the sample distributions in Panel A are more convergent than those in Panel B, as evidenced by smaller differences in medians (broken lines), means, and variances. The convergence between the samples is sufficiently marked for the smaller-sample comparison so that the Kolmorov-Smirnov test cannot reject the null hypothesis that the samples are drawn from the same distribution.

The visual picture of convergence is clearer with respect to populism, projected in the bottom two panels, with sharp reductions in the differences in means and medians from Panel D to Panel C. However, the convergence between the smaller samples in Panel C is substantively smaller than the convergence in Panel A, and here the Kolmorov-Smirnov test leads us to conclude that the two groups are probably sampled from populations with different distributions.²

² The Wilcoxon rank-sum test produces similar results, except that it provides stronger statistical support for rejecting the null hypothesis that the difference in populism between the two sample distributions of 29 government and 35 opposition parties is due to random sampling ($p=0.0041$).

Figure B.7.a: Cumulative distributions of values on EU-skepticism and Populism for two pairs of samples (A & C= smaller sample; B & D=larger sample)



Note: Panel A and C compare distributions for 29 government parties and 35 opposition parties that changed government status from 2019 (smaller-sample comparison). Panel B and D compare distributions for 78 government parties and 191 opposition parties in 2023 (larger-sample comparison). Blue lines indicate parties in government in 2023; red lines indicate parties in opposition in 2023. Broken lines show the median value for respective party subsamples. For example, the broken blue line in Panel B is the median value of EU-skepticism for the 78 government parties in 2023, the broken red line in Panel B is the median value for the 191 opposition parties in 2023.